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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on the Market for Corporate Control. (December 2009) 
Hyunjung Kim, B.A., Yonsei University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Hwagyun Kim 
 
 This dissertation examines the relative importance of the information effect on 
corporate takeover in total takeover gains. It develops the measure of information effect 
based on the residual income valuation model with I/B/E/S analysts’ abnormal earnings 
forecast revisions. Empirical results show that the information effect and the synergy are 
estimated to be around 4% and 22% respectively in the 1,372 US samples during 1980-
2006. Furthermore, almost all of the synergy gains disappear as the deal is expected to be 
failed while the measured information effect remains afterwards. The evidence suggests 
that the information effect is more evident in the disciplinary (failed & high Tobin’s-q for 
bidders) or acquisitional (small capitalization & high book-to-market ratio for targets) 
takeovers while the synergy is greater in the successful tender-offer. Overall, the corporate 
takeover bid generates information gains up to 15% of total takeover gains. 
It also develops a theoretical model on the market for corporate control using the 
assumption that there exists management slack which does not contribute to shareholder 
wealth. This model provides explanations to several questions about corporate takeovers, 
which include the following: Why do managers prefer takeovers to other investment 
alternatives? When are they likely to occur? What are the sources of takeover gains? Do 
takeovers create value? Why are stock offers more common? Who gains from such 
transactions both in the long and short runs? Why do they occur in massive waves? Why is 
 iv
diversification often attractive to bidder managers? How does corporate governance play 
its role during this process? And why do managers often resist takeovers? The agency 
model this paper develops is compatible with existing theories on takeovers including 
neoclassical, inefficient stock market, and the free cash flow approach. Furthermore, it is 
consistent with most of the empirical evidence available. 
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CHAPTER Ⅰ 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Corporate control is defined as the right to determine the management of corporate 
resources and the rights to hire, fire, and set the compensation of top-level managers 
according to Fama and Jensen (1985). Therefore, the market for corporate control 
represents the executive labor market or the place where corporate takeover occurs. 
Theories and empirical evidence have been updated by many researchers, including Jensen 
and Ruback (1983), Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988), and Andrade et al.(2001), it is not 
sufficient to summarize the whole story in the market for corporate control including 
recent findings with neutral perspective. Chapter Ⅱ attempts to summarize the existing 
literature on the market for corporate control both in terms of theory and empirical 
evidence provided so far. This may help not only for the novice reader in this area to 
understand this issue, but also for others to take advantage of quick access to related 
literature by navigating more streamlined arguments so that they could initiate exploring 
research questions of interest to them.  
Empirical research on mergers and acquisitions successfully demonstrated that 
takeover generates gains, most of which accrue to target shareholders. These gains are 
often reported to be around 25% of revaluation of target share (e.g., Andrade et al. 2001). 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) suggest that this phenomenon can be mainly explained by 
two effects, synergy effect and information effect.   
 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Financial Economics. 
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Synergy effect means that corporate takeover is beneficial to the target firm’s 
shareholders as a result of takeover due to expected spillover gains. Meanwhile, 
information effect can be defined as “revaluation of target share which results from new 
arrival of information on ‘stand-alone’ target firm that is generated during the takeover 
deal process” following to Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983).  
In Chapter Ⅲ, I attempt to quantify the size of the information effect through 
examining total takeover gains. To this end, I develop an empirical procedure to quantify 
the information effect. Specifically I come up with a measure by combining an accounting 
based valuation approach to the model of abnormal accounting earnings forecast revision. 
According to Pound (1988), analysts forecast future earnings of a target firm after a 
takeover announcement, base upon the assumption that the target firm will continue to 
run as a stand-alone entity. 1 Following Pound (1988), I use analysts’ earnings forecast data 
to compute the intrinsic value measure of the target firm. The main advantage of the 
approach is that it allows us to quantify the information effect in terms of share value so 
that I can compare this directly with total share revaluation from actual variations in stock 
returns. In the below, I explain the empirical strategy in detail. 
Suppose that a takeover announcement is made and the target firm’s share price 
increases unexpectedly. Then, the information effect states that there exists much room for 
improvement of this target company even if actual merger does not occur. In order to 
measure the size of this effect, I need to have hypothetical values of target firms, which do 
                                                 
1 The Information hypothesis is rationalized in theory by Grossman and Hart (1981). They argue 
that takeover can be used as a tool to reduce the information asymmetry between target 
management and shareholders. If either the incumbent target managers inefficiently run the target 
resources or the target share is undervalued in the stock market for some reasons, shareholders can 
realize these hidden gains by exploiting the information, i.e. through acquisitions. Therefore, 
takeover generates information gains. 
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not include information about future takeover gains, yet still contain the information about 
ameliorating the state of the target company.  Alternatively, I can select the samples of 
target firms whose deal did not go through and not taken by other firms later to verify if 
their unexpected increases in share prices are maintained. The latter method is 
straightforward, though there is risk of obtaining a smaller number of samples. The 
drawback of the former approach is, of course, difficult to have such a measure. In this 
paper, I attempt to overcome this issue by taking both routes. Especially for the latter, I 
compute target firms’ values based on future earnings forecasts which are presumed to be 
orthogonal to synergistic gains.  
Using this measure, I answer to the following questions. First, what is the size of the 
information effect, if it exists? Second, is the information effect independent of the effect 
from synergistic motives? Third, what are the sources of the information effect? In 
response to the questions, the empirical findings can be summarized as follows: I find that 
stand-alone earnings forecasts of 1,372 targets during 1980-2006 are abnormally revised 
upward from the takeover announcement. This is consistent with Brous and Kini (1993) 
who suggest a method to measure the abnormal changes of future income correcting this 
upward bias. Following their method and applying the intrinsic value metric, 26% of share 
revaluation of the target is approximately decomposed into 3.5% of information effect and 
22% of synergy for total samples on their average values. Second, the magnitude of this 
information effect is validated in the 154 failed deals which are not subsequently taken 
over by other bidders. Similar to Bradley et al. (1983), positive share revaluation from the 
takeover announcement dramatically drops after the deal failure. However, contrary to 
their findings, it does not shrink to zero, but rather remains around a level of 9%, slightly 
over the level of the measured information effect (8.5%). This is robust in share 
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revaluation models and samples. From this evidence, I infer that the information effect 
should be appropriately quantified. Lastly, I find the evidence that the information effect is 
more likely driven by motives exploiting restructuring gains or undervaluation of target 
share, rather than by synergistic, overvaluation leveraged, or hubris/agency-cost oriented 
motives. The results show that the information effect is not affected by the marginal 
changes of variables representing the combined firm, but by the changes of variables 
representing the stand-alone target firm, e.g., target’s book-to-market value of equity. This 
evidence reinforces the validity of the measure of information effect. Overall, the empirical 
results suggest that takeovers generate information gains and it amounts to up to 15% of 
total takeover gains. 
In Chapter Ⅳ, I attempt to develop the model of corporate takeovers. In spite of 
successful research on the market for corporate control2, this market might still be 
described as an open sea full of unknown species. Although researchers have attempted to 
solve the puzzles presented by this market regularly with updated empirical evidence,3 the 
resulting information has still not led to a clearer picture. Specifically, about the issue of 
why mergers occur, research success has been more limited as Andrade et al. (2001) have 
mentioned. Furthermore, as Jensen and Ruback (1983) stated, it is difficult to identify the 
source of takeover gains even in the context of a single takeover. 
The objective of Chapter Ⅳ is not to develop a new theory of takeovers but rather 
to provide the basic theoretical tool to put together the current competing existing 
                                                 
2 Throughout the paper, the corporate control is defined as the rights to determine the management 
of corporate resources; the rights to hire, fire and set the compensation of top-level managers 
following to Fama and Jensen (1985).  
 
3 For the summary of empirical evidences, see Jensen and Ruback (1983), and also see Jarrell, 
Brickley, and Netter (1988), and Andrade et al. (2001). 
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hypotheses and the empirical evidence that remain as separate as the pieces of an unsolved 
puzzle.  This activity may help future readers and researchers to understand and draw the 
whole picture of the market for corporate control. The agent of interest in this paper is the 
top level manager and it is assumed that the typical agency problem, the conflict of 
interests of an agent occurs in any corporation with ownership and control that are 
separate. 
Recently, there has been emerging empirical research on corporate governance in 
takeovers initiated by a series of corporate scandals. Most research on this issue has 
focused on how to design the payoff of the agent in order to remove or reduce the agency 
problem, i.e., the optimal contracting. As far as the takeover is concerned, most studies 
focus on finding empirical evidence about how either a weak corporate governance system 
or an executive compensation scheme is related to a bidder’s valuation after a takeover 
offer.4 But, such research lacks the theoretical work needed to analyze the agent’s incentive 
as it occurs outside of the available empirical evidence.  This paper offers an attempt to 
model the takeover decision-making process in the person of the top level manager, the 
agent in whom such offers are initiated, negotiated, and finalized.  
Any manager’s incentive to increase managerial gains might include elements such 
as hubris, over-confidence, a desire for empire-building with increased resources as well as 
performance-aligned compensation. All of these could result in different outcomes of a 
takeover proposal. The magnitude of this agency cost on the part of the human 
                                                 
4 A lot of examples of merger failure have been reported both in academic papers and the media 
although it is not sure whether the failure is from the agency cost or not. See the Economist “How 
mergers go wrong?” for these examples of so called failed merger. Generous CEO compensation and 
perks also have been issued through newswires since the recent financial crisis and bail-out plans 
for banks. See Wall Street Journal This Morning, (4.27) on the examples of these generous CEO 
perks. 
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characteristics of the manager depends on the firm specific CEO controlling devices or 
corporate governance system, which includes the compensation scheme, the supervision of 
the board of directors, and any existing anti-takeover protection. Therefore, incorporating 
the features of this corporate governance into the agent’s decision making process would 
reinforce the validity of the model.  
Chapter Ⅳ provides the rationale as to how and why agency cost drives a takeover 
especially under a sound and effective corporate governance system. An inefficient market 
could motivate shareholders to take entrenched positions against corporate piracy by 
outside corporate raiders. The rational agent, the manager, may exploit this firm specific 
anti-takeover entrenchment as his or her protection against being disciplined by an outside 
hostile takeover, the last resort of CEO controlling devices. This allowed agency cost could 
be maximized as the resources controlled by the agent increase. Therefore, the takeover of 
other firms by stock exchange offer is the best opportunity to realize their agency costs.  
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CHAPTER Ⅱ 
THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 
 
1.  THE BIG PICTURE5 
 
Before introducing the literature, it is useful to review the components of the market for 
corporate control in a dynamic perspective to streamline the discussion. The whole time 
period around a takeover can be divided into four segments or stages: the stand-alone 
operation period, valuation or investigation period, deal offer and negotiation period, and 
the post-deal period. Appendix F graphically summarizes these dynamic features in the 
market for corporate control. 
 
1.1. Stand-alone operation period  
 
In this period the firm, as a stand-alone entity, performs three typical business activities 
such as operation, investment, and finance. Operation is the production activity by the firm, 
specifically the technology that is utilized by the manager. This technology is not only 
affected by the manager itself but also other stakeholders such as customers, employees, 
government, and other firms both in the same industry and the market as a whole. 6 
Investment is the capital accumulation process of acquiring additional capital in the capital 
                                                 
5 This section is for novice readers so that advanced readers may fairly skip this section.  
 
6 This may be the similar argument of the five forces analysis of industry or market structure 
suggested by Porter (1997). Five forces are the threat of substitute products, the threat of new 
competitors, the intensity of competitive rivalry, the bargaining power of customers, the bargaining 
power of suppliers. Government was added as a sixth force after.  
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goods market (in-house investment) or acquiring control of other firms’ capital in the 
market for corporate control (takeover). 7 Finance is the activity to finance both operations 
and investments. Three types of financing such as internal, external equity, and debt 
financing are typically undertaken. Note that factors surrounding the financial market may 
affect the financing of a takeover project. Every decision made by the manager is evaluated 
by controlling devices making up the firm’s own corporate governance system8 such as the 
compensation scheme, the board of directors, and the hostile takeover as a last resort. The 
main focus during this period is to examine the driving force behind the takeover by 
realizing the gains realized by a takeover as opposed to the firm remaining a stand-alone 
entity. This work is not merely theoretical, but also requires empirical support.  
 
1.2. Valuation or investigation period 
 
In this period, the bidder evaluates the takeover of potential targets. After such an 
investigation, the bidder has superior or equal information to evaluate the takeover 
candidates than the market as a whole.9 Takeover gains represent monetary or 
                                                 
7 Firm also performs security investment activity by owning other firm’s bond or equity less than 
controlling shares, normally 50%. Note that these types of investment, classified as ‘available-for-
sale (AFS)’ or ‘hold-to-maturity (HTM)’ security in the accounting principles, are not of our interest 
so to be excluded as an investment category throughout the paper. 
 
8 Jensen and Ruback (1983) define the corporate governance system as a repository of control rights 
of the acquired or current management team. Fama (1980) argue that the viability of the large 
corporation with diffuse security ownership is better explained in terms of a model where the 
primary disciplining of managers comes through managerial labor markets, both within and outside 
of the firm, with assistance from the panoply of internal and external monitoring devices that evolve 
to stimulate the ongoing efficiency of the corporate form, and with the market for outside takeovers 
providing discipline of last resort. 
 
9 This assumption is plausible from the fact that a lot of firms have “M&A” department devoted 
entirely to discovering and analyzing acquisition candidates. During this investigation period, the 
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nonmonetary gains from the takeover transaction to any stakeholders such as 
shareholders, debt holders, employees, and managers in both the bidder and target firm 
and even the investment banks providing the financial advising or underwriting services. 
These gains may be summarized as synergy, restructuring gain, valuation gain, and 
managerial gain (S-R-V-M). First, synergy could be obtained from the non-financial side by 
increasing product efficiency or by reducing investment overlap such as R&D or other 
capital expenditure. Synergy could also be derived from the financial side by generating tax 
benefits for the combined entity or by lowering its cost of equity. This type of takeover can 
be called a synergistic takeover. Another kind of takeover is achieved through 
restructuring gain, which is realized by disciplining inefficient management of the target 
through relatively efficient bidder management. This type of takeover is often called a 
disciplinary or allocational takeover. The third gain is the valuation one, which is 
achievable by exchanging the bidder firm’s capital with that of the relatively undervalued 
target firm. In this scenario, taking-over other firm’s capital means abandoning the 
opportunity for in-house capital investment at the same time. Therefore, if the bidder 
firm’s capital is overvalued in the market relative to the fundamental value then the simple 
strategy of purchasing relatively undervalued target capital with the funds for in-house 
capital investment generates gains for the bidder. Note that it is hard to differentiate the 
restructuring gain from the valuation gain empirically since the undervaluation can be a 
result of inefficient management. This paper separates these two gains for conceptual 
purposes by assuming market efficiency in calculating the restructuring gain. Lastly, the 
managerial gain is achieved by realizing the manager’s hubris or agency cost incentive. 
                                                                                                                                                
acquirer may get private information from the target candidate firm, or collect it by themselves. (see 
Grinblatt and Titman (2002)) 
 10
Takeovers also entail physical relocation costs, legal and financial advising costs, or the 
cost to break through any anti-takeover defense in the case of a hostile mood. The main 
focus during this period is on empirically confirming or quantifying these four gains.  
 
1.3. Deal period 
 
The deal period begins with the announcement of the takeover offer and ends with deal 
closure or abandonment by any party. Most information about the takeover is released to 
the public during this period. This information is divided into three categories, that 
involving the deal itself, the firm, and the manager. First, the deal information includes the 
premium10 offered, deal size (transaction value divided by bidder capitalization), form of 
the deal (tender offer vs. merger), method of payment (cash, stock or hybrid), level of 
hostility (hostile vs. friendly), level of focus (diversification vs. focused), existence of any 
competing bidder, and the final deal outcome (success vs. failure). The firm information 
includes all available financial or accounting information of the target and the bidder such 
as capitalization, book-to-market ratio, liquidity, leverage, Tobin’s-q, or previous operating 
cash flow of the firm.  Lastly, the CEO information includes biographical characteristics 
such as age and gender, past history of takeover, current compensation scheme, changes in 
holdings in equity, stock options, and side-payment arrangement from the takeover deal, 
including golden parachute,  additional bonuses, or the promise of future job security. The 
main focus in this period is examining the market reaction to the takeover offer and how it 
varies across the firm according to this information.  
                                                 
10 In practice, the premium is calculated as the offered price divided by the benchmark pre-offer 
price of the target share. This benchmark can be one or two days, four weeks, or three months 
before the offer date. 
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1.4. Post-deal period 
 
This period begins from the deal outcome of success or failure. Deal success creates the 
combined entity. Deal failure may initiate the subsequent offer by competing bidders or 
restructuring of the target firm because of some information obtained during the deal 
period. Managers both in the target and the bidder firms are expected to be disciplined by 
the internal and external controlling devices mentioned in the stand-alone period. Some 
may lose their jobs or others keep them depending on the subsequent restructuring of the 
firm. Some managers will attempt a management buyout (MBO) after the failure to secure 
their jobs or to exploit the future value increase of the firm. The main focus during this 
period is to examine empirically the long term performance of the combined firm in order 
to confirm the theoretically developed motivations behind the deal. Another area of 
research interest is to examine the market response to the failed deal in order to infer the 
rationale behind the failure.   
 The successful theory should be consistent with explaining the empirical evidence 
obtained through the four periods, from the stand-alone to post-deal periods. Therefore, 
the theory has to connect the driving force behind the takeover with the subsequent 
empirical evidence. In this context, identifying the driving force is the starting point, and 
this force is to what the theory is supposed to contribute the most.   
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2. WHAT DRIVES TAKEOVER 
 
2.1. Neoclassical approach 
This approach argues that shifts in industry structure11 cause a takeover. Little theoretical 
work has been done on this issue to the author’s knowledge. Empirically, Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) examine takeovers in 51 industries during 1980s and find that the total 
takeover and restructuring activities in an industry is positively associated with industry 
shocks such as deregulation, the volatility of energy prices, foreign competition12, and 
financing innovation.13 Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) confirm this argument by 
providing similar evidence using merger samples during the 1990s. This approach argues 
that synergy is the main motivator of takeover gains since industry shocks require firms to 
create additional value through takeovers in order to survive the shocks. Therefore, 
friendly focused mergers are expected to emerge from this kind of synergistic motive.  Such 
deals are also likely to succeed since both parties would want the deal and positive post 
merger performance is expected under this approach.   
 
 
                                                 
11 According to Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), the structure of an industry, including the number and 
size of firms, is a function of factors such as technology, government policy, and demand and supply 
conditions and major changes, or shocks, in any of these factors which affect the industry structure 
cause shifts in industry structure. 
 
12 The effect of the volatility of energy prices is assumed to be greater as the energy dependence of 
the industry increases. The effect of foreign competition measured by changes in import penetration 
ratio which is the ratio of imports divided by new supply, however, shows weak statistical 
significance.   
 
13 For example, the emergence of the high-yield (junk) bond market enables to finance a number of 
acquisitions in 1980s. Long and Malitz (1985) document that the fraction of debt in capital structure 
is inversely related to R&D/sales at the industry level. 
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2.2. Q-theory of takeover 
 
Grossman & Hart (1981)argue that a takeover can be initiated to realize the potential 
future restructuring opportunity of the target firm. In other words, the target firm is 
inefficiently managed for some reason at the time of the takeover announcement. 
Therefore, just the replacement of the incumbent management by new management may 
increase the value of the firm (this has also been called the kick in the pants hypothesis). In 
this model, the takeover can be seen as a means of disciplining the current inept 
management.14 This type of takeover often entails some restructuring activity, such as 
employee layoffs and salary cuts of inefficient organizations. This model is similar to the 
synergistic one in the sense that it both does not harm any part of the shareholders, and it 
increases the wealth of target shareholders or both parties. Grossman & Hart call this kind 
of takeover “Allocational.” Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) modeled this hypothesis using 
Tobin’s Q theory. Using this model, they find that a firm’s takeover investment responds to 
its Q, the ratio of market value to the replacement cost of capital, more than its direct 
investment does, probably because the takeover investment is a high fixed cost and a low 
marginal adjustment cost activity. They also find that the merger waves of the 1900s and 
the 1920s, 1980s, and 1990s were a response to profitable reallocation opportunities15, but 
the 1960s wave was probably caused by something else. Since this type of takeover seeks 
to achieve restructuring gain, which requires replacement of the management, it is more 
                                                 
14 This kind of acquisitions are often structured as leveraged buyouts (LBOs) where an individual or 
a group often led by a firm’s own management arranges to buy a public firm with the fund financed 
mainly with debt and take it private. 
 
15 They estimate the HP filtered series of “dispersion of Tobin’s Q”, which is the difference between 
the market value of asset and the replacement cost of the asset and find that each merger wave but 
for that of 1960s is proceeded by a rise in this dispersion.   
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likely to take the form of a hostile cash tender offer, which has a higher probability of deal 
failure due to management resistance.  Empirically, many researchers report the empirical 
evidence that the bidder has a higher Q than the target does (e.g.,  Servaes 1991; Andrade 
et al. 2001). 
 
2.3. Inefficient market approach 
 
Shleifer & Vishny (2003) present a theoretical model of stock-market-driven acquisitions. 
They argue that takeovers may be motivated by exploiting the overvaluation of the bidding 
firm’s stock by acquiring relatively undervalued target stock. They call this kind of 
takeovers “stock-market-driven (SMD)” acquisitions. This approach is similar to the Q-
theory of takeover (Q) in the sense that both are seeking to exploit the undervaluation of 
the target. However, they are different in four important aspects. First, the SMD acquisition 
transfers wealth from target shareholders to acquirer shareholders while the Q takeover is 
a wealth-creating deal through restructuring. Second, gains from the SMD takeover are 
combinational, i.e., only realizable if the bid succeeds, while gains from the Q takeover can 
be achieved even if the target remains a stand-alone entity. Third, SMD assumes market 
inefficiency while the Q approach does not necessarily assume that. Lastly, stock is 
preferred as a payment in an SMD acquisition while cash is preferred in a Q acquisition. 
 Recently, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) extend this argument of over-valuation into 
stock market to explain merger waves. They argue that waves of cash and stock purchases 
for takeovers could be rationally driven by periods of over- and undervaluation of the stock 
market. Although much empirical evidence supports this approach, it is hard to distinguish 
SMD acquisition from Q acquisition empirically since the proxy of misvaluation, e.g., book-
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to-market of equity, is closely correlated with the Q measure. This is one of the major 
challenges in empirical research.  
 
2.4. Managerial incentive approach 
 
This approach argues that takeovers might be motivated by acquirer managers who have 
conflicts of interest with shareholders. As a result, such acquiring managers frequently 
overpay in acquiring the target firm, and the overpayment drives the upward revaluation 
of the target shares. This approach can be divided into two categories, such as hubris and 
agency cost, according to whether the takeover motive of the manager is aligned with the 
shareholder’s interests. The hubris hypothesis is suggested by Roll (1986). He argues that 
managers of bidding firms might be affected by hubris so that they simply pay too much for 
their targets. Malmendier & Tate (2005) support his idea by providing empirical evidence 
showing that overconfident managers overestimate the returns on their investment 
projects and view external funds as unduly costly so that they do not decrease the equity 
holdings after the takeover. Luo (2005) argues that the insider, the manager, may have less 
information on the firm’s prospects than outsiders, or the market, and this lack of 
information may generate the wrong decision.  
 The agency cost hypothesis is developed by Jensen (1986). He argues that because 
of free cash flow16 incentives for managers, they tend to maximize the size of resources in 
control, empire-building, which is explicitly related to their compensation. Given this 
scenario, corporate acquisitions are one way that managers spend cash instead of paying it 
                                                 
16 Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net 
present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital (Jensen 1986). 
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out to shareholders. Empirically, this hypothesis is supported by the negative drift in the 
acquiring firm’s stock price following a merger announcement. This negative movement 
might imply that the takeover gains could be overstated or nonexistent (as in a non-value 
creating deal). Empirical studies suggest many symptoms signaling the hubris/agency-cost 
oriented mergers, including diversification (e.g., Morck et al. 1990; Lang & Stulz 1994; 
Villalonga 2004); large size bidders (Moeller et al. 2004);  glamour acquirer (Rau & 
Vermaelen 1998); cash rich bidders (Harford 1999); and low leveraged bidders (Maloney 
et al. 1993). Recently, Cai & Vijh (2007) find more explicit evidence of agency cost in that 
the management compensation is an important motive behind corporate acquisitions.17 
This evidence related with first specific corporate governance are discussed in a latter 
section of this paper in detail. 
 
3. WEALTH IMPLICATION 
 
3.1 Who is the winner?   
 
Overall, the target shareholders seem to gain in a takeover while the bidder shareholders 
seem not to gain. Empirical results on stock market reactions varies among researchers 
according to their takeover samples with different periods and deal characteristics (see 
Roll (1986); Jensen and Ruback(1983); Andrade et al. (2001)). On the share revaluation of 
                                                 
17 They examine the stock and option holdings of target and acquirer CEOs during 1993 to 2001, and 
find that both acquiring and target firm CEOs might be benefited from acquisitions whether the 
deals are successfully closing or not. They find that acquisitions enable target CEOs to remove 
liquidity restriction on stock and option holdings and also enable acquirer CEOs to improve the 
long-term value of overvalued holdings. For more discussions about benefits received by target chief 
executive officers and job turnovers of target CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions, see 
Hartzell et al. (2004). 
 17
the target firm, there is no dispute on the direction revaluation even though its size varies. 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) report about 16 to 30 percent in tender offers and only about 
10% in negotiated merger offers, while Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988) report 53% in 
the 1980s. Andrade et al (2001) report 16% with 3,688 merger samples from 1973 to 
1988. See Table 1 for the summarized empirical results that have been provided so far.  
 In the case of bidders, however, there is no consensus, either in the direction of 
revaluation or its magnitude. Loughran and Vijh (1997) find that after a size and book-to-
market adjustment, tender offers result in positive abnormal bidder returns of 43% in the 
five years following the merger. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find that acquirers experience 
long-run excess returns of 8.5% in the three years following the merger using 316 tender 
offer samples between 1980 and 1991. Jarrell and Poulson (1987) report significant 5% 
abnormal returns in 1960 tender offers while an insignificant 1% loss in the 1980s. 
Meanwhile, Travlos (1987) reports negative 1.47% in stock offers, and 0.24% in US cash 
offers. Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) find similar results in stock offers and 2.0% in US 
cash and 0.7% in UK cash offer samples. Andrade et al (2001) report negative 0.7% with 
3,688 merger samples from 1973 to 1988.  
 Furthermore, some methodological problems have been reported with using 
bidder returns. First, Roll (1986) argues that there exists contaminating information, that 
is, information about the bidder rather than the bid itself. Second, Malatesta (1983) and 
Schipper and Thompson (1983) point out that the present value of the expected benefits of 
a bidder’s acquisition program is incorporated into the share price when the acquisition 
program is announced or becomes apparent in the market. Some takeover announcements 
may not be surprising to the market if they are anticipated. The current market price may 
already incorporate the probability of the successful takeover, prior capitalization effect. 
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Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1983) focus on the abnormal returns associated with the first 
four bids after the initiation of a merger program, arguing that the earlier bids in a merger 
program should contain more information about the profitability of the program than later 
bids. The third problem is one of measurement in that takeover gains may be only a small 
part of a bidder’s stock price, and a relatively large bidder has high volatility of return, 
which eludes takeover gains (Asquith et al. 1983).  Lastly, the performance extrapolation 
hypothesis argues that the market wrongly extrapolates the past performance of the 
bidder in determining the combined value of the two firms.  
 
3.2. Does the takeover create value? 
 
3.2.1. Stock returns 
Combined firms’ stock returns show mixed results. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford report 
statistically significant 1.8% returns for combined firm shares with a short daily event 
window of [-1,+1], while they report insignificant 1.9% returns with longer event windows  
of [-20, close]. Measuring total dollar gains also yields mixed results.18  Some studies 
examine post-takeover long-term stock performances. For example, Andrade et al. (2001) 
reports negative 1.4% returns with value weighted abnormal returns for three years after 
the merger. However, much existing literature has raised methodological concerns about 
long-term event studies using the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as a measure of share 
revaluation (see Barber & Lyon 1997; Kothari & Warner 1997; Andrade et al. 2001). Such 
                                                 
18 Malatesta (1983) reports statistically significant $32.4 million increase in terms of combined 
equity value on average from their 30 successful merger samples while Bradley, Desai, and Kim 
(1982) report statistically insignificant $17.2 million with their 162 tender-offer samples. Later, 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) report 7.4 percent ($117 million in 1984 dollars) gain in 236 
successful tender offers which is statistically significant. 
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researchers are concerned that this CAR measure is not robust enough in the benchmark 
return estimation under some model assumptions.  
3.2.2. Post-takeover accounting performance 
Some research successfully reports significantly positive operating performance after a 
takeover, which indicates that such a takeover is a positive NPV project. Healy, Palepu, and 
Ruback (1992) examine post-acquisition performance for the 50 largest U.S. mergers 
between 1979 and 1984, and they find statistically significant increases in abnormal 
industry-adjusted post-merger operating cash flow returns. Their findings are also 
confirmed by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001). Healy et al. also find that this 
performance improvement is particularly strong for firms with highly overlapping 
businesses, and mergers do not lead to cuts in long-term capital or R&D investments. This 
latter finding is inconsistent with Devos et al. (2009), who find that most of takeover gains 
are from cutbacks in investment.  
 
4. SOURCES OF TAKEOVER GAINS 
 
Empirical studies about the sources of takeover gains have focused on examining the 
relative importance between synergy and information effects among four takeover gains 
developed in theory. The information effect represents the sum of the restructuring gain 
and valuation gain since these are hard to identify empirically as mentioned above. 
However, there is no consensus on this issue yet. Moreover, there is little empirical 
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research to identify the source of agency cost or measure it directly in spite of the negative 
drift in bidder abnormal returns.19  
 
4.1 Synergy hypothesis 
 
This hypothesis argues that the most takeover gains result from synergy. Influential 
research by Bradley et al. (1983) provides the empirical evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis. Before them, Dodd and Ruback (1977) first examined20 84 unsuccessful 
takeovers and found that significantly positive abnormal returns of 18.96 percent in the 
tender offer month are persistent for five years after the offer. This result seems to be 
evidence that effects of synergy are not substantial. However, Bradley et al. argue that the 
seemingly permanent positive abnormal returns may be due to the anticipation of a future, 
higher-valued bid. If the target shareholders believe that the present value of this expected 
future bid exceeds the value of an outstanding offer, they will not accept the existing tender 
offer, which results in a takeover failure. Given this reasoning, they divided their sample of 
unsuccessful tender offers into two sub-samples: firms subsequently taken by a competing 
bidder within five years from the initial offer and those  not taken for the same period. 
They find that the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the subsequently not-taken 
sample goes back to its pre-announcement level on average right after the offer is 
                                                 
19 Besides of this negative drift, some researcher suggests the positive bidder return on the 
announcement of bid cancellation as an evidence of agency cost takeover. This is also aligned with 
the argument by Dodd (1980) who mentioned that the deal termination party is important.  
 
20 Among lots of empirical literature on information effect, we consider Dodd & Ruback (1977) as a 
foundation for two reasons. First, as an event date they use the takeover announcement date instead 
of effective date of acquisitions. This appropriately enables us to capture the effect of information 
leakage before the final acquisition. Second, they consider an unsuccessful takeover sample as well 
as a successful one in their analysis. This dichotomy of whole sample has an important role to test 
the information hypotheses. 
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withdrawn, while CAR for subsequently taken samples remain consistent. These results are 
consistent with the synergy hypothesis because for the subsequently not-taken target 
firms, synergistic benefits may not be utilized afterwards.  
 Their findings facilitate the subsequent studies that attempt to identify the detailed 
source of synergy. The following three major sources are provided as the specific source of 
synergy gain: increased productive efficiency (Healy et al. 1992; Houston et al. 2001); 
obtaining monopolistic market power entailing monopolistic rent (Kim & Singal 1993; 
Sapienza 2002)21; and exploiting tax benefits (Jensen & Ruback 1983; Hayn 1989). 
Recently, Devos et al. (2009) successfully measured synergistic gains using Value Line 
analyst forecasts. They estimate that the average synergy gains are 10.3% of the combined 
equity value of a merging firm, which is calculated in terms of the cash flow return of a 
combined firm, and again this is further broken down into operating (8.38%) and financial 
(1.64%) synergies. They find that most of this operating synergy is from cutbacks in 
investment. Financial synergy from takeovers that is achievable by lowering the combined 
firm’s cost of capital22 or by providing various tax gains23 to the acquiring firm is relatively 
small in their findings.  
 
                                                 
21 Ellert (1976) label this a ‘monopolistic hypothesis’ and differentiate with synergy hypothesis. 
Both of these monopolistic and productive efficiency hypotheses have been long discussed (See 
Lintner 1971; Mandelker 1974). However, empirical evidences show mixed signals for both kinds of 
synergy hypotheses. Market power(competition) does not create merger gains (Jensen & Ruback 
1983). 
 
22 Most of takeovers during the 1960s and 1970s in the United States are conglomerate mergers 
which are motivated by this kind of financial synergies. Since diversification reduces the risk of 
bankruptcy for any given level of debt, it can increase the amount of debt in the firm’s optimal 
capital structure which lower the firm’s cost of capital (Grinblatt & Titman 2002).  
 
23 There is also the counter-evidence against the tax benefit. The implementation of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 is known to discourage firms to acquire other firms (Grinblatt & Titman 2002). 
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4.2. Information hypothesis 
 
This hypothesis argues that the so-called information effect is the main source of takeover 
gains. The information effect is defined as the “revaluation of target share which results 
from new arrival of information on ‘stand-alone’ target firm that is generated during the 
takeover deal process.” 24 Similar to Dodd and Ruback (1977), Safieddine and Titman 
(1999) also find a 5.14% decline in the target share on the termination date for 573 
unsuccessful takeover attempts from 1982 to 1991.25 They also found that many of these 
firms implemented restructuring strategies that were similar to the strategies that would 
have been imposed by their hostile suitors. This result may be evidence of the substantial 
amount of information effect.  
 Some researchers successfully provide evidence of the information hypothesis by 
introducing security analysts’ accounting forecasts. Under this approach, researchers 
examine abnormal security analysts’ earnings forecast revisions around the time of the 
takeover announcement. They assume that financial analysts continue to forecast earnings 
per share of the target firm in terms of its stand-alone value in spite of the takeover bid 
                                                 
24 This definition is followed by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983). The Information hypothesis is 
rationalized in theory by Grossman and Hart (1981). They argue that takeover can be used as a tool 
to reduce the information asymmetry between target management and shareholders. If either the 
incumbent target managers inefficiently run the target resources or the target share is undervalued 
in the stock market for some reasons, shareholders can realize these hidden gains by exploiting the 
information, i.e. through acquisitions. Therefore, takeover generates information gains. 
 
25 Perhaps, the threat of additional takeover attempts provides management with the incentives to 
cut wasteful spending and to take other steps that create value for their shareholders (Grinblatt and 
Titan, 2002) 
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announcement in order to provide investors with appropriate valuation information.26 
Therefore, if significantly positive earnings forecast revisions are observed, this means 
some kind of stand-alone revaluation, i.e. information effect, occurs upon announcement of 
takeover news. At the beginning, Pound (1988) fails to find this evidence with his or her 94 
I/B/E/S enlisted firms targeted between 1979 and 1984. However, Brous & Kini (1993) 
find significantly positive forecast revisions using 307 tender offers between 1977 and 
1988 after adjusting optimism bias and serial correlations in analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Sudarsanam et al. (2002) confirm this finding with U.K. tender offer samples using the 
same methodology as Brous & Kini.  
 
5. CROSS-SECTIONAL EVIDENCE 
 
5.1. Deal characteristics 
 
Both the bidder and target return are negatively associated with stock offers. Travlos 
(1987) finds that stock exchange bidding firms have significantly negative abnormal 
returns at the announcement period while cash-financing bidding firms have a normal rate 
of return at the same time. This finding is consistent with the signaling hypothesis, which 
implies that stock financing conveys the negative information that the bidding firm is 
overvalued. He also argues that tender offers or hostile takeovers usually have the same 
                                                 
26 Pound (1988) support this stand-alone forecasting argument from analysts’ retail reports as well 
as from his own survey of financial analysts who forecast future earnings per share for the firm they 
cover.   
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empirical implications as cash offers27. This contention is consistent with an argument that 
cash-only deals are usually value creating deals while stock payments may signal that the 
bidder has little wealth-creating investment opportunity or that a bidder is inefficiently 
managed (Myers & Majluf 1984). Uncertainty about the target’s value tends to lead firms to 
make stock offers rather than cash offers (Eckbo et al. 1990).28 Meanwhile, premiums in 
stock offers are much lower than those in cash offers (Travlos 1987; Franks et al. 1988).29 
 Asquith et al. (1983) argue that synergistic takeovers are more likely to succeed 
since these takeovers produce gains for the shareholders of both the acquirer and target. In 
contrast, disciplinary takeovers are more likely to fail. Non-agency cost bidders will 
abandon the bid as the premium increases. This tendency may result in positive bidders’ 
returning on the announcement of bid cancellation. 
 A disciplinary takeover, by definition, is more likely to be resisted by the target 
manager, i.e., be perceived as more hostile. Empirical studies report greater target return 
in hostile takeovers. The takeover resistance increasing the takeover cost may truncate the 
low NPV offer. This may result in higher abnormal returns than in the other case, 
Truncation hypothesis. In the same token as deal success, a hostile attitude often results in 
bid failure. A lower market return rate upon bid announcement in a failed merger is 
                                                 
27 Tender offers are usually cash offers and mergers are usually common stock exchange offers. And 
cash offers that are typically associated with hostile takeovers (due to quicker registration) and, 
thus, higher premiums have the non-negative bidder returns, while generally friendly exchange 
offers that typically have lower premiums are associated with negative returns (Travlos 1987) 
 
28 Stock offers have the advantage that the acquiring firm ultimately pays less for the bad 
acquisitions since the acquirer’s stock price is likely to perform worse after making a bad 
acquisition. 
 
29 Cash offer has tax advantage of the tax basis step-up for depreciation since it allows for the firm to 
write up the tax basis of the acquired firm’s asset by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982. However since the Tax Reform Act of 1986 any increase in the value of depreciable assets of 
the acquired firm from electing the asset write-up has been taxed.  
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associated with the lower probability of success resulting from management resistance. 
Some researchers find that anti-takeover resistance destroys the wealth of the bidder 
shareholder by reducing the possibility of the takeover’s success while it increases the 
rival’s stock price by protecting the rival producer (Ellert 1976; Eckbo et al. 1990). While 
many researchers suggest hostility as a symptom of a disciplinary motive (Morck et al. 
1988; Mitchell & Lehn 1990), Bhagat et al. (2005) argue that hostility is a symptom of 
agency costs.  
 Normally a tender offer, which is associated with a hostile cash offer, has greater 
premiums than a friendly merger offer. Grossman and Hart (1980)(1980) develop the free-
rider problem30 that exists in the case of tender offers.  
 Bid competition or the existence of potential bidders is positively associated with a 
greater premium. This is from the fact that the bidding process is like the auction (Roll, 
1986). Bradley (1980) also argues that competition reduces the probability of corporate 
raiding or piracy.  
 Empirical evidence on diversification are mixed.  On the one hand, some argue that 
diversification is a way of overcoming industry shock by seeking targets in other industries 
having positive NPV projects. They also argue that this could be the rational response to 
poor growth opportunity or technological shock (see Lewellen 1971; Campa & Kedia 2002; 
                                                 
30 There are several ways to solve this problem in practice. First, the bidder may attempt to buy 
target shares secretly on the open market. However, U.S. regulation requires purchasers to file a 13D 
report to the Securities and Exchange Commission on their intentions when their holdings reach 5% 
shares of outstanding share. Second, risk arbitrageurs might accumulate possible target shares with 
substantial amount enough to tender the offer. Third, if the bidder can transfer the wealth from the 
target to its own subsidiary by selling attractive price, minority shareholders will accept the tender. 
Fourth, two-tiered offer, in which second tier offer price is lower than the first one, might force the 
minority shareholder to sell their shares. However, in these days many firms have so called ‘fair 
price amendments’ in their corporate charters which require the second-tier price to be equal to the 
first one. For more details, see Grinblatt and Titman (2002). 
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Graham et al. 2002; Villalonga 2004)). Or diversification may have financial synergy in the 
form of the one-time tax credit. On the other hand, there are evidence that this 
conglomeration decreases the value of the combined firm, i.e., resembles an agency cost 
oriented takeover.31  
 
5.2. Firm fundamentals 
 
Moeller et al (2004) find that large acquirers tend to pay more than small ones, and they 
infer that this might represent the agency cost (size effect). Harford (1999) argues that a 
more cash rich acquirer is likely to raise the agency cost involved takeover bid (liquidity 
effect). He found that cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions which are 
value decreasing, more frequently diversifying acquisitions. Furthermore, these 
acquisitions tend to be followed by abnormal declines in operating performance. Maloney 
et al. (1993) find that a highly leveraged firm is less likely to make agency cost oriented 
investment decisions since it has less resources to waste on unprofitable mergers and 
acquisitions (leverage effect). Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) find that bad bidders with 
low Tobin’s-Q and large free cash flows offer takeover bids that result in negative stock 
market reactions upon the takeover announcement. Schwert (2000) documents the lower 
valuations of targets of hostile takeovers than those of average targets, whereas Andrade et 
al. (2001) show that in 66% of the mergers between 1973 and 1998, the acquirer’s Q 
exceeded the target’s Q. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) show that value bidders with high 
book-to-market of equity outperform glamour bidders in the three years after the 
                                                 
31 This evidence is supported by several studies (Morck et al. 1990; Lang & Stulz 1994; Graham et al. 
2002; Villalonga 2004).  
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completion of the merger, and that glamour bidders pay more frequently with stock than 
do value bidders. Growth firms which have stable economic histories and substantial free 
cash flows with few growth opportunities are more likely to be over-valued firms. They are 
less likely to have profitable projects or more likely to have excess capacity so that they 
might attempt agency cost-oriented takeovers (Jensen 1986)32  
 
5.3. Corporate governance characteristics 
 
Empirical research in corporate finance has provided evidence that strong corporate 
governance systems are positively associated with higher firm value. The influential 
research of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) finds that firms with stronger shareholder 
rights had higher firm values, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital 
expenditures, and fewer corporate acquisitions. Bebchuck and Cohen (2009a) find that 
management entrenchments represented as six provisions in the IRRC universe, e.g. 
staggered boards, are associated with a reduction in firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
La Porta et al. (2002) show that firm value is positively associated with the rights of 
minority shareholders. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) find that firms that are less 
compliant with the provisions of rules such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and various 
amendments to the U.S. stock exchanges’ regulations which were motivated by the 2001-
2002 corporate scandals earn positive abnormal returns compared to firms that are more 
compliant when these rules are announced.  
5.3.1. CEO compensation 
                                                 
32 Jensen provide the empirical evidence in the oil industry, however, he predicts that stock 
exchange deals are likely to be initiated by bidders with small or no free cash flows.  
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Empirical studies provide evidence that the executive compensation arrangement seems to 
fail in reducing the agency cost. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that the design of this 
compensation would also be partly a product of this agency problem. They argue that the 
greater power of managers entails greater executive compensation and provide the various 
reasons why the board of directors frequently fails to control the CEO.33 CEOs of firms with 
stronger takeover protections, such as a staggered board, get pay packages, e.g. golden 
parachutes, that are both larger and less sensitive to performance, and their 
compensations are camouflaged by stealth compensation34 or outside compensation 
consultants. Recently, Cornett et al. (2008) find that stock option compensation is 
positively correlated with earnings management, and once the likely impact of earnings 
management is removed from profitability estimates, the relation between performance 
and option compensation disappears. Some researchers find that executives have 
incentives to hedge the risks of the equity based option awards by selling previously 
owned shares, and this hedging incentive is more evident in managers with higher levels of 
ownership (Lambert & Larcker 1985; Ofek & Yermack 2000). In the case of corporate 
takeover, however, there is a strong positive relation between acquiring managers' equity-
based compensation (EBC) and stock price performance around and following acquisition 
announcements (Mehran 1995). Datta et al. (2001) report that compared to low EBC 
managers, high EBC managers pay lower acquisition premiums and acquire targets with 
higher growth opportunities. Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) report that leveraged buyout 
                                                 
33 Directors might care about the future re-nomination or multi-nomination which usually 
influenced by the current CEO. They usually have limited information on the executive 
compensation which is so complicated that it is often justified by outside compensation consultants 
who are in favor of current CEO. Furthermore they tend to approve gratuitous farewell payment 
package with sympathy to leaving CEOs. 
 
34 For example, pension plans, deferred compensation, postretirement perks, consulting contracts, 
and executive loans could be used as stealth compensation. 
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activity, which was often part of, or in response to, hostile offers, constituted close to 2 
percent of the stock market value in the late 1980s, but was virtually nonexistent in the 
1990s. They argue that hostile takeovers and LBOs largely disappeared in the 1990s 
because of, at least in the United States, a development of management incentive 
mechanisms such as stock options.  
 Hartzell et al, (2004) find that side payments negotiated by target CEOs such as golden 
parachutes or special cash arrangements are positively associated with prior excess 
payments and negatively associated with takeover premiums and the likelihood that the 
target CEO becomes an executive of the acquiring company. They also find that target CEOs 
experience relatively higher job turnover rates several years after the takeover 
announcement. 
5.3.2. Board of directors 
Empirical study also finds that a weak board of directors is associated with agency-cost 
oriented takeovers. Core et al. (1999) find that executive compensation is positively 
correlated with relatively weak or ineffectual boards and negatively correlated with the 
presence of a large number of outside shareholders and a larger concentration of 
institutional shareholders. Bebchuk, Coates, and Subramanian (2002) find that staggered 
boards are a key determinant for whether a target receiving a hostile bid will remain 
independent.   
5.3.3. Anti-takeover protection 
Lastly, empirical evidence shows that anti-takeover protections are associated with higher 
premium and lower bidder returns. Anti-takeover protections have benefits such as 
increased bargaining power to increase any takeover premium as well as costs such as 
agency cost by managers to run the firm inefficiently. Masulis et al. (2007) find that 
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acquirers with more anti-takeover provisions and overlapping positions of the CEO and 
chairperson of the board experience significantly lower announcement period abnormal 
returns. Jarrell and Poulson (Jarrell & Poulsen 1987) find that anti-takeover amendments, 
on average, lead to negative changes in the stock price of the target but positive ones when 
an institutional block holder exists. Comment and Schwert (1995) find that defensive 
mechanisms such as a poison pill might increase the bargaining power of the target, 
resulting in higher premiums instead of deterring the deal. However, it is still an open 
question as to whether this increased bargaining power also increases the side payment to 
target managers as well as increases the premium. Jarrell and Bradley (1980) find that the 
1968 Williams Act increased takeover premiums significantly while it decreased the 
bidder’s returns so as to reduce the volume and productivity of cash takeovers. This result 
is mainly due to the takeover act forcing greater disclosure delays in the execution of 
takeovers so that it dilutes the bidder’s information gain of how to accomplish valuable 
corporate combinations. Schipper and Thompson (1983) shows that abnormal bidder 
returns were negative at the time of four takeover regulatory changes, such as the 
Accounting Principle Board Opinions 16 and 17, the 1969 Tax Reform Act, the 1968 
Williams Amendment, and its 1970 extension. This result may indicate that these takeover 
regulations may increase the bargaining power of the target or truncate low profitability 
takeovers. 
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6. TIME SERIES EVIDENCE 
 
6.1. Increasing takeover activity 
 
There has been an observed trend of increasing corporate takeover activity. As Andrade et 
al. (2001) stated, the dollar value of transactions for mergers and acquisitions has 
increased and gets a significant portion of this increase in the total transaction cost in the 
stock market. This increase coincides with the development of the modern corporation in 
which ownership and controlling rights are separated. Although there is no detailed 
empirical analysis on this issue yet, this trend may indicate that a greater portion of the 
overall takeover activities is the agency cost oriented one.  
 
6.2. Takeover waves 
 
Successful theory also should explain takeover waves, in which takeover activity occurs in 
clusters, both in terms of time and industry. However, there is not enough evidence 
available about this issue. Historically, four waves have been observed and categorized as 
follows: the oligopoly wave of the 1920s, the conglomerate wave of the 1960s, the hostile 
cash tender-offer wave of the 1980s, and the recent friendly stock exchange wave of the 
1990s, although there is no agreement on the driving forces behind the two most recent 
waves.  
 All of the four approaches to the driving force of takeovers support the wave 
phenomenon. The neoclassical approach argues that industry-wide shocks such as 
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deregulation35 and technology innovation drive waves (Mitchell & Mulherin 1996; Andrade 
et al. 2001). Business cycle factors such as recessions36 or credit crunch may explain 
takeover waves, especially in terms of time clustering. Harford (2005) argues that this 
macro-level liquidity component causes industry merger waves to cluster in time even if 
industry shocks do not.  
 The Q-approach provides empirical evidence that takeover waves are followed by 
dispersion of Tobin’s-q (see Jovanovic, 2002).37 The inefficient stock market approach 
contends that the overvaluation of the 1990s is responsible for that takeover wave 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003).  Rhodes-Kroft et al. (2004) also support this idea by arguing 
that rational targets without perfect information will accept more bids from over-valued 
stock bidders during market peaks because they overestimate synergies. Some researchers 
suggest that corporate governance issues led to the merger wave of the 1980s and 1990s 
(Holmstrom & Kaplan 2001). 
 
7. REMAINING ISSUES 
 
In the theory of the market for corporate control, there are few models to explain the 
relations or causalities among takeover motives and sources of takeover gains. Specifically 
in the case of the managerial incentive approach, more rigorous modeling work is required. 
                                                 
35 Permissive stance toward mergers by the Justice Department during the Reagan administration 
and deregulation of transportation, communications, and financial services in 1980s may be these 
examples. 
 
36 The temporary decline in M&A activity at the end of 1980s coincide with a recession and the 
collapse of the junk bond market and the 1990s wave is coincided with the bull market, or 
exuberant mood of stock market.  
 
37 However, Chattergee (1992) argue that the firm level restructuring shock brings disciplinary 
takeover while the industry wide shock brings takeover wave.  
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There is also no consensus on the background of takeover waves, especially that of the 
recent 1990s.  
 Empirically, including the manager’s hubris or agency cost as one of major takeover 
gains is required. Therefore, dichotomous analysis such as synergy vs. information effect is 
no longer persuasive. Rather it is necessary to quantify and compare more explicitly each 
takeover gain with more rigorous analysis. One example of this is incorporating the success 
probability of the deal and examining whether the capital market could forecast this 
appropriately during the deal announcement period.  
 Meanwhile, empirical study should also focus on finding cross-sectional evidence 
on the agency cost using rich evidence recently developed about corporate governance 
issues. Examples of these research questions are as follows. Does the manager who wants 
an agency cost oriented takeover pay higher advising fees to investment bankers to justify 
the offer? Is takeover resistance from disagreement with the premium or disagreement 
with the side-payment to the target CEO?  Did the demise in hostile takeovers in the 1990s 
result from the decrease of disciplinary takeovers, or did it merely reflect the increase in 
hostile takeover protection mechanisms? Is the inefficient manger actually disciplined after 
a deal failure? How is management entrenchment associated with agency cost takeovers?
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CHAPTER Ⅲ 
MEASURING INFORMATION EFFECT ON TAKEOVERS  
 
1. RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Before developing the model of information effect, I review the earlier literature on the 
information effect. The first section reviews the five main sources of takeover gains by 
their motives. Since the information effect is defined on the target share revaluation, i.e. 
total takeover gains, these include the sources of information effect by construction. The 
Second section reviews the literature on whether the information effect has a significant 
portion in takeover gains or not. 
 
1.1. Takeover motives: sources of takeover gains 
 
1.1.1. Synergistic  
This hypothesis argues that the combining of two firms by mergers results in an increased 
aggregate market value of two firms. Three rationales are provided as  specific sources of 
synergy gain: increased productive efficiency (Healy et al. 1992; Houston et al. 2001); 
obtaining monopolistic market power entailing monopolistic rent (Kim & Singal 1993; 
Sapienza 2002)38; exploiting tax benefit (Jensen & Ruback 1983; Hayn 1989). These 
synergistic opportunities might be initiated by industry restructuring or deregulation 
                                                 
38 Ellert (1976) label this a ‘monopolistic hypothesis’ and differentiate with synergy hypothesis. 
Both of these monopolistic and productive efficiency hypotheses have been long discussed (See 
Lintner 1971; Mandelker 1974). However, empirical evidences show mixed signals for both kinds of 
synergy hypotheses. 
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which is consistent with neo-classical theory of merger waves (Andrade et al. 2001). See 
Devos et al. (2009) for a well-established survey about this synergy hypothesis.  
1.1.2. Disciplinary 
Grossman & Hart (1981) argue that the takeover can be initiated to realize the potential 
future restructuring opportunity of target firm. In other words, the target firm is 
inefficiently managed at the time of the takeover announcement for some reason. 
Therefore, just the replacement of the incumbent management by new management may 
increase the value of the firm (kick in the pants hypothesis). In this context, the takeover 
can be a means of disciplining the current inept management. This kind of takeover is 
similar to the synergistic one in the sense that it both does not harm any part of the 
shareholders, and it increases the wealth of target shareholders or both parties. Grossman 
& Hart call this kind of takeover as an ‘Allocational’. 
1.1.3. Acquisitional 
Grossman & Hart (1981) also argues that some takeovers are motivated by acquiring 
management who has obtained asymmetric information which signals that the target firm 
is undervalued at the time of announcement (sitting on a gold mine hypothesis). In this 
context, corporate takeovers act as means of exploiting the undervaluation. This kind of 
takeover is different with the synergistic and disciplinary ones in the sense that this is not a 
wealth-creating deal but rather discovering the hidden wealth of a target share. However, 
an acquisitional takeover is similar to a disciplinary one since the gains for these kinds of 
takeovers can be achieved as a stand-alone entity without any physical combination of two 
firms.  
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1.1.4. Overvaluation-leveraged 
Sleifer & Vishny (2003) argues that takeovers may be motivated to exploit the 
overvaluation of bidding firm’s stock by acquiring relatively undervalued target stock. They 
call these kinds of takeovers “stock-market-driven (SMD)” acquisitions. This is similar to 
the acquisitional takeovers in the sense that both are seeking to exploit the misvaluation of 
the stock market. However they are different in two points. First, overvaluation-leveraged 
acquisition transfers wealth from target shareholders to acquirer shareholders while the 
other is a wealth-creating deal in the point of target shareholders without any transfer of 
wealth. Second, gains from overvaluation-leveraged takeovers are combinational, i.e. only 
realizable in the bid success, while gains from the acquisitional one can be achieved as 
stand-alone entity. Third, cash cannot be used as a payment in the overvaluation-leveraged 
acquisition while it can be chosen in the acquisitional mergers.  Travlos (1987) find that 
stock exchange bidding firms have significantly negative abnormal return while cash-
financing bidding firms have a normal rate of returns at the announcement period. This is 
consistent with the signaling hypothesis, which implies that stock-financing conveys the 
negative information that the bidding firm is overvalued. He also argues that tender offers 
or hostile takeovers usually have the same empirical implication as cash offers39. Shleifer & 
Vishny (2003) present a theoretical model of stock-market-driven acquisitions. Recently, 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) extend this argument of over-valuation into stock market wide 
explaining merger waves. They argue that waves of cash and stock purchases for takeovers 
could be rationally driven by periods of over- and undervaluation of the stock market. 
                                                 
39 Tender offers are usually cash offers and mergers are usually common stock exchange offers. And 
cash offers that are typically associated with hostile takeovers (due to quicker registration) and, 
thus, higher premiums have the non-negative bidder returns, while generally friendly exchange 
offers that typically have lower premiums are associated with negative returns (Travlos 1987) 
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1.1.5. Hubris/agency-Cost 
This hypothesis argues that takeovers might be motivated by acquirer managers who have 
conflict of interests between themselves and shareholders. As a result, they frequently 
overpay in acquiring the target firm and the overpayment makes the upward revaluation of 
target share. Unlike the above four hypotheses, this hubris/agency-cost motive does not 
aligned with the shareholder’s interests, and the agency cost arises from the information 
asymmetry between managers who make all corporate investment decisions including 
mergers and acquisitions and the shareholders who delegate these rights. In this context, 
takeover gains paid to target shareholders as premium could be illusive and the so called 
winner’s curse is often observed. Roll (1986) argues that managers of bidding firms might 
be infected by hubris so that they simply pay too much for their targets. Malmendier & Tate 
(2005) argue that overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment 
projects and view external funds as unduly costly. Jensen (1986) argues that because of 
free cash flow40 incentives of managers, they tend to maximize the size of resources in 
control which is explicitly related with their compensation. In this context, corporate 
acquisitions are one way that managers spend cash instead of paying it out to shareholders.  
 Empirically, this hypothesis might explain the challenging evidence of negative drift 
in acquiring firm’s stock price following the merger announcement. This negative 
movement might imply that the takeover gains could be overstated or nonexistent. 
Empirical studies suggest many symptoms signaling the hubris/agency-cost oriented 
mergers; diversification (e.g., Morck et al. 1990; Lang & Stulz 1994; Villalonga 2004); large 
size bidder (Moeller et al. 2004);  glamour acquirer (Rau & Vermaelen 1998); cash rich 
                                                 
40 Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net 
present values when discounted at the relevant cost of capital (Jensen 1986). 
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bidders (Harford 1999); low levered bidders (Maloney et al. 1993). Recently, Cai & Vijh 
(2007) find more explicit evidence of agency cost that the management compensation is an 
important motive behind the corporate acquisitions.41 
 
1.2. Significance of information effect: “synergy vs. information” 
 
Empirical literature on the significance of information effect shows conflicting evidences. 
They are summarized into two approaches according to their measures of information 
effect.  
1.2.1. Market approach 
The first approach uses abnormal stock returns to test these competing hypotheses and 
concludes that the information effect is negligible. In this approach, movements of 
abnormal stock returns are examined for the unsuccessful takeovers. With significant 
information effect, some significant portion of positive share revaluation of target at the 
announcement should be persistent even after the deal is withdrawn. Dodd and Ruback 
(1977) firstly examined42 84 unsuccessful takeovers and found that significantly positive 
                                                 
41 They examine the stock and option holdings of target and acquirer CEOs during 1993 to 2001, and 
find that both acquiring and target firm CEOs might be benefited from acquisitions whether the 
deals are successfully closing or not. They find that acquisitions enable target CEOs to remove 
liquidity restriction on stock and option holdings and also enable acquirer CEOs to improve the 
long-term value of overvalued holdings. For more discussions about benefits received by target chief 
executive officers and job turnovers of target CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions, see 
Hartzell et al. (2004). 
 
42 Among lots of empirical literature on information effect, we consider Dodd & Ruback (1977) as a 
foundation for two reasons. First, as an event date they use the takeover announcement date instead 
of effective date of acquisitions. This appropriately enables us to capture the effect of information 
leakage before the final acquisition. Second, they consider an unsuccessful takeover sample as well 
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abnormal returns of 18.96 percent in the tender offer month are persistent for five years 
after the offer. However, Bradley et al. (1983) provide the counter-evidence with opposite 
direction. They argue that the seemingly permanent positive abnormal returns may be due 
to the anticipation of a future, higher-valued bid. If the target shareholders believe that the 
present value of this expected future bid exceeds the value of an outstanding offer, they 
will not accept the existing tender offer, which results in a failure. With this reasoning, they 
divided their sample of unsuccessful tender offers into two sub-samples; subsequently 
taken by competing bidder within five years from the initial offer and subsequently not-
taken sample for the same period. They find that cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for 
subsequently not-taken sample go back to its pre-announcement level on average right 
after the offer is withdrawn, while CAR for subsequently taken samples are persistent. This 
is consistent with synergy hypothesis because for the subsequently not-taken target firms, 
synergistic benefits may not be utilized afterwards.  
1.2.2. Security analyst approach 
Second approach introduces security analysts’ accounting forecasts to test these 
confronting hypotheses and concludes that information effect exists significantly. This 
approach examines abnormal security analysts’ earnings forecast revisions around the 
takeover announcement. They assume that financial analysts continue to forecast earnings 
per share of target firm as its stand-alone value in spite of the takeover bid announcement 
in order to provide investors with appropriate valuation information.43 Therefore, if 
                                                                                                                                                
as a successful one in their analysis. This dichotomy of whole sample has an important role to test 
the information hypotheses. 
 
43 Pound (1988) support this stand-alone forecasting argument from analysts’ retail reports as well 
as from his own survey of financial analysts who forecast future earnings per share for the firm they 
cover.  
 40
significantly positive earnings forecast revisions are observed, this means some kind of 
stand-alone revaluation, i.e. information effect, occurs by takeover news. At the beginning, 
Pound (1988) fails to find this evidence with their 94 I/B/E/S enlisted firms targeted 
between 1979 and 1984. However, Brous & Kini (1993) find significantly positive forecast 
revisions with 307 tender offers during 1977 to 1988 after adjusting optimism bias and 
serial correlations in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Their methodology will be discussed 
later in section 3. Sudarsanam et al. (2002) confirm this finding with U.K. tender offer 
samples by the same methodology with Brous & Kini.  
 
2.   METHODOLOGY 
 
One critical assumption ruling the previous section is that both the synergy and the 
information effect are fairly measured. In this section, I develop the methodology to 
explicitly measure the information effect in terms of share values. Synergy is measured 
indirectly by subtracting the explicitly measured information effect from the revaluation of 
the target share. 
 
2.1. Information Effect 
 
2.1.1. Discounted Residual-Income Approach 
One explicit way to measure the information effect is to extract only stand-alone parts from 
the total revaluation of the target share. Therefore, the successful measure of information 
effect should satisfy two features: the terms of share value; and stand-aloneness. First, the 
measure should be expressed in terms of share revaluation. Here the value of shareሺ ௜ܸ,௧כ ሻ is 
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typically defined as the present value of its expected future dividends based on all 
currently available information as follows. 
 
௜ܸ,௧כ ൌ ෍
ॱ௧ൣܦ௜,௧௝ ห Ωሿ
൫1 ൅ ݎ௜௘൯
௜
∞
௜ୀଵ
 (1)
In this equation, ܦ௜,௧௝  represents the dividend of ݆௧௛upcoming fiscal period at time ݐ for the 
firm ݅, and ॱ௧ሾ·  | ߗሿ represents the expectation based on information available at time ݐ 
and ݎ௜௘ represents a cost of equity of the firm ݅ which is assumed to be constant. Second, 
stand-aloneness requires that the measure should be free from the effect of a takeover 
event, i.e. as if there is no bid offered. Existing performance measures, however, are not 
qualified as successful measures of the information effect. Typical stock performance 
measures, e.g. CAR, cannot separate the stand-alone values. One successful-looking 
measure of information effect is the abnormal earnings forecast revisions introduced by 
Brous & Kini (1993). Although this may be qualified as stand-alone measure, it does not 
sufficiently provide an implication of valuing a share.44 On the methodology of Brous & 
Kini, I will discuss later in this section.  
 Discounted residual income approach sometimes referred to as Edwards-Bell-
Ohlson (EBO) valuation equation provide the answers to these questions. Ohlson (1995) 
demonstrate that, as long as a firm’s earnings and book value are forecasted, the intrinsic 
                                                 
44 They use abnormal change of accounting earnings forecasts. Accounting earnings, however, have 
some limitations as a proxy for its share value. Most of all, accounting earnings is not exactly linked 
to the firm’s cash flow to shareholders, i.e. a dividend which is directly contributed to its equity 
value. Second, earning is so volatile that it has negative values sometimes. Third, earnings may 
diverge from its stock price that implicitly gives us a misleading, inaccurate share value.  Lastly, one 
or two earning numbers may tell us the direction of the firm’s valuation in a qualitative sense 
however, they may not provide us an idea of how much its intrinsic value changes in the 
quantitative sense. 
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value written as (12) can be rewritten as the reported book value, plus an infinite sum of 
discounted future residual incomes as follows. 
 
௜ܸ,௧כ ൌ ܤ௜,௧଴ ൅ ෍
ॱ௧ሾܰܫ௜,௧௝ െ ݎ௜ כ ܤ௜,௧௝ିଵሿ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻ௝
∞
௝ୀଵ
 (2)
In this equation, each of ܤ௜,௧௝ , ܰܫ௜,௧௝  represents the firm’s book value per share and net 
income per share for the ݆௧௛ upcoming fiscal period. Any kind of time frequency can be 
used as a fiscal period only if the accounting earnings are reported, i.e. quarterly or yearly. 
This accounting based valuation model explicitly represents the intrinsic value of share 
since the above equation is derived from (12). This is also supported by empirical 
evidences (Lee et al. 1999). 45 In this context, this intrinsic value of share is considered as 
an alternative measure of share price. Furthermore, this measure can be designed as stand-
alone valuation of share as long as security analysts’ earnings forecasts ሺܨ௜,௧௝ ሻ are used as 
expected future net incomes ሺॱ௧ሾܰܫ௜,௧௝ ሿሻ in (13). The rationale is that financial analysts are 
assumed to continue to forecast earnings per share of a target firm as its stand-alone value 
in spite of the takeover news in order to provide investors with appropriate valuation 
information (Pound 1988). Finally I can develop the change of the intrinsic value of share, 
i.e. revaluation, from the first difference of the intrinsic value normalized by its share price. 
I call this revaluation as ‘intrinsic value revisionሺܸܴ௧ሻ’ since the value of share is changed 
as security analysts revise their forecasts on future earnings and I express it as follows. 
                                                 
45 They examined the relative valuation measure of intrinsic value over price (V/P) using Dow 30 
stocks during 1963-1996. They find that the first-order autocorrelation for the V/P measures are 
smaller that the case of other traditional measures such as earnings (E/P) or book value (B/P) and 
also show that V/P follows a stationary process meanwhile others follows unit-root, and V/P has 
values close to 1 on average which varies from 0.60 to 0.74 according to a discount rate and an 
explicit estimation period the model assumes. This means that when V/P deviates from its mean, it 
reverts back more quickly in the subsequent time period.  
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 ܸܴ௜,௧ ൌ
∆ ௜ܸ,௧כ
௜ܲ,௧ିଵ
ൌ ௜ܸ,௧
כ െ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵכ
௜ܲ,௧ିଵ
 (3)
In this definition, ௜ܲ,௧ିଵ represents the share price prior to the takeover announcement. By 
normalization, this measure is similar to the stock return measure.46 The only difference is 
that the value revision is a stand-alone measure, i.e. a measure of the information effect.  
2.1.2. Abnormal Value Revision (AVR) 
In order to implement the value revision equation (14) empirically, I adopt the three 
period model by Lee et al. (1999) where residual incomes maintain their levels beginning 
with the third fiscal year. From this assumption and clean surplus accounting47, I can derive 
the empirical version of value revision as follows (see appendix for this derivation in 
detail). 
 ܸܴ௜,௧ ൌ
݇௜,௧௘ ܨܴ௜,௧ଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻ ൅
݇௜,௧௘ ܨܴ௜,௧ଶ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻଶ ൅
ܨܴ௜,௧ଷ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻଶݎ௜  
(4)
In this equation, ݇௜,௧௘  represents the expected future dividend payout ratio with all the 
available information set at time ݐ and ܨܴ௜,௧௝  represents the analysts’ earnings forecast 
revision. The analysts’ forecast revision is defined as ܨܴ௜,௧௝ ൌ ሺܨ௜,௧௝ െ ܨ௜,௧ିଵ௝ ሻ/ ௜ܲ,௧ିଵ where ܨ௜,௧௝  
represents the I/B/E/S analysts’ consensus earnings forecast for the ݆௧௛ upcoming fiscal 
year at time ݐ. 
 This value revision is measurable since all the variables in RHS of (15) are available 
as data. However this measure might be a biased one if the security analysts’ earnings 
                                                 
46 By this normalization, value revisions, calculated from different amounts and times, are also able 
to be averaged or compared to each other as the market returns.   
 
47 Clean surplus relation requires that earnings include all gains and losses affecting the book value 
so that the change in book value from period to period is equal to earnings minus net 
dividends: ሺܤ௧௜ାଵ ൌ  ܤ௧௜ ൅ ܰܫ௧௜ାଵ െ ܦ௧௜ାଵሻ. 
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forecasts are biased. Much of accounting literature point out that analyst earnings forecasts 
appear to be upwardly biased on average (O'Brien 1988; Lys & Sohn 1990; Abarbanell 
1991; Brown 1993). In other words, their forecasts are overly optimistic48 ahead of the 
fiscal year and are then systematically revised downwards as approaching to the fiscal year 
end. As a result, any forecast revisions for specific fiscal period would be significantly 
negative until the fiscal period ends. In order to correct this optimism bias, I adopt the 
model of expected forecast revision by Brous & Kini (1993). They assume that analysts are 
expected to revise their earnings forecasts as follows. 
 
ॱሾܨܴ௜,௧௝ ሿ ൌ ݇௜ ൅
1
ܶ ෍ ߜ௜,௧ି௦
்
௦ୀଵ
 (5)
In this equation, the drift term ሺ݇௜ሻ is a constant period mean of all available forecast 
revisions ൫ܨܴ௜,௧൯ with the same forecast end date outside the event window of [-2, +4] 
months. The error term ሺߜ௜,௧ି௦ሻ is defined as the difference between ݇௜ and the actual 
forecast revision at month ݐ. Like Brous & Kini (1993), I assume that ܨܴ௜,௧ follows the 
fourth-order moving average process since approximately 20% of analysts are expected to 
revise their forecasts every month. If I define the abnormal analyst earnings forecast 
revision as ܣܨܴ௜,௧௝ ൌ ܨܴ௜,௧௝ െ ॱሾܨܴ௜,௧௝ ሿ  then this is calculated by substituting expected 
revision obtained from the equation (16). Finally if I define abnormal intrinsic value 
revision as ܣܸܴ௜,௧ ൌ ܸܴ௜,௧ െ ॱሾܸܴ௜,௧ሿ then the new measure of information effect ሺܣܸܴ௜,௧ሻ is 
written as follows.  
                                                 
48 For rationales behind  the optimism bias, many hypotheses are suggested in accounting literature: 
career concern incentives to develop their reputations (Hong & Kubik 2003); cognitive bias 
hypothesis (Easterwood & Nutt 1999); investment banking incentives (Michaely & Womack 1999); 
security trading incentives (Cowen et al. 2006); strategic reporting hypothesis (Lim 2001); self 
selection hypothesis (McNichols & O'Brien 1997) (Das et al. 2006); rational expectations hypothesis 
(Lim 2001; Gu & Wu 2003); and earnings management hypothesis (Abarbanell & Lehavy 2003). 
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 ܣܸܴ௜,௧ ൌ
݇௜,௧௘ ܣܨܴ௜,௧ଵ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻ ൅
݇௜,௧௘ ܣܨܴ௜,௧ଶ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻଶ ൅
ܣܨܴ௜,௧ଷ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻଶݎ௜  
(6)
In this equation, however, three ex-ante variables should be determined as a priori; 
abnormal analysts’ earnings forecast revisionsሺܣܨܴ௜,௧ଵ ,  ܣܨܴ௜,௧ଶ ,  ܣܨܴ௜,௧ଷ ሻ for the upcoming 
three fiscal years, cost of equity capitalሺݎ௜ሻ, and dividend-payout ratio ሺ݇௜,௧௘ ሻ.  
 First, the abnormal analyst forecast revisions can be calculated from (16). However, 
earnings forecasts data in the monthly I/B/E/S summary tape are available in many cases 
only for the currentሺܨ௜,௧ଵ ) and followingሺܨ௜,௧ଶ ) fiscal year while forecasts for the third fiscal 
yearሺܨ௜,௧ଷ ) are sparse. As a consequence, ܣܨܴ௜,௧ଷ  is difficult to calculate. Therefore, I 
regenerate abnormal forecast revision for the third fiscal year as ܣܨܴ௜,௧ଷ ൌ ܣܨܴ௜,௧ଶ ൈ ܣܮܶܩ௜,௧, 
where  ܣܮܶܩ௜,௧ represents an abnormal long term growth rate of earnings per share at time 
t calculated by the same method as others.49 Second, the cost of equity capitalሺݎ௜ሻ is 
calculated from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The market risk premium assumed 
in the CAPM is the average annual premium over the risk-free rate for the CRSP value-
weighted index over the preceding 30 years. For a riskless rate, I use the one month U.S. 
Treasury bill rate. Frankel & Lee (1998) find that the choice of ݎ௜ has little effect on their 
analysis.  
 Lastly, the expected firm-specific dividend payout ratio is calculated as an average 
of the recent five year dividend payout ratios from the announcement date ሺ݇௜,௧௘ ൌ
                                                 
49 In our samples, average long-term growth rate of earnings per share for the target firm also shows 
optimism bias like raw earnings per share for near upcoming fiscal years.   
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ଵ
௡ ∑ሺܦ௜,௧/ܰܫ௜,௧ሻሻ. Following Lee et al. (1999), if  ݇௜,௧௘ ൏ 0 owing to negative EPS, I divide 
dividends by (0.06 × total assets) to derive an estimate of the payout ratio.50  
2.1.3. Cumulative Abnormal Value Revision (CAVR) 
Now the information effect can be obtained by cumulative abnormal value revision (CAVR) 
with appropriate event window around the takeover announcement. If the announcement 
time is defined as zero, then this relation can be written as follows.  
 
ܥܣܸܴ௜ ሾ ݐ଴, ܶ ሿ ൌ ෍ ܣܸܴ௜,௧
்
௧ୀ௧బ
 (7)
In this equation, ݐ଴ and ܶ represent the beginning and ending time of the takeover 
announcement event window.  
 
2.2. Synergy 
 
For the time being, let us assume that the total takeover gains to target shareholders are 
composed of synergy and information effect and no other gains exist. Since the information 
effect can be obtained as Equation (18), if the total gains can be given, then the synergy is 
calculated as a residual term by subtracting the information effect from the total gains. In 
order to measure the total gains to target share holders, typical cumulative abnormal 
return around the takeover announcement with market model51 is adopted in this paper. 
                                                 
50 FYI, the cost of equity in our samples is reported on average to be 10.06%, average dividend 
payout ratio is reported to be 15.11% with 3.59% standard deviation during our sample periods. 
51 FYI, in the market model, individual stock return is specified as ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ܴ௠௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ where 
ܴ௜௧represents a daily stock return for firm i at time t, ܴ௠௧does a return on the equally weighted 
market portfolio in time t, ߙ௜, ߚ௜ does regression parameters, and ε୧୲ does a stochastic error term 
assumed to be i.i.d. normal with mean zero and constant variance σ୧ଶ. Finally, cumulative abnormal 
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Denote the ܣܴ௜,௧ the periodic abnormal return of the ݅ stock at time ݐ, then the periodic 
synergy denoted as ܻܵ ௜ܰ,௧ is defined as the difference between the periodic abnormal 
return (AR) and the periodic abnormal analyst value revision (AVR) as follows.    
 ܻܵ ௜ܰ,௧ ൌ ܣܴ௜,௧ െ ܣܸܴ௜,௧ (8)
As the same token with the CAR and CAVR, synergy is defined as a cumulative term of these 
measures for an appropriate event window that is written as follows.  
 ܥܻܵ ௜ܰሾ ݐ଴, ܶ ሿ ൌ ܥܣܴ௜ ሾ ݐ଴, ܶሿ െ ܥܣܸܴ௜ ሾ ݐ଴, ܶሿ
ൌ ෍ ൫ܣܴ௜,௧ െ ܣܸܴ௜,௧൯ ൌ ෍ ܻܵ ௜ܰ,௧
்
௧ୀ௧బ
்
௧ୀ௧బ
 
(9)
Note that this synergy measure is calculated with an assumption that the total takeover 
gains to target shareholder (CAR) and the information effect is captured for the same event 
windows, ሾ ݐ଴, ܶ ሿ. Under the situation where these two measures have different event 
windows, however, synergy can be measured as follows.52  
 ܥܻܵ ௜ܰሾ ݐ଴,  ଵܶ, ଶܶ ሿ ൌ ܥܣܴ௜ ሾ ݐ଴, ଵܶሿ െ ܥܣܸܴ௜ ሾ ݐ଴, ଶܶሿ (10)
 
  
                                                                                                                                                
return to the individual stock is given as  ܥܣܴ௜ሾ ݐ଴, ܶ ሿ ൌ ∑ ൫ܴ௜,௧ െ ߙො௜ െ ߚመ௜ܴ௠௧൯௧்ୀ௧బ , where ݐ଴ and ܶ 
represent the beginning and ending time of the takeover announcement event window. 
 
52 In general setting, the synergy can be defined with different event horizons for each of CAR or 
CAVR that can be written as  CSYN୧ሾ tଵ,  tଶ, Tଵ,  Tଶ ሿ ൌ CAR୧ ሾ tଵ,  Tଵሿ െ CAVR୧ ሾ tଶ,  Tଶሿ. For convenience 
of our discussion, let us assume that only the ending points of the event windows are different 
between these two measures of CAR and CAVR. This is because that synergy included in the CAR will 
decrease as the probability of the combination of two firms decreases. If this kind of counter-
synergy event, e.g. deal failure, occurs following the announcement, the synergy should be 
calculated with shorter horizon than the normal event windows used for the other counterpart, 
CAVR. Therefore, if the sample includes failed deals, then the synergy may be measured by Equation 
21. 
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3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
3.1. Data  
 
3.1.1. Sample Selection 
Table 1 describes the sample selection procedure. The sample selection process generates 
four sample groups as some queries are applied sequentially. The largest sample labeled 
“DEAL” includes takeovers which have deal characteristics. This sample comes from the 
Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. mergers and acquisitions database. I select US 
domestic mergers and acquisitions announced between 1980 and 2006. I consider only 
‘control-oriented takeovers’ where acquiring firms end up with all the shares of the 
acquired firm from initial ownership of less than 50% of the target shares. I further require 
that both the deal value is greater than U.S. $1 million. The deal value is defined by SDC as 
the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. I further 
exclude the deals that are announced and completed at the same time. Finally, this 
procedure selects 21,636 takeover deals in the DEAL sample. If an additional restriction 
that both the bidder and the target are public firms, then the legitimate deals, labeled as 
“PDEAL” group, are reduced into 13,070 observations.  
 The third largest sample group labeled “PRIC” represents takeovers that have share 
revaluation measures, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as well as deal characteristics. 
In addition to PDEAL group, target firm should be listed on the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) during the event window, [-10, +10] trading days from takeover 
announcement date. This procedure reduces the sample size into 4,740 observations.  
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Table 1  
Sample selection 
This table reports the sample selection process which yields five different sample groups with different 
names. As more queries apply, the number of samples included in these groups also decreases by definition. 
The first group named "DEAL" is from the Security Data Company(SDC) domestic mergers and 
acquisitions(M&A) database. This group represents M&A deals so that deal characteristics such as tender-
offer, deal status, or premium are available for all observations in it. The second group named "PDEAL" 
represents the deals between public acquirers and targets. The third group named "PRIC" is from the Center 
for Research in Stock Prices (CRSP). This group represents stock market or investor reaction for the M&A 
deals so that cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for deal announcement are available for all deals in it. The 
forth group named "VALU" is from the I/B/E/S summary dataset and the COMPUSTAT industrial annual 
dataset. This group represents the financial analysts' reaction so that cumulative abnormal value revisions 
(CAVRs) where the value is calculated by 'residual income model', are available for those deals in it. The last 
group "ACCO" is also from the Compustat, but additionally the acquirer has accounting data such as leverage, 
liquidity or Tobin's-q so that I can consider acquirer's fundamental characteristics which are important to 
understand its motives behind the M&A offer. The group of the major interest in this paper is "VALU". 
Because this group contains both CARs and CAVRs for each deals in it and the main focus is to analyze CAVRs 
which is a proxy of analyst evaluation on M&A news, and compare this with the other market 
correspondence, CARs. 
No. of 
obs. After 
Query 
Sample 
Group Query Description 
21,636 DEAL (1) US domestic deals offered between 1980 and 2006 covered in SDC Platinum 
  (2) Deal value is $1 million or higher 
  (3) Percent of shares acquirer seeks is no less than 50%. 
  (4) Deal closing does not come with the announcement simultaneously. 
  (5) Deal should be a finalized one; neither pending nor unknown status. 
13,070 PDEAL (6) Deals are between public firms 
4,740 PRIC (7) The target has CRSP stock price during [−10, +10] trading days from the bid 
1,372 VALU (8) The target is covered by I/B/E/S at announcement month, and 
  (9) The target has EPS forecasts for the following fiscal period. 
: current (FY1) and following(FY2) fiscal year and long run growth rate(LTG). 
(10) The target has at least 5 previous earnings forecast data prior to the bid 
  (11) The target has dividend payout ratio identified by Compustat. 
810 ACCO (12) Both acquire & target have previous fiscal year accounting data in Compustat 
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 The fourth largest sample group labeled “VALU” represents takeovers which also 
have cumulative abnormal value revisions (CAVRs), a measure of the information effect in 
this paper, as well as cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), a measure of total takeover 
gains to target shareholders. Upon PRIC sample, I take additional restriction that target 
firms are also covered by the I/B/E/S summary dataset within a [-2,+4] monthly event 
window and there exist consensus earnings forecasts for the current (FY1) and following 
(FY2) fiscal year and long run growth rate (LTG). Furthermore, target firms are required to 
have at least 5 previous forecast data prior to the announcement. In other words, they 
should have at least three forecasting data samples to estimate the expected forecast 
revision in calculating CAVRs. After all, this procedure generates 1,372 observations. This 
is the default sample in this paper since I can examine both information effect and share 
revaluation with this sample. 
 The smallest sample labeled “ACCO” represents takeover deals which have 
accounting data of both the acquirer and target as well as deal characteristics, CARs, and 
CAVRs. In order to find the sources of the information effect, I should explicitly examine the 
firm’s fundamentals. In other words, accounting data should reflect the hidden information 
on the status quo of the target firm which leaks to acquirer managers prior to the 
announcement. Furthermore, the acquirer-side accounting information plays an important 
role both in the “disciplinary” takeovers and the “hubris/agency-cost” oriented ones for 
revaluating target shares. In this sample, therefore, both parties should be covered by 
Compustat Industrial annual tape at the time of announcement. Finally, this additional 
condition generates 810 observations. This sample will be used for examining sources of 
takeover gains to target shareholders. 
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Table 2 
Sample summary by decades 
This table reports summary statistics of the sample. Panel A reports deal characteristics of 1,372 U.S. domestic 
takeover deals between public firms from 1980 to 2006 where the offer price is over US$ 1 million and the 
acquirer pursued more than 50% of target shares. Furthermore, the target is also listed on CRSP and covered 
by Compustat and I/B/E/S dataset ("VALU" sample).   'Hostile' is classified as the way that Security Data 
Company (SDC) defines. 'Conglomeration' is the deal in which acquirer and target has different two digits SIC 
codes. 'Days to closing (withdrawn)' is the day difference between announcement and closing(withdrawn). 
Premium is calculated from the four weeks pre-offer stock price of the target firm. Panel B reports the 
summary of firm fundamentals from the 810 "ACCO" samples where both acquirer and target are covered by 
COMPUSTAT.  'Liquidity' is defined as cash(Compustat data36) divided by book value of asset(Compustat 
data44). 'Leverage' is defined as book value of debt divided by market value of equity which is calculated as a 
sum of book value of debt and market value of equity. 'Tobin's Q' is defined as market value of asset divided by 
book value of asset. 'Operating Cash Flow' is defined as earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA, Compustat data21) divided by book value of asset.  'BEME' is defined as book value of equity 
(Compustat data60) divided by market value of equity followed by Fama-French (1996). "Capitalization" is 
defined as market value of equity at the end of previous month from takeover announcement. Student t-test 
and sign test are performed for those null hypotheses that the relative ratio ("Target/Acquirer") is equal to one 
and that the frequency of the case where acquirer has greater value than the target ("Acquirer > Target(%)") is 
equal to 50%. Statistical significances are denoted as *(10%), ** (5%), ***(1%). 
A. Deal characteristics Total   1980s   1990s   2000s   
Successful  82.4% 76.0% 84.4%  81.2%
Cash only 24.3% 42.1% 18.1%  28.8%
Stock only 41.6% 19.0% 50.1%  34.6%
Hostile attitude 7.4% 20.9% 5.6%  3.1%
Tender offer  19.4% 50.2% 14.7%  10.0%
Competing bid 10.7% 18.1% 9.0%  10.0%
Conglomeration  36.7% 50.2% 33.0%  36.9%
Days to closing (median) 126 99 127  133
Days to Withdrawn (median) 87 58 103  77
Premium (median) 33.8% 38.4% 35.8%  27.6%
        
B. Firm Fundamentals Acquirer(A) Target(T) T/A (median) T < A (%) 
      
Liquidity  0.15 0.18 4.08 *** 47.28
Leverage 0.38 0.39 1.43 *** 44.32 *** 
Operating Cash Flow (OCF) 0.09 0.09 1.06  49.01
Tobin's Q 2.49 2.05 0.98  64.07 *** 
BEME  0.40 0.53 1.75 *** 32.72 *** 
Capitalization (Million $) 84.84 8.89 0.32 *** 94.32 *** 
Number of observations  1,372  221  842   309   
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3.1.2. Summary Statistics 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the sample. Panel A describes summary statistics for 
the deal characteristics as defined by SDC. Each deal characteristic is reported by three 
decades to examine the waves where takeover samples may be clustered by time and 
industry. Most deal statistics are consistent with existing literature on merger waves. 
Among the three periods under examination, the 1980s is the most conspicuous. This 
period is also described as a combative takeover mood where hostile, competing cash 
tender-offers are dominant. As a result, the duration of the deal process is relatively short 
and takeovers in this period are more likely to fail with respect to the other periods. More 
than half of takeovers are conglomerate mergers, a combination of different industries 
(two-digit SIC code), in this period of corporate raiders. On the other hand, the 1990s are a 
period of “friendly stock-financed mergers”. As Andrade et al. (2001) argue, mergers of the 
1990s look important in number of events and its market values, so that more than 60% of 
the observations in total samples are distributed in this period. Lastly, the 2000s does not 
show much difference from the 1990s. For the total 1,373 deals, approximately 82% of 
takeovers are successful, and a failed bid is finalized more quickly (87 days) than a 
successful one (126 days). The premium calculated from the difference between the 
offered bid price and the share price four weeks prior to the takeover announcement is 
about 34% in terms of median of the total sample. Most of the above deal characteristics 
are also similar in the other sample groups defined in the paper. 
 Panel B of table 2 describes summary statistics for fundamental characteristics of 
the 810 ACCO sample. In the remainder of this section, these accounting fundamentals are 
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defined for the rest of the paper; 53 'Liquidity' is cash divided by the book value of asset; 
'Leverage' is the book value of debt divided by market value of equity being calculated as a 
sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity; 'Tobin's-Q' is defined as the 
market value of asset divided by the book value of asset; 'Operating cash flow (OCF)' is 
defined as earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by the 
book value of asset. 'BEME' represents book-to-market value of equity following from 
Fama & French (1996); "Capitalization" is defined as the market value of equity at the end 
of the recent month from the takeover announcement. From this table, the target firm 
looks slightly more liquid and more undervalued and has a smaller firm size than the 
acquiring firm. This may indicate that the target firm might be a worthwhile acquisition. On 
the other hand, this panel does not show much difference in leverage, operating cash flow, 
and Tobin’s-q between target and acquirer.  
 
3.2. Measuring information effect 
 
3.2.1. Existence of Information Effect 
Table 3 reports the security analysts’ average abnormal earnings forecast revisions (AFRs) 
for 1,373 VALU samples calculated from the fourth order moving average model by Brous 
& Kini (1993).54 The majority of results are also consistent with their work. The number of 
observations consistently decreases from the event month 0 since targets are delisted after 
                                                 
53 FYI, we report the specific Compustat data item numbers for several accounting data used in this 
paper as follows: cash (=data1); book value of asset (=data6); EBITDA (=data13); book value of 
equity (=data60).  
 
54 In order to control outliers, earnings forecast revisions outside the 3*SD from the mean are 
winsorized in our samples. 
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the deal success which takes four months on average. Panel-A reports raw data of analysts’ 
earnings forecast revisions (FRs). Every forecast revisions in [-5, +5] event months has a 
significantly negative value for each of the three upcoming fiscal years. This may reflect the 
optimism bias in security analysts’ earnings forecasts.55 Panel B shows the results after this 
bias is corrected. Abnormal forecast revisions (AFRs) are significantly positive especially 
during [0, +3] months for all three fiscal years. If I cumulate these abnormal reactions 
during four months, these are 0.48%, 0.37%, and 0.43% for each corresponding current 
(FY1), second (FY2), and third (FY3) fiscal year. As expected, abnormal forecast revisions 
outside the event window, e.g. [-4, -1], are not significantly different from zero. From this, I 
presume that the model adopted here effectively eliminates the optimism bias in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Figure 1 shows the reaction of the abnormal earnings forecast revisions 
graphically. Again, a significant upward reaction in abnormal earnings forecast is observed 
after the event month 0 and this positive revision persists for three or four months 
thereafter. However less than 1% of abnormal forecast revision looks small enough to be 
negligible considering that the corresponding share revaluation is usually reported to be 
approximately 25%. Therefore in order to convince the significant information effect, 
appropriate translation of these positive accounting earnings revision into valuation 
terminology of a share, i.e. quantification, is required.  
3.2.2. Timing difference among measurements 
Table 4 reports the quantification result of information effect which is calculated from the 
model developed in the previous section with a discounted residual income approach. 
Furthermore, measurement results of share revaluation and the synergy are also provided  
                                                 
55 This negative drift may represent the fact that the target firms usually suffers from the relatively 
poor performance before receiving the takeover offers. To examine this argument against the 
optimism bias hypothesis remains as a future research. 
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Table 3 
Analysts' earnings forecast revisions on takeover announcement 
This table reports analysts’ consensus forecast revisions for earnings per share of target firms around the 
takeover announcement month according to different fiscal years. Samples for this table are 1,372 U.S. 
domestic control-oriented mergers and acquisition deals between public firms valued over one million dollars 
from 1980 to 2006 and target firms are identified in SDC, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S ("VALU" sample). 
"FY1" means upcoming first fiscal year for which annual earnings are not reported, i.e. normally current fiscal 
year. "FY2" means next second upcoming fiscal year in which earnings are not available.  "FY3" denotes third 
upcoming fiscal year. "Forecast revisions (FRs)" are calculated as the difference between current and previous 
monthly earnings forecast divided by the stock price of previous month from the takeover announcement. 
Abnormal revisions (AFRs) are calculated using a fourth-order moving average model by Brous & Kini (1993). 
Earnings forecasts for target firms are from I/B/E/S and each firm should have at least 5 previous forecasting 
data before announcement, i.e., at least three forecasting data outside the monthly event window (-2, +4). 
Furthermore, forecasting revisions outside the 3*SD from the mean are winsorized for dealing with outliers. 
In this table, FR and AFR are average values of observations for each period. The null hypothesis is that the 
average raw(abnormal) revision equals zero. Cross-sectional standardized t-statistic is below the each 
revision value. Statistical significances are provided as *(10%), ** (5%), *** (1%). 
Event month 
A. Forecast Revision (FR) B. Abnormal Forecast Revisions (AFR) 
 N    FY 1 FY 2 FY3  FY 1 FY 2 FY3 
-5 -0.0025 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0001 0.0003 0.0004        845 
-8.64 -7.19 -7.32 -0.25 1.13 0.99 
-4 -0.0024 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0022 *** 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003     1,040 
-10.13 -7.99 -8.38 1.25 1.09 0.9 
-3 -0.0026 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0023 *** 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003     1,204 
-10.02 -8.69 -8.69 0.7 0.93 0.77 
-2 -0.0022 *** -0.0022 *** -0.0027 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0001 0.0001     1,263 
-9.49 -9.1 -9.22 2.9 0.25 0.34 
-1 -0.0022 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0024 *** 0.0005 ** 0.0003 0.0002     1,316 
-10.38 -9.53 -10.12 2.28 1.26 0.62 
0 -0.0016 *** -0.0013 *** -0.0015 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0014 ***     1,373 
-9.81 -8.74 -8.35 5.82 4.95 5.42 
1 -0.0009 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0011 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0014 ***     1,209 
-7.34 -6.78 -6.87 7.9 6.63 6.02 
2 -0.0006 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0007 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0012 *** 0.0015 ***        992 
-5.08 -4.68 -4.77 7.65 7.23 7.6 
3 -0.0007 *** -0.0007 *** -0.0009 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0007 *** 0.0009 ***        726 
-5.62 -5.33 -5.83 7.13 3.91 4.1 
4 -0.0008 *** -0.0010 *** -0.0013 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0000 -0.0001        482 
-4.24 -4.71 -5.03 3.21 0.18 -0.23 
5 -0.0005 ** -0.0005 ** -0.0008 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0005 ** 0.0004        349 
  -2.58 -2.48 -2.96  4.62 2 1.24 
cumulative -0.0052 *** -0.0047 *** -0.0058 *** 0.0048 *** 0.0037 *** 0.0043 ***     1,373 
[0,3]   -13.52   -13.14   -13.74    10.79   8.03   7.84    
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together in this table. Monthly information effect is reported as average abnormal analyst 
value revision (AVR) where [-1,+3] months from takeover announcement are used as event 
windows to estimate expected forecast revisions. Monthly share revaluation of the target is 
measured by average abnormal return (AR). 56 Monthly synergy denoted as SYN is 
calculated as a residual term by distracting the AVR from its corresponding monthly AR.  
                                                 
56 To be consistent with monthly abnormal analysts’ value revisionሺAVRሻ, we set the zero event 
month as [-10, +10] CRSP trading days from the announcement. Thus, daily event window runs as [-
31, +94] trading days in order to generate the [-1,+4] monthly event window.  
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Figure 1. Abnormal earnings forecast revisions on takeover announcement
This figure shows abnormal earnings forecast revisions on the takeover announcement by three
different forecasting horizons. "FY1" means upcoming first fiscal year in which annual earnings are
not reported. "FY2" and "FY3" means the next second and the third fiscal year respectively.
Abnormal revisions are calculated by fourth order moving average model by Brous & Kini(1993).
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Table 4 
Dividing takeover gains  
This table reports the abnormal return, analyst value revision and synergy both with periodic and cumulative 
terms. The sample used in this table includes 1,372 U.S. domestic control-oriented mergers and acquisition 
deals between public firms valued over one million dollars from 1980 to 2006 and target firms are identified 
in SDC, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S. "Abnormal returns(AR) is calculated using the market model with 
OLS errors and equally weighted CRSP index estimated for [-283, +32] CRSP trading day windows. "Abnormal 
analyst value revision (AVR)" is obtained from the method used in this paper where the intrinsic value 
revision is calculated from the "three period residual income model" empirically performed by Frankle and 
Lee (1998) and abnormal revision for those corresponding those three years are calculated using the method 
used by Brous and Kini (1993). "Synergy (SYN)" is calculated as a difference between abnormal return and 
abnormal analyst value revision for each observation. CAR, CAVR, CSYN is defined as aggregation of ARs, 
AVRs, and SYNs from the five months before the announcement. All these variables are reported as average 
terms of observations for each corresponding month. The null hypothesis is the these average values equals 
zero. Student t-statistics are reported below each values and statistical significances are denoted as *(10%), ** 
(5%) and ***(1%).  
month from 
announce 
 periodic cumulative [-5,   ] N 
 AR   AVR   SYN   CAR   CAVR   CSYN 
  
-5  -0.85%  0.29% -1.14% -0.78% 0.29% -1.14%        845 
 -2.04  0.91 -2.25 -2.04 0.91 -2.25  
-4  0.28%  0.20% 0.08% -0.29% 0.43% -0.93%     1,040 
 0.70  0.73 0.17 -0.80 1.12 -1.53  
-3  0.28%  0.22% 0.06% -0.05% 0.60% -0.68%     1,204 
 0.69  0.69 0.12 -0.13 1.19 -0.95  
-2  0.86% ** 0.05% 0.81% 0.61% 0.62% 0.24%     1,263 
 2.15  0.16 1.70 1.35 1.06 0.30  
-1  2.07% *** -0.17% 2.24% *** 2.68% *** 0.42%  2.43% ***    1,315 
 4.77  -0.55 4.63 4.06 0.68 2.77  
0  23.41% *** 1.17% *** 22.23% *** 26.09% *** 1.58% ** 24.51% ***    1,372 
 34.33  4.71 31.90 28.32 2.46 23.33  
1  0.38%  1.20% *** -0.81% ** 26.37% *** 2.63% *** 23.74% ***    1,208 
  1.03  5.42 -1.87 26.12 3.84 20.59  
2  -0.03%  1.23% *** -1.28% *** 26.33% *** 3.52% *** 22.81% ***       991 
  -0.07  6.45 -2.87 24.56 4.93 18.39  
3  -0.35%  0.89% *** -1.10% ** 26.31% *** 3.99% *** 22.31% ***       725 
  -0.68  4.02 -2.01 23.16 5.44 16.89  
4  -0.23%  -0.37% -0.03% 26.55% *** 3.86% *** 22.68% ***       481 
  -0.40  -0.92 -0.04 22.62 5.13 16.67  
5  -0.73%  0.16% -0.71% 26.84% *** 3.91% *** 22.93% ***       348 
    -1.03   0.55   -0.92    22.06   5.16   16.32    
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 The pattern of monthly ARs is similar to that of AVRs except the timing and the 
magnitude.57 As long as timing is considered, investors seem to respond to the same 
takeover event not only earlier but also more quickly than the security analysts. 
Significantly positive AVRs are smoothed over [0, +3] months within a range from 0.89% to 
1.23%. And most of them outside this window are not significantly different from zero. On 
the other hand, significantly positive ARs are observed in [-2, 0] months which is earlier 
than the case of AVR. Importantly, most of them are concentrated or dominant in a zero 
event month so that about 23% abnormal return is observed in this single period. Similar 
to AR, monthly synergy is significantly different from zero in [-1, 0] window. As a result, 
CAR and CSYN have significantly positive values from one month before the announcement 
while the CAVR does from two months before the event.  
 This can be inferred from the model developed in Section 2 of this paper. Since the 
share revaluation is a response to the takeover bid, this news itself can leak to 
shareholders before the announcement. From the news shareholders can catch the fact 
that the target is a worthwhile bid, and from the bid premium, which is considered as the 
share revaluation in the model they revaluate their own shares immediately after the 
announcement. Since no significant ARs are observed after the announcement month 0, 
shareholders do not seem to change their revaluation. Meanwhile, it would take more time 
for security analysts to gather some specific information to evaluate the stand alone firm 
from the news of the takeover bid. Furthermore, some analysts may delay their evaluations  
 
                                                 
57 Comparing CAVR and CAR is the same as comparing the reactions of two different parties in the 
market, investors and security analysts, on the same event of the takeover announcement. Key 
differences between the two parties may be stand-aloneness in valuation and the information set at 
the time of the takeover announcement. In this context the difference in timing and magnitude of 
response may represent their characteristics.  
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Table 5 
Quantification 
This table reports three measures of takeover announcement for two different sample groups with short and 
long event windows. "VALU" sample group includes 1,372 U.S. domestic control-oriented mergers and 
acquisition deals between public firms valued over one million dollars from 1980 to 2006 and target firms 
are identified in SDC, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S. "ACCO" sample group includes 810 deals which has 
bidder accounting information in the "VALU" sample group. "Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) is 
calculated using the market model with OLS errors and equally weighted CRSP index estimated for [-283, 
+32] CRSP trading day windows and the accumulation window ends in zero event month. "Cumulative 
abnormal analyst value revision (CAVR)" is obtained from the method used in this paper where the intrinsic 
value revision is calculated from the "three period residual income model" empirically performed by Frankle 
and Lee (1998) and abnormal revision for those corresponding those three years are calculated using the 
method used by Brous and Kini (1993). "Cumulative synergy (CSYN)" is calculated as a difference between 
CAR and CAVR for each observation where CAR is cumulated until zero event month at most, that is 
represented by 0 in the middle of the event window. The null hypothesis is that these average values equals 
zero. Student t-statistics are reported below each values and statistical significances are denoted as *(10%), 
** (5%) and ***(1%).  
A. Short window  CAR [-1,0] CAVR [-1,+3] CSYN [-1,0,+3] N 
VALU   0.2548 *** 0.0342 *** 0.2206 ***     1,372 
  32.08 6.53 25.86  
ACCO  0.2775 *** 0.0333 *** 0.2442 *** 810 
  26.88 5.45 22.59  
B. Long window   CAR [-5,0] CAVR [-5, +5] CSYN [-5,0,+5] N 
VALU  0.2609 *** 0.0391 *** 0.2218 ***     1,372 
  27.59 5.16 19.83  
ACCO  0.2881 *** 0.0370 *** 0.2511 *** 810 
    23.33   4.36   18.32     
 
 
because of their herding behavior. Accounting literature argues that herding behavior is 
broadly observed among security analysts which makes them act as followers to some 
leaders  (Welch 2000; Clement & Tse 2005). 
3.2.3. Quantification 
Although empirical results show that the information effect is significant, it takes relatively 
small portion from the total takeover gains to target shareholders. Table 5 reports the  
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quantification results by varying the horizon of the event window and the definition of the 
sample group. It shows that the information effect is estimated around 4% while the 
synergy is around 22% in terms of CAVR and CSYN in the 1,372 VALU sample. Note that the 
synergy measured as CSYN has extended form of event window denoted by  ሾെݔ, 0, ൅ݕሿ as 
expressed in Equation 21 of the Section 3. 58 Results are similar either in the short or long 
event horizon while the synergy is measured slightly greater, up to 3%, in the ACCO sample 
groups than that of VALU sample group. Overall, empirical results indicate that the 
                                                 
58 This is because both the VALU and ACCO sample group includes failed deals where synergy 
captured as abnormal stock return might disappear as the deal is failed or expected to be failed. 
Considering that most failed deals are withdrawn within 90 days from the announcement, it is 
reasonable to consider the synergy in the short horizon around the announcement, e.g. zero in this 
table, when it looks probable to succeed in the perspective of investors.  
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Figure 2. Takeover gains divided into the information effect and the synergy
This figure shows cumulative abnormal return (CAR), cumulative abnormal anlyst value revision
(CAVR) and cumulative synergy (CSYN) on the takeoverannouncement. Abnormal return in CAR is
calculated from the market model with OLS errors and equally weighted CRSP index estimated for
[-283,32] CRSP trading day windows. Abnormal analyst value revision in CAVR is calculated from
"three period residual income model" empirically performed by Franckle and Lee (1998) where
abnormal revisions for those corresponding three periods are calculated according to the method
used by Brous and Kini (1992). Cumulative synergy (CSYN) is calculated as a difference between
CAR and CAVR.
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information effect takes about 15% of all takeover gains to target shareholders and the 
remaining 85% goes to synergy. Figure 2 shows this relation among CAR, CAVR, and CSYN 
for the long horizon event windows of [-5,+5] month.  
 
3.3. Validating the measure: “failed-deal” analysis 
 
Theory predicts that the synergy should disappear as the physical combination of two 
firms is expected to be futile, in other words, deal failure.  Table 6 reports the time-series 
movements of CAR, CAVR and CSYN during [-1, +5] event months for 154 failed takeover 
samples. In this table, some failed deals which have the long negotiation period, measured 
as calendar days between the announcement and the withdrawn event, exceeding the 180 
days either have negative announcement CARs are removed from the original failed deal 
observations. 59 I divide the failed deal samples into two subgroups with the same criteria 
used by Bradley et al. (1983) into ‘Finally-Taken’ and ‘Remain-Independent’. The former 
includes deals which were initially withdrawn but finally taken over by another bidder 
within 5 years from the initial bid failure. The latter includes takeovers which is not taken-
over and remains independent firm even after 5 years. In the failed deal sample, 109 deals 
are included in the Finally-Taken group and 45 deals go to Remain-Independent group. 
Remain-Independent group is of interest in this paper since Finally-Taken group is  
                                                 
59 The first restriction makes the synergy measured in the [-1, +5] windows only includes the one 
remained even after the deal failure. From the 242 original failed deal observations in VALU sample 
group, 58 observations are removed by this restriction. The second restriction is adopted since this 
paper assumes non-negative takeover gains to target shareholders: synergy or information effect. 
There are few theories on the value-decreasing deal, i.e., with negative CAR, for target shareholders. 
Negative abnormal return to the takeover announcement may represent the possibility of the 
agency cost of the target management. However this is beyond the scope of this paper at this point 
and time. Additionally, 30 observations are removed from this restriction 
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Table 6 
Failed deal : Finally-taken  vs. Remain-independent deals 
This table reports cumulative abnormal return (CAR), cumulative abnormal analyst value revision (CAVR) and cumulative synergy (CSYN) for the 154 "failed 
deal" samples in the corresponding monthly accumulation window starting from one month before the announcement. "Failed deal" sample includes U.S. 
domestic control-oriented mergers and acquisition deals between public firms valued over one million dollars from 1980 to 2006 and target firms are 
identified in SDC, CRSP, COMPUSTAT and I/B/E/S and its initial offer is withdrawn instead of successfully closed. Furthermore, this failed merger sample is 
divided into two groups as "finally-taken (FT)" and "remain-independent (RI)" group. The former is successfully acquired by other takeover offer within 5 
years from its initial offer while the latter is not. "Cumulative abnormal return (CAR)" is an aggregation of abnormal returns calculated using the market 
model with OLS errors and equally weighted CRSP index estimated for [-283, +32] CRSP trading day windows. "Cumulative abnormal analyst value revision 
(CAVR)" is an aggregation of abnormal analyst value revision obtained from the method introduced in this paper where the intrinsic value revision is 
calculated by "three period residual income model" empirically performed by Frankle and Lee (1998) and abnormal revisions for those corresponding those 
three years are calculated according to the method used by Brous and Kini (1993).  "Cumulative synergy (CSYN)" is an aggregation of synergy calculated as a 
difference between abnormal return and abnormal analyst value revision for each observation. CAR, CAVR, and CSYN are reported as those average terms of 
observations in their corresponding months. The null hypothesis is that these average values equals zero. For t-statistics, portfolio time-series method by 
Brown & Warner (1985) is used for CAR and cross-sectional standardized t-statistics are used for CAVR, CSYN. For testing the null hypothesis that the 
difference of CAR, CAVR, CSYN equals zero, student t-statistics under the unequal variance assumption. These t-statistics are reported below each of the CAR, 
CAVR, CSYN.  and statistical significances are denoted as *(10%), ** (5%) and ***(1%).  
Monthly 
event 
window 
  CAR  CAVR  CSYN 
 
Finally-taken 
(n=109) 
Remain-
independent 
(n=45) 
Difference Finally-taken (n=109) 
Remain-
independent 
(n=45) 
Difference Finally-taken (n=109) 
Remain-
independent 
(n=45) 
Difference 
(-1,-1) -1.06% 2.08% 3.14% 0.57% 2.40% 1.83% -1.52% 0.19% 1.71%
-0.75 0.799 1.21 0.50 1.48 0.88 -0.85 0.08 0.59
(-1,0) 25.64% *** 27.09% *** 1.44% 2.86% * 3.36% 0.50% 22.79% *** 23.73% *** 0.94%
12.882 7.354 0.29 1.73 1.51 0.17 7.30 6.49 0.20
(-1,1) 26.75% *** 23.79% *** -3.00% 3.76% * 7.71% ** 3.96% 22.99% *** 16.07% *** -6.90%
10.971 5.274 -0.48 1.95 2.66 1.12 6.10 3.56 -1.18
(-1,2) 26.61% *** 17.82% *** -8.80% 4.54% ** 8.95% *** 4.42% 22.07% *** 8.86% -13.20% * 
9.454 3.421 -1.28 2.37 3.19 1.27 5.61 1.60 -1.95
(-1,3) 27.35% *** 9.75% ** -17.60% ** 4.57% ** 8.85% ** 4.28% 22.78% *** 0.90% -21.90% *** 
8.688 1.674 -2.31 2.35 3.05 1.20 5.09 0.16 -3.01
(-1,4) 27.64% *** 9.68% * -18.00% ** 4.41% ** 9.48% *** 5.07% 23.23% *** 0.21% -23.00% *** 
8.016 1.518 -2.29 2.17 3.32 1.39 4.89 0.04 -3.26
(-1,5) 26.65% *** 8.99% * -17.70% ** 4.59% ** 8.46% *** 3.87% 22.05% *** 0.53% -21.50% *** 
    7.155   1.305   -2.00    2.30   2.75   1.05    4.23   0.09   -2.65   
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Figure 3. Remain-Independent Deals
This figure shows average values of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and cumulative
average abnormal analyst value revision(CAVR) on takeover announcement for "initially-failed
takeover"deals which is not successfully acquired by any other bidder within 5 years from its
initial offer. "CAR" is calculated from the market model and "CAVR" is from three period residual
income model proposed by Frankle and Lee (1998) where its three period component of
abnormal earnings forecast revisions are followed by Brous and Kini (1993).
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
CA
R, 
CA
VR
Month from announcement
CAR
CAVR
Figure 4. Finally-Taken  Deals
This figure shows average values of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and cumulative
average abnormal analyst value revision(CAVR) on takeover announcement for "initially-
failed takeover"deals which successfully acquired by other takeover offer within 5 years from
its initial offer. "CAR" is calculated from the market model and "CAVR" is from three period
residual income model proposed by Frankle and Lee (1998) where its three period component
of abnormal earnings forecast revisions are followed by Brous and Kini (1993).
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more likely implement the successful takeover by any other bidder in the long run so that 
the market participants may expect this fact through various sources of information.  
 In consistent with the theory, 24% of CSYN at the announcement month dramatically 
shrinks to zero at the end of five months from the announcement for the Remain-
Independent group while the Finally-taken group maintains its level around 23%. On the 
other hand, CAVR has similar pattern between two groups where it continues to increase 
from the announcement up to 5% in the “Finally-Taken” group, or 9% in the “Remain-
Independent” group at the end of five months from the announcement. This result 
indicates that the deal failure does not affect the stand-alone measure of the information 
effect, CAVR.60 From a different angle, CAR converges to CAVR in the Remain-Independent 
group. Another column of this table shows that 27% CAR at the announcement month 
shrinks to 9%, slightly over the 8.5% CAVR at the five months from the announcement.  
 However, in the Finally-Taken group, CAR and CAVR do not converge but show 
separate sample paths apart to the end (27% vs. 5%). Figure 3 and 4 graphically 
summarize these empirical results. Furthermore, these patterns are robust in CAR model 
and sub-grouping which will be discussed later. 
 
  
                                                 
60 For testing the statistical significance, portfolio time series (Brown & Warner 1985) is applied to 
the CAR while the cross-sectional standard deviation test is applied to the CAVR. This is because for 
the case of analyst forecast revision data, there is only a small number of observations are available 
outside the event window, i.e. small observations for estimation, so that it does not add much value 
to calculate the variance of value revisions for the target firm with these small observations. FYI, 
other alternative tests has similar results for significance of CAR measure: e.g., Patell’s test (Patell 
1976); estimated GLS(Sanders & Robins 1991); Collins-Dent test (Collins & Dent 1984); the 
standardized cross-sectional test (Boehmer et al. 1991); cross-sectional standard deviation; 
generalized sign tests (Cowan 1992).  
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3.4. Sources of Gains 
 
Table 7 reports the results of two kinds of univariate analyses in order to examine the 
source of measured synergy or the information effect. First, CAVR and CSYN with short 
event horizons are reported for different subgroups divided by proxy variables 
representing sources of takeover gains argued by previous studies. Next columns provide 
Pearson correlation coefficients between these measures for each corresponding variable. 
3.4.1. Sources of the information effect 
  ‘Tobin’s-Q’, defined as market value of total assets divided by its book value, is 
adopted as a proxy of management efficiency following to existing literature (e.g., Lang et 
al. 1989). Theory predicts that the greater the acquirer’s Tobin’s-Q, i.e. efficient 
management, the greater the CAVR should be observed. Panel-B of this table divides 
takeover deals into a large and small group according to the median value of each 
accounting variable. Results show that the higher the bidder’s Q, the greater the CAVR is 
reported. The Large group has a greater CAVR (3.9%) than the small group (2.8%); 
however, these are not statistically significant. This may reflect the difficulty of measuring 
the management efficiency exclusively as well as precisely. In order for the takeover 
sample to be more disciplinary, I compare this Tobin’s-Q only in failed deals. This is 
because failed takeovers are more likely to be a disciplinary takeover as shown in the 
Panel-A of this table. Failed deals have a significantly greater CAVR than successful ones 
(6.2% > 2.7%). Therefore, if I compare Tobin’s-Q in the failed merger samples then the 
difference in the information effect becomes significant. The high bidder Q group with 
failed outcome has a far greater CAVR than that of the small group (10.2% > 2.6%) 
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Table 7 
Univariate analysis 
This table reports the three performance measures of takeover announcement as of CAR, CAVR, and CSYN by 
sub-groups segmented by deal and firm characteristics. Samples are 1,356 U.S. domestic control oriented 
takeover deals between public firms from 1980 to 2006 where the target is identified in SDC, CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S, and both acquirer and target are covered by COMPUSTAT. "Cumulative abnormal return (CAR)" is 
an aggregation of abnormal returns calculated using the market model with OLS errors and equally weighted 
CRSP index estimated for [-283, +32] CRSP trading day windows. "Cumulative abnormal analyst value 
revision (CAVR)" is an aggregation of abnormal analyst value revision obtained from the method introduced 
in this paper where the intrinsic value revision is calculated by "three period residual income model" 
empirically performed by Frankle and Lee (1998) and abnormal revisions for those corresponding those 
three years are calculated according to the method used by Brous and Kini (1993).  "Cumulative synergy 
(CSYN)" is an aggregation of synergy calculated as a difference between abnormal return and abnormal 
analyst value revision for each observation. CAR, CAVR, and CSYN are reported as those average terms of 
observations. Accumulation is applied for monthly event window of [-1,3] for each of them in this table. 
'Liquidity' is defined as cash (Compustat data36) divided by book value of asset (Compustat data44). 
'Leverage' is defined as book value of debt divided by market value of equity which is calculated as a sum of 
book value of debt and market value of equity. 'BEME' is defined as book value of equity (Compustat data60) 
divided by market value of equity followed by Fama-French (1996). "Capitalization (CAP)" is defined as 
market value of equity at the end of previous month from takeover announcement. Statistical significances of 
coefficients are denoted as *(10%), ** (5%), *** (1%). 
Variables Subgroup Comparison  Correlation  CAVR [-1,+3] CSYN [-1,0,+3] CAVR [-1,+3] CSYN [-1,0,+3]
A, Deal dummy d=1 d=0   d=1 d=0            
  
1980s 3.8% 3.3% 31.1% 23.4% ** 0.010 0.083 *** 
1990s 3.4% 3.1% 25.1% 22.8% 0.008 0.035 
Success 2.7% 6.2% ** 26.5% 15.5% *** -0.079 ** 0.138 *** 
Cash-only 5.4% 2.6% ** 30.5% 22.4% *** 0.069 ** 0.115 *** 
Stock-only 2.7% 3.8% 21.5% 26.4% ** -0.032 -0.079 ** 
Hostile 4.4% 3.1% 29.5% 24.2% 0.021 0.046 
Tender-offer 5.3% 2.9% * 34.3% 22.1% *** 0.054 0.154 *** 
Competing bid 7.6% 2.8% ** 15.9% 25.5% *** 0.085 ** -0.097 *** 
Same industry 3.4% 3.2% 22.6% 27.7% ** 0.008 -0.079 ** 
B. Firm financials (Large) (Small)   (Large) (Small)          
     
Acquirer liquidity 3.3% 3.4% 25.8% 23.1% 0.024 0.051 
Acquirer leverage 2.7% 3.9% 23.5% 25.4% -0.072 ** -0.023 
Acquirer OCF 3.8% 2.9% 25.7% 23.2% 0.019 -0.001 
Acquirer Tobin's-Q 3.9% 2.8% 25.0% 23.9% 0.015 -0.019 
(& Failed) 10.2% 2.6% ** 6.5% 23.0% ** 0.136 * -0.185 ** 
Acquirer BEME 3.6% 3.1% 23.1% 25.7% -0.001 0.010 
Acquirer CAP 1.8% 4.9% ** 25.4% 23.4% -0.105 *** 0.037 
Target Tobin's-Q 3.0% 3.6% 22.4% 26.4% * -0.024 -0.115 *** 
Target BEME 4.2% 2.5% 26.7% 22.1% ** 0.142 *** 0.070 ** 
Target CAP 1.2% 5.5% *** 19.8% 29.1% *** -0.154 *** -0.183 *** 
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and the correlation between the CAVR and acquirer’s Tobin’s-Q is also significantly positive 
(0.201). Some researchers suggest hostility as a symptom of a disciplinary motive (Morck 
et al. 1988; Mitchell & Lehn 1990), however, the empirical results show weak evidence for 
this argument. Hostile takeover has a greater CAVR than a friendly one (4.4%>3.1%); 
however the difference is not statistically significant.61 These results are graphically 
summarized in the Figure 5.62 
 In order to capture the symptom of target share undervaluation, suggested by the 
theory as another important source of information effect,  large book-to-market value of 
equity (BEME) and the small market capitalization (CAP) for target firm is adopted 
following to  
 Fama & French (1996). In consistent with theory, the large target BEME group has a 
significantly greater CAVR than the small group (4.2% > 2.5%) and the small CAP target 
group has a significantly greater CAVR (5.5% >1.2%). One interesting result is about cash-
only deals which may be another candidate of information containing takeover bid. This 
group has a significantly greater CAVR than the stock included deals (5.3% > 2.8%). 
Correlation table provided in the Appendix shows that cash-only deals are positively 
correlated with target book-to-market ratio (0.11) and negatively correlated with the  
                                                 
61 An alternative explanation on hostility may be provided. Bhagat et al. (2005) argue that hostility is 
a symptom of agency costs. In our model, agency cost does not affect the information effect but 
affects share revaluation in a positive direction. Therefore, if we assume that hostile takeovers has a 
mixed type of disciplinary and hubris/agency-cost motives, then the combination of significantly 
greater CAR and insignificantly greater CAVR for hostile takeovers against a friendly one could be 
rationalized. 
 
62 Table 7 applies to the 810 ACCO samples since accounting variables such as BEME or Tobin’s-Q 
are considered simultaneously as well as deal characteristics. However, all of above results, as long 
as it is regard to the deal characteristic, are also robust in the 1,372 VALU sample. 
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target capitalization (-0.14) with significances. This may suggest that cash-only deals may 
be motivated, to some extent, by acquiring the undervalued target share.63  
3.4.2. Sources of Synergy  
In spite of recent findings by Devos et al. (2009), it still seems to be hard to explicitly 
measure the synergistic gain with some accounting data. Synergy measure, CSYN, in this 
paper is also the implicit measure driven by CAR and CAVR. With these shortcomings as 
taken, most of the empirical results support the existing literature. 
                                                 
63 However cash-only deal dummy does not significantly correlated with acquirer’s Tobin’s-q which 
is considered as a proxy of disciplinary takeover. Therefore, these types of takeover deals are more 
likely to be acquisitional rather than disciplinary according to the empirical results in this paper.  
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Figure 5 . Information effect by subgroup 
This figure shows cumulative abnormal anlyst value revision (CAVR) on the takeover announcement for 
810 U.S. domestic deals ("ACCO" sample). Abnormal analyst value revision is calculated from "three 
period residual income model" empirically performed by Frankle and Lee (1998) where abnormal 
revisions for those corresponding three periods are calculated according to the method used by Brous 
and Kini (1993).
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Asquith et al. (1983) argue that synergistic takeovers are more likely to succeed since it 
gains for shareholders of both the acquirer and target. The table shows that successful 
takeovers have a significantly greater CSYN than failed deals (26.5% > 15.5%). 
Furthermore, CSYN is positively correlated with a successful dummy (0.138) while CAVR is 
negatively correlated with successful dummy (-0.079). Based on these findings, successful 
dummy is the most obvious variable to differentiate the synergy and information effect in 
this table. Bradley et al. (1983) argue that a tender offer is motivated by synergy. In the 
table, tender offers have a significantly greater CSYN than mergers (34.3% > 22.1%) while 
the CAVR does not differentiate the tender offers and mergers. The other deal 
characteristics may support the above findings. Since a tender offer normally entails a cash 
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Figure 6 . Synergy by subgroup 
This figure shows cumulative abnormal anlyst value revision (CAVR) on the takeover announcement 
for 810 U.S. domestic deals ("ACCO" sample). Abnormal analyst value revision is calculated from 
"three period residual income model" empirically performed by Frankle and Lee (1998) where 
abnormal revisions for those corresponding three periods are calculated according to the method 
used by Brous and Kini (1993).
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payment, a significantly greater CAR of cash-only deals against stock included deals (30.2% 
> 22.4%) can be rationalized.64 Andrade et al. (2001) argue that the mergers in 1990s may 
be a period of synergistic opportunities initiated by industry restructuring or deregulation 
which is consistent with neo-classical theory of merger waves. Empirical evidence seems to 
support their findings. Although the 1990s dummy does not differentiate the CSYN from 
other period (25.1% vs. 22.8%) with statistical significance, it is statistically significant 
under 10% when only merger samples are considered (23.4% vs. 18.8%). These results are 
graphically summarized in the Figure 6. 
3.4.3. Synergy vs. Information 
Table-8 reports multiple linear regression results for the CAVR and CSYN on several deal 
and firm characteristics. Three different specifications best explaining the CAR or CAVR are 
reported respectively in this table. Closely correlated deal variables, e.g. “success and 
competing” or “% of stock and tender offer” do not enter as explanatory variables at the 
same time. Most of the results are consistent with the previous univariate analysis and the 
existing literature. In the model-1 of CAVR regressions, significantly negative coefficient (-
0.034) for successful dummy is reasonable considering that disciplinary takeover is more 
likely to be failed. Furthermore, variables representing undervaluation of the target share 
also have appropriate coefficients both in direction and statistical significance; target 
BEME (0.067), and target capitalization (-0.014). Coefficient for bidder’s BEME 
representing the restructuring potential of the target firm by efficient bidder management 
shows appropriate direction (-0.040) with statistical significance.   
                                                 
64 In conclusion, our empirical results suggest that cash only deals include deals of both synergistic 
and informational takeovers. This is consistent with an argument that cash-only deals are usually 
value creating deals (Travlos 1987) 
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Table 8 
Multiple Regression 
This table reports results of least square multiple regression for two dependent variables of CAVR and CSYN 
on the variables representing deal or firm characteristics. Samples are 810 U.S. domestic control oriented 
takeover deals between public firms from 1980 to 2006 where the target is identified in SDC, CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S, and both acquirer and target are covered by COMPUSTAT ("ACCO").  "Cumulative abnormal analyst 
value revision (CAVR)" is an aggregation of abnormal analyst value revision obtained from the method 
introduced in this paper where the intrinsic value revision is calculated by "three period residual income 
model" empirically performed by Frankle and Lee (1998) and abnormal revisions for those corresponding 
those three years are calculated according to the method used by Brous and Kini (1993).  "Cumulative 
synergy (CSYN)" is calculated by subtracting CAVR[-1,+3] from CAR[-1,0] which is obtained by the market 
model with OLS error. CSYN and CAVR are reported as those average terms of observations. 'BEME' is defined 
as book value of equity (Compustat data60) divided by market value of equity followed by Fama-French 
(1996). "Capitalization (CAP)" is defined as market value of equity at the end of previous month from 
takeover announcement. Panel-B presents Pierson correlation coefficients among residuals from six different 
regression specifications in Panel-A.  Statistical significances of coefficients are denoted as *(10%), ** (5%), 
*** (1%). 
A. Regression                              
Variables CAVR [-1,+3] CSYN [-1,0,+3] 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant   0.046 * 0.019   0.024   0.097 ** 0.169 ** 0.135 ** 
 1.86  1.21  1.27   2.28  4.69   2.76
Success (1/0) -0.034 * 0.104 *** 0.104
 -1.74 3.12  3.13
Competing bid (1/0) 0.046 ** 0.047 ** -0.084 ** 
 1.98  2.04  -2.11 
% of stock -0.002 -0.037
 -0.14  -1.33
Tender-offer (1/0) 0.023 0.019 0.081 *** 0.088 *** 
 1.26  1.06  2.57  2.80 
Hostile (1/0) -0.009 -0.005 0.002 0.134 *** 0.109 ** 0.153 ***
  -0.33   -0.18   0.07   2.82  2.35  3.24
Same industry (1/0) 0.010 0.007 0.006 -0.027 -0.020 -0.031
  0.71  0.54   0.44  -1.13   0.3999  -1.31
Bidder BEME -0.040 * -0.044 ** -0.044 ** -0.005 0.008 -0.008
 -1.74   -1.97  -1.98  -0.13   0.21   -0.21
Bidder CAP 0.000 0.031 *** 0.036 *** 0.031 ***
 0.04  3.91  4.70  3.84
Target BEME 0.067 *** 0.066 *** 0.067 *** 0.026 0.025 0.027
 3.49  3.44  3.48  0.80  0.02  0.84
Target CAP -0.014 *** -0.015 *** -0.016 *** -0.056 *** -0.058 *** -0.057 ***
     -2.62     -3.39   -3.44   -6.05    -6.20    -6.03  
Adj. R-square 0.041   0.043   0.041   0.090   0.084   0.084   
Observations   810   810   810     810   810   810   
B. Correlations among residuals       
CSYN [-1,0,+3]   CAVR [-1,+3]       4   5   6   
1 -0.410 *** -0.406 *** -0.415 ***
2 -0.404 *** -0.410 *** -0.419 ***
3   -0.415 *** -0.412 *** -0.410 ***               
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Competing bid dummy also have significantly positive coefficient (0.046) in the model 2. 
Dummy variables representing synergistic gains as discussed before, have significantly 
positive regression coefficients: successful (0.097); success (0.104), hostile (0.134); tender-
offer (0.081). Coefficients in accounting variables show that synergy is greater when large 
bidder (0.031) acquires small target (-0.056). Overall, success dummy and competing 
dummy most differentiate the synergy and information effect with adverse sign of 
coefficients in this table.  Panel B presents correlation between residuals from CAVR and 
CSYN regressions. For every match from each three regressions, they are strongly and 
negatively correlated under 1% significance level. This may indicate that when there is a 
lot of new information revealed by the announcement, the synergies tend to be low. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Revisiting failed-deal analysis 
 
One of the decisive empirical evidences for information effect is that announcement CAR 
approach to CAVR after the deal is withdrawn shown in figure 3. However, a lot of existing 
literatures has raised methodological concerns in long-term event studies using the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as a measure of the share revaluation (see Barber & 
Lyon 1997; Kothari & Warner 1997; Andrade et al. 2001). They are concerned that this 
CAR measure is not robust in the benchmark return estimation and some model 
assumptions. 65 Although this paper may not belong to the long-horizon event study, 
                                                 
65 For the robustness of the CAVR, it has some limitations to be examined because it uses relatively 
small observations to estimate the expected revision so that alternative approach except averaging a 
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further evidence of robustness of this abnormal return measure is helpful to reinforce the 
empirical findings. 
 In conclusion, the finding is robust in the CAR calculations. Table 9 reports the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) calculated from different ways with daily66 
stock return data. Let us first stick to the previous subgroup definition such as Finally-
Taken and Remain-Independent and OLS errors in the model. To the market model, base 
model to estimate the benchmark return in this paper, Fama-French 3 factor model or 
Fama-French 3 factor model with momentum factor, i.e., 4 factor model, is compared. They 
yield similar CARs (7.34% or 9.48%) with that of the market model (8.99%) in both 
subgroups and these values are also similar to CAVR (8.46%).  However, with the GARCH 
error assumption, CARs are over-estimated relative to that of OLS assumption. This means 
that the synergy measured as difference between CAR and CAVR is also greater in the 
GARCH assumption so that Remain-Independent group has some positive synergy at the 
end of the event window instead of being totally disappeared. Overall, these results 
reinforce the argument that total takeover gains to target shareholders in the Remain-
Independent deals dramatically shrink toward the level of the information effect. In other  
 
                                                                                                                                                
constant estimation period is hard to launch. We try to increase the number of observations for the 
estimation by grouping forecast revisions sharing the same fiscal period index, i.e. FY1, FY2, FY3 
instead of sharing the same forecast end date. However although this model can increase 
observations, it does not appropriately capture abnormal reactions on the takeover event.  
66 Long horizon analysis with monthly returns do not used in the table. This is from the concern that 
benchmarking the recent five year return performance, for example, might overstate the recent 
performance of the status-quo target firm. Since most target firms suffer from their recent poor 
stock performances in the sample. For 4,740 deals in the PRIC samples, average market adjusted 
return of the target share with long horizon, [-74,-11] event months, is 0.31% while the same return 
for the short horizon, [-11,-4], recent eight months, is -0.23%.  Accounting performance also shows a 
similar pattern. The average operating cash flow (OCF) of the target firm continuously decreases 
during the 5 years prior to the takeover announcement from 12.0% to 10.8%. 
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Table 9 
Robustness of CAR models & assumptions 
This table reports cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) for 154 failed takeover deals which have non-
negative abnormal returns for the event month with the market model, default model used in this paper. 
Results with various assumptions are reported for the CRSP daily trading day estimation window; [-283, -32]. 
To estimate the benchmark return, three different models are applied; market model, Fama-French 3 factor, 
Fama-French 3 factor with momentum factor. For considering the error of the model, the results from both OLS 
and GARCH are reported. Samples are divided into two groups in which the first group represents synergy 
contained one ("Finally-Taken" or "Reoffered") while the other group represents the one not containing the 
synergy ("Remain-Independent" or "Abandoned"). "Finally-Taken" group means its initial offer is withdrawn, 
but, successfully acquired by other takeover offer within 5 years from its initial offer while "Remain-
independent" group is finally withdrawn, i.e., not taken by any others. "Reoffered" means the initial offer is 
withdrawn but the other bid is offered subsequently or concurrently by another acquirer within one year from 
the deal-failure while "Abandoned" means no subsequent offer occurs. By default, OLS error is assumed and 
additionally alternative results of "GARCH" error assumption are provided in second panel below the OLS 
results. For comparison purpose, cumulative abnormal analyst value revisions for the corresponding groups 
are also reported in the panel-B of this table. The null hypothesis is that the CAR or CAVR equals zero. t-values 
are reported below the CAR or CAVR which the former is calculated from the time-series portfolio method by 
Brown and Warner (1985) and the latter is the cross-sectional standardized t-score. Statistical significance 
denoted as *(10%), ** (5%) and *** (1%).  
 Finally-Taken vs.
Remain-
Independent Reoffered vs. Abandoned 
    (n=109) (n=45) (n=95)  
(n=59)
A. Cumulative abnormal return  
CAR [-1,+5] Market Model 26.65% *** 8.99% * 28.52% ***  10.17% * 
 (OLS)  7.16           1.31           7.95            1.58 
 Fama-French (3 factor) 25.66% *** 7.34% 27.22% ***  9.18% * 
 6.96           1.08           7.65            1.44 
 Fama-French (4 factor) 24.99% *** 9.48% * 26.30% ***  11.05% ** 
            6.78               1.40             7.38               1.75   
CAR [-1,+5] Market Model 29.67% *** 14.73% ** 31.80% ***  14.85% ** 
 (GARCH)           7.97           2.13           8.87            2.29 
 Fama-French (3 factor) 29.18% *** 12.60% ** 30.90% ***  13.76% ** 
          7.93           1.84           8.68            2.16 
 Fama-French (4 factor) 28.69% *** 14.79% ** 30.22% ***  15.63% ***
            7.80               2.17             8.48               2.47   
B. Cumulative abnormal analyst value revision 
CAVR [-1,+5]   
4.59% **   8.46% *** 4.05% *   8.42% ***
         2.30               2.75             1.92               3.09   
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words, almost all of synergy gains expected at the announcement not expected to 
implement any more as deal fails.   This table also provides the CAR results according to the 
alternative definition of subgroups. “Reoffered” represents failed deals where at least one 
other suitor places takeover bids to the same target within a year from the initial deal 
failure. “Abandoned” represents the opposite case where no other bidder is interested in 
taking over the control of the target firm for a year. “Abandoned” is matched to the 
“Remain-Independent” group in the previous setting which is considered as having low 
probability of realizing the synergy. Almost all results are also robust in this sample 
description. CAR of “Abandoned” group has 9% to 11% which is slightly over the CAVR 
(8.4%) in the estimation models with OLS errors. Appendix 5 shows movements of CAR 
and CAVR calculated from six different settings for two different subgroups of failed deals. 
All six pairs of figures show similar patterns.  
 
4.2. Sources other than synergy 
 
 This paper assumes that CSYN measure only contains synergy. However, as reviewed in 
the literature review, other combinational gains from “stock-market-driven (SMD)” or 
“agency-cost-driven (ACD)” takeover may be included in the CSYN since it is calculated by 
subtracting the information effect, CAVR, from total takeover gains, CAR. Second panel of 
Table 10 reports four performance measured of takeover announcement compared in 
subgroups divided by variables representing these two sources. Before this work, the first 
panel provides the correlations.   
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Table 10 
Sources other than synergy: SMD vs. ACD 
This table reports the statistics which provide how four different takeover performance measures are varied 
by factors other than synergy or the information effect. Panel-A reports correlation between these 
performance measures (Premium, CAR, CAVR, CSYN) and sub-groups segmented by SMD, bidder Governance 
index, and bidder Entrenchment index. Samples are from U.S. domestic control oriented takeover deals 
between public firms from 1980 to 2006 where the target is identified in SDC, CRSP, and I/B/E/S. "Premium" 
is calculated from the four weeks pre-offer stock price of the target firm. "Cumulative abnormal return (CAR)" 
is an aggregation of abnormal returns calculated using the market model with OLS errors and equally 
weighted CRSP index estimated for [-283, +32] CRSP trading day windows. "Cumulative abnormal analyst 
value revision (CAVR)" is an aggregation of abnormal analyst value revision obtained from the method 
introduced in this paper where the intrinsic value revision is calculated by "three period residual income 
model" empirically performed by Frankle and Lee (1998) and abnormal revisions for those corresponding 
those three years are calculated according to the method used by Brous and Kini (1993).  "Cumulative synergy 
(CSYN)" is calculated by subtracting CAVR[-1,+3] from CAR[-1,0]. Premium, CAR, CAVR, and CSYN are 
reported as those average terms of observations.  'SMD' represents stock-market driven takeover defined as 
stock-only deals where bidder BEME is both less than the target BEME (relatively over-valued) and less than 
33 percentile of all observations. 'BEME' is defined as book value of equity (Compustat data60) divided by 
market value of equity followed by Fama-French (1996). "Governance index" is defined as Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) and the "Entrenchment index" is defined as Bebchuck, Cohen, and Farrell (2009). P-values are 
provided below each of the correlation coefficient in Panel-A and the student-t statistics for null hypothesis 
that the measure equals zero. Statistical significances of coefficients are denoted as *(10%), ** (5%), *** (1%). 
Premium CAR [-1,0] CAVR [-1,+3] CSYN [-1,+3] N 
Panel-A. Correlation coefficient                  
SMD (1/0) 0.0280 -0.0243 0.0113 -0.0296 810 
0.446 0.490 0.748 0.400 
Bidder Governance index -0.0225 -0.0607 -0.0157 -0.0517 637 
0.578 0.126 0.693 0.193 
Bidder Entrenchment index -0.0746 * -0.1041 ** 0.0142 -0.1088 ** 551 
0.086 0.015 0.739 0.011 
Panel-B. Subgroup comparison                     
(1) SMD dummy                  
0 0.4007 *** 0.2804 *** 0.0325 *** 0.2479 *** 696 
29.41 25.74 4.86 21.68 
1 0.4282 *** 0.2599 *** 0.0382 ** 0.2217 *** 114 
12.06 8.37 2.58 6.91 
[ 0 - 1 ] -0.027 0.0205 -0.006 0.0262 810 
-0.76 0.69 -0.32 0.84 
(2) Bidder Entrenchment index 
0 0.4218 *** 0.3156 *** 0.0152 0.3004 *** 71 
12.95 9.1 0.85 8.25 
1 0.4108 *** 0.3140 *** 0.0418 *** 0.2722 *** 99 
10.93 9.84 3.45 9.15 
2 0.3972 *** 0.2697 *** 0.0215 ** 0.2482 *** 134 
16.91 11.43 2.09 10.42 
3 0.4169 *** 0.2612 *** 0.0161 0.2451 *** 123 
13.07 10.76 1.11 8.94 
4-6 0.3424 *** 0.2296 *** 0.0309 ** 0.1988 *** 124 
13.97 11.01 2.55 9.6 
 [(0,1) - (4,5,6)]  0.0730 ** 0.0850 ** -0.0002 0.0852 *** 294 
    1.99   2.59   -0.01   2.64     
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 SMD dummy is generated following to Devos et al. (2009). In order to exploiting the 
overvaluation of the acquirer share to the target share, two conditions should be met. First, 
the method of payment should be a form of stock exchange67 (Shleifer & Vishny 2003). For 
this consideration, stock-only deals are chosen in the sample. Second, the bidder stock 
should be relatively overvalued against the target share. Third, absolutely overvalued 
bidders are only chosen. Book-to-market value of equity (BEME) is used as a proxy for 
share overvaluation. For satisfying the absolute overvaluation, bidders should have BEME 
less than 33 percentile of total 810 bidders in the ACCO sample. SMD dummy does not have 
significant correlation neither with CSYN nor with the other performance measures. This is 
also supported by subgroup comparison in the second panel. CSYN is not significantly 
different between SMD (24.8%) and non-SMD (22.2%) takeover.  
 In order to examine the gains from the agency-cost-driven takeover, bidder 
Entrenchment index68, developed by Bebchuck, Cohen, and Farrell (2009b) is used as a 
proxy. Rational for this is that the more bidder managements are protected by their 
corporate governance system, the more likely to raise the agency-cost oriented takeover 
bid resulting in the positive premium, CAR, or CSYN. However, empirical evidence in this 
paper shows the opposite direction. As shown in the panel A of Table 10, bidder 
Entrenchment index is negatively correlated with premium (-0.0746), CAR (-0.1041), and 
CSYN (-0.1088) with significance while it is not significantly correlated with CAVR. 
                                                 
67 Stock-only payment itself is necessary for overvaluation-leveraged takeovers, but not sufficient as 
our results in table 6 indicate. Stock-only payment samples have a significantly lower CAR than a 
non-stock payment deal (20.6% < 29.4%). This is partly because non-stock payment deals are more 
likely to be synergistic. In some sense, stock payment may act as a signal that the bidder has little 
wealth-creating investment opportunity or a bidder is inefficiently managed (Myers & Majluf 1984). 
 
68 This table also provides the correlation results using Governance index developed by Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (20003). However this index is not significantly correlated with any of four 
performance measures.  
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Subgroup comparison results shown in the second panel of this table are consistent with 
correlations in the upper panel. Specifically, CSYN decreases from 30.04% to 19.88% as the 
bidder Entrenchment index increases. Testing for difference between highly entrenched 
group with 4, 5, 6 index and less entrenched group with 0 or 1 index, reports significantly 
positive difference (0.0852) under 1% significance level. This empirical result suggests that 
takeover gains included in CSYN does not include the agency-cost of bidder management.  
 These are also supported by univariate analysis previously discussed in Table 7. 
Harford (1999) argues that a more cash rich acquirer is likely to raise the agency cost 
involved takeover bid.69 Maloney et al(1993) also argue that a high leveraged firm is less 
likely to make agency cost oriented investment decisions since it has less resource to waste 
on unprofitable mergers and acquisitions. Both the bidder’s liquidity and the leverage are 
not significantly correlated with CSYN. Moeller et al (2004) argue that a large acquirer 
tends to pay more than the small ones and this might represent the agency cost. The results 
do not support this argument. Bidder capitalization is not significantly correlated with 
CSYN and rather it is negatively correlated with CAVR. Diversification, a deal between two 
different two digit SIC codes, is suggested as a proxy of agency-cost (Morck et al. 1990; 
Lang & Stulz 1994). There is mixed result with regard to focused deal, between same two-
digit SIC codes. Focused deal dummy is significantly negatively correlated with CSYN. 
However this does not simply indicate that the conglomerate deal is driven by agency cost 
of bidder management since diversification could be a rational response to poor growth 
opportunity or technological shock (see Lewellen 1971; Campa & Kedia 2002; Graham et 
                                                 
69 He found that cash-rich firms are more likely to attempt acquisitions which is value decreasing, 
more frequently diversifying acquisitions. Furthermore, these acquisitions are followed by 
abnormal declines in the operating performance. 
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al. 2002; Villalonga 2004). Finally, I do not find the evidence that successfully explains 
agency-cost oriented takeovers in this paper.70  
 
4.3. Limitations 
 
4.3.1. Analyst’s earnings forecast 
Throughout the paper, I assume that security analysts forecast “stand-alone” value of the 
target firm so that their forecasts are not affected by the takeover announcement news. 
However, I are not certain that all the analysts would act like this. Some analysts might 
quickly absorb this big corporate news into their forecasts. Furthermore, individual 
security analysts may have a difference in experience, employer size, analyst coverage, 
brokerage house characteristics, or firm-specific experience (Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 
1999; Mikhail et al. 2003). Unfortunately, consensus forecasts data does not capture these 
features. Lastly, I/B/E/S earnings forecasts are only available for a few fiscal years ahead. 
Most security analysts in I/B/E/S release their forecasts only for two fiscal years ahead 
while forecasts for three to five upcoming fiscal years are relatively sparse. This may 
impede the precise quantification of the information effect calculated from the discounted 
sum of an infinite series of future residual income changes. Although these limitations 
above are beyond the scope of this paper at this point, they are challenging topics in 
corporate finance or accounting research.  
  
                                                 
70 There is few theories on whether the agency cost is solely motivate the takeover deals or not. 
Rather it is more likely to be combined or camouflaged with other value creating motives such as 
synergy or the information effect. Furthermore, it is hard to measure explicitly the agency cost from 
total takeover gains to target shareholders. This may be challenged in the separate project.  
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Table 11 
Generalizability : Sample comparisons 
This table reports deal characteristics of four different sample groups. Group "DEAL" is composed of samples 
from U.S. domestic takeover deals from 1980 to 2006 where the offer price is over US$ 1 million and the 
acquirer pursued more than 50% of target shares. "PDEAL" sample contains only deals between public firms. 
"PRIC" group samples additionally require to be listed on CRSP. Furthermore, "VALU" samples additionally 
require to be covered by Compustat and I/B/E/S dataset. The last group "ACCO" includes samples where the 
acquirers are also identified by Compustat. 'Hostile' is classified as the way that Security Data Company (SDC) 
defines. 'Conglomeration' is the deal in which acquirer and target has different two digits SIC codes. 'Days to 
closing (withdrawn)' is the day difference between announcement and closing (withdrawn). Premium is 
calculated from the four weeks pre-offer stock price of the target firm. Student's t test is performed for 
performance measures; CAR, CAVR, and CSYN. Null hypothesis is the mean value is different from the other 
samples. Statistical significances are denoted as *(10%), ** (5%), *** (1%). 
  
Samples 
DEAL   PDEAL   PRIC   VALU   ACCO   
A. Deal Characteristics 
Successful  84.0% 89.1% 86.0% 82.4%  81.4%
Cash only 31.3% 21.3% 27.8% 24.3%  25.4%
Stock only 30.6% 42.9% 40.0% 41.6%  39.9%
Hostile attitude 3.5% 2.4% 5.2% 7.4%  8.0%
Tender offer  10.4% 11.5% 21.1% 19.4%  18.9%
Competing bid 6.1% 4.3% 8.7% 10.7%  10.9%
Conglomeration  47.3% 39.2% 36.9% 36.7%  35.9%
Days to closing (median) 109 113 125 126  122
Days to Withdrawn (median) 90 91 78 87  97
Premium (median) 36.7% 43.8% 41.1% 39.6%  40.5%
B. Performance Measures 
CAR [-1,0] 26.81% 25.83%  28.58%
CAVR [-1,+3] 3.91%  3.77%
CSYN [-1,0,+3] 21.71%  24.44%
Number of observations    21,636       13,070         4,740         1,372             810  
 
 
4.3.2. Sample selection 
Another possible concern for the empirical results is that the samples may be too small to 
generalize empirical findings to original population. Number of observations is 
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dramatically reduced from 13,070 to 810 as queries apply. This dramatic sample reduction 
might entail a so called “sample selection bias”. For example, “survival bias” or “size bias” 
may be occurred since CRSP, I/B/E/S, and Compustat are usually covers large firms which 
survive. As shown in Table 11, performance measures such as CAR, CAVR, and CSYN do not 
show much difference from each other. The problem occurs because the CAR is not 
available for the original samples and the CAVR and CSYN is not available for the two 
largest samples. Panel-A shows that most deal characteristics are similar among four 
samples except some combative features. The proportion of hostile bids and tender-offers 
in the DEAL or PEAL samples are smallest among all sample groups. The empirical results 
show that both of these types of takeovers have a significantly greater CAR, but not a 
significantly different CAVR with the other subgroups. In this context, I can presume that 
26% of the CAR is possible to underestimate the original share revaluation in spite of no 
quantitative evidence. However, there is not much clues to suspect the 4% CAVR reported 
in this paper is biased from the original information effect in population. 
 
  
 82
CHAPTER Ⅳ 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DRIVEN TAKEOVERS 
 
1. THE BASIC SETTING 
 
1.1. The timeline and the management contract 
 
There are N firms71 in the economy that produce distinct products. There are sufficiently 
many shareholders in each firm who only own capital. There are also a number of agents 
who only own production technology in the executive labor market. According to the 
management contract, the agent, who would otherwise be without a wage, rents his or her 
human capital or technology to shareholders. The employment contract would have been 
signed at time ܿ and would terminate at time ܶ when the manager would retire. The event 
date of the interest is denoted as time ݐ, and the agent will make the takeover decision at 
this time. Given this context, let us call the pre-takeover period the ‘stand-alone period’ and 
the post-takeover period the ‘takeover period’ from this latter event date forward. 
Similarly, the reader should assume that no share of the firm in question has been acquired 
by any other firm during the first period since this model is focused on the takeover 
decision making period. During his or her tenure as a CEO, the managing agent performs 
three typical firm activities, operation, investment, and finance. Both the stock market and  
                                                 
71 Firm is defined as a nexus of contracts among factors of production where the ownership of 
securities and the corporate control are separated following to Fama (1980). He argue that 
shareholders, the risk bearers in the modern corporation, also have markets for their services-
capital markets-which allow them to shift among teams with relatively low transaction costs and to 
hedge against the failings of any given team by diversifying their holdings across teams. Therefore, 
the separation of ownership and management implies the efficient allocation of risk bearing in this 
context. 
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t T 
           
  Stand-alone operation Post-takeover operation   
    (Investigate) (Negotiate)    
         
          
Contract signed w. shareholders        
     Governance given       
Agent begins operation         
1. 100% equity financing       
2. Choose operation slack       
3. Investment Capital ends with K  
  Technology observed by shareholders  
   Productivity shock between (t,T) signaled to the agent 
   Takoever gains evaluated 
   Agent decision making  
      1. Investment & takeover  
      2. Financing (internal fund + equity)  
      3. Operation slack Contract ends 
   Receiving payment 
   Agent retires 
    
Figure 7 Timeline of the model 
This table shows the information flow during the corporate takeover process. Factors which is suggested as a driving force of 
merger wave is denoted as * or **. Neoclassical theory argues that the industry-wide shock on foreign competition, energy 
price, technology shock such as financial innovation derives merger wave, and these variables are denoted as '*'. Meanwhile, 
the behavioral theory argues that the over-valued stock market may derive the 1990s merger wave that is express as '**'.  
'Internal (firm) situation, denoted as '***', such as free cash flow, corporate governance system, and executive compensation 
scheme, may be determined endogenously as a result of the optimal control mechanism or another kind of agency cost by the 
existing CEO. However I assume these variables are exogenously given for the simplicity of the discussion in this paper. I also 
assume that there is an industry-wide spillover effect, denoted as '(+)' when the takeover offer is announced. 
 
 
the executive labor market are assumed to be temporarily inefficient but not necessarily so 
in the long run. The compensation to the agent is paid at the end of the contract 
period ሺܶሻ in the form of equity shares. Both the agent and the shareholders are risk 
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neutral, and there is no depreciation of the capital. Figure 7 summarizes the basic timelines 
and the assumptions under this model.   
 
1.2. The firm value 
 
Let ௜ܲ௧ be the per capita value of a firm ݅ at time ݐ. This would be a sum of discounted future 
cash flows estimated at time ݐ precluding the takeover of any other firm.72 This value can 
be written as follows.  
 ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ܨሺ݇݅ݐ, ݍ௜௧ሻ ,       ݅ ൌ 1, … , ܰ. (11)
 This value has two components, the observed value function and misvaluation of 
the firm. The former, ݌ሺ݇, ݍሻ,  is observed by shareholders from the previous operations 
including investments. I will assume that both ݇௜௧ and ݍ௜௧ are non-negative real numbers 
which are bounded above and ݌ is strictly increasing in ݍ௜௧,  and ݂ሺ0,0ሻ ൌ 0.73  In order to 
compare the productivity of the agents with different kinds of capital, all capital stocks are 
expressed into the capital ݅, ݅. ݁. , ௝݇௧ ൌ ܭ௝௧ሺ௉೔೟௉ೕ೟ሻ. The remaining misvaluation component, ߠ௜௧, 
is unknown to shareholders at time ݐ. This misvaluation can represent the upcoming firm 
                                                 
72 In other words, this current price is written as ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ܧ௧ ∑ ሼݕ௜௦/ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜௦ሻሽ∞௦ୀ௧  where ݎ represents the 
cost of capital while ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݂ሺ݇௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻ represents the free cash flow (FCF) of the firm which is the 
operating cash flow (OCF) net of the capital expenditures (CAPEX) for given time. 
 
73 One simple form of the price function where capital and the productivity determine the firm’s 
cash flow is the linear function such as ݌ ൌ ݍ݇ . Alternatively, we can consider the convex price 
function such as ݌ ൌ ݍ݇ െ ܿሺ݇ሻ where ܿᇱሺ݇ሻ ൐ 0,   ܿᇱᇱሺ݇ሻ ൐ 0 so that the profitability declines after 
some point of the capital accumulation. Since the price is a sum of future cash flows which are 
determined by a lot of factors, it is hard to identify an appropriate functional specification. Therefore 
the simple ݍ݇ function seems to be enough to discuss the complicated argument such as takeovers. 
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specific productivity shock or represent the insufficient disclosure74 of the firm status or 
merely represent the market microstructure. This information is asymmetrically delivered 
to the manager who controls the firm while it is not available to shareholders who expect 
that the future will be the same as today at best. Therefore, the misvaluation parameter has 
time dependent value that can be expressed as  ሺߠ௜௦|ݏ ൏ ݐሻ ൌ 1 and  ሺߠ௜௦|ݏ ൒ ݐሻ ൌ ߠ௜௧.75 For 
simplicity, this information asymmetry is resolved until time ܶ, which is considered as a 
sufficiently lengthy period of time from the current time ݐ so that the share price is equal to 
the intrinsic value of the capital. Now this relation can be written as 
 ௜ܸ௧ ൌ ௜ܲ௧ߠ௜௧ ൌ ௜்ܲ, (12)
where  ܧሾߠ௜௧ሿ ൌ 1, and  ߠ௜௧ ؿ ሺ0, ∞ሻ. As long as ߠ௜௧ , the misvaluation parameter, has a 
different value from one, the misvaluation of a share occurs and this can be expressed as 
follows. 
 
[Definition 1] The stock market is efficient when  θ୧୲ ൌ 1 across all firms and times while it 
is inefficient otherwise. In an inefficient market at time t, the share is undervalued when 
θ୧୲ ൐ 1, overvalued when θ୧୲ ൏ 1, and appropriately valued when θ୧୲ ൌ 1.  
 
 
 
                                                 
74 For various reasons, the stock market is not perfectly efficient. Most of all, there can be insufficient 
disclosure or window dressings on the status quo of the firm fundamentals, or privately obtained 
information by the manager on the changes in the future operating environment such as 
government regulation, investment opportunity, industry structure, oil shock, foreign competition, 
technology innovation, relations with labor union, or the firm’s corporate governance scheme.  
 
75 In the continuous time setting, this misvaluation is assumed as diffusion process such as  
݀ߠ௜௧ ൌ ߤ݀ݐ ൅ ߪ݀ݖ௜௧ where ݖ௜௧ is standard Brownian motion. However, the dynamics in continuous 
time is not the main interest of this paper, we remains this kind of extension as a future research. 
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1.3. Operation 
 
Let us look at the productivity ሺݍ௜௧ሻ of a manager in detail. Assume that the executive labor 
market is sufficiently efficient so that shareholders can hire the manager who best fit the 
firm regardless of the firm size. This appropriate fit means that an entrepreneur’s 
production technology is appropriately evaluated in the market. For simplicity of 
discussion, I will assume that this potential technology ሺݍכሻ is the same across firms.76 
Regulations ሺ߬ҧሻ 77 governing all firms restrict the technology in some way. The typical 
agency problem, the deviation of a manager’s interest from those of the shareholders, 
occurs in any corporation with ownership and control that are separate. Let  ܽ௜௧ be the 
average value of this operational slack chosen by the manager of the firm ݅ from the 
beginning of the contract up to time ݐ. Then the difference in the production technology 
observed by shareholders at time ݐ is determined only by this amount of the operational 
slack. This difference can be written as follows 
 ݍ௜ ൌ ݍכ െ ߬ҧ െ ܽ௜ ൌ ݍത െ ܽ௜ , (13)
where  ܽ௜ ؿ ሺ0, ݍതሻ. For simplicity, assume that the operational slack is not time variant so 
that the technology does (ݍ௜ ൌ ݍത െ ܽ௜ሻ. That is, the manager keeps the level of the per 
capita operational slack to the end of the contract period once it is set at the beginning 
stage of the whole operation. In order to analyze this operational slack, one should 
                                                 
76 Alternatively, we may assume that the best production technology to each firm is different across 
firms. For example, the technology difference may be associated with the distinct vintage of each 
firm (product) following to the product life cycle theory. However, we adopt the same potential 
technology endowment assumption in order to analyze the effect of distinctive management slack or 
firm specific governance system. 
 
77 Taxation, industry regulation, anti-takeover or antitrust rules may be included in this category.  
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introduce the per capita agency cost function of ܩሺ݇, ܽሻ satisfying ܨሺ݇, ݍ േ ܽሻ ൌ ܨሺ݇, ݍሻ േ
ܩሺ݇, ܽሻ, and ܩሺ݇, ܽሻ is also strictly increasing in ܽ.78 
 
[Definition 2] Denote ܣ௜௧ is the per capita agency cost of the firm ݅ at time ݐ. Then the 
agency cost is defined as the difference between the share value running at full capacity of 
operational technology ሺݍതሻ and that with some positive amount of operational slack ሺܽ௜ሻ. 
That is, ܣ௜௧ ൌ ܩሺ݇௜௧, ܽ௜ሻߠ௜௧ ൌ ܨሺ݇௜௧, ݍതሻߠ௜௧ െ ܨሺ݇௜௧, ݍ௜ሻߠ௜௧  where  ݍ௜ ൌ ݍത െ ܽ௜ . 
 
 Also assume that the management slack is divided into the two following 
components: one for the employee and the other for managers themselves. Denote the 
former as employee slack ሺܽ௜ாሻ and the latter as private management slack ሺܽ௜ெሻ. Examples 
of employee slack include idle or excessive labor, generous employee retirement plans, or 
fringe benefits excessive as compared to other. Since these values are determined by the 
manager who controls them, this slack may represent the weakness of the manager from 
the perspective of shareholders. In contrast, management slack may represent private 
benefits enjoyed by the manager. Typical examples are perks such as private jets or 
facilities that present costs to the firm and deferred payments such as beneficiary pension 
plans or farewell bonuses at retirement. Assume that only the management slack can add 
to the utility of the manager while the employee slack is attributed to employees. In this 
context, if corporate restructuring is defined as an attempt by managers to reduce 
operational slack, managers might prefer employee slack as the target. If I let ߶௜ be the 
                                                 
78 ܩሺ݇, ܽሻ can be driven from the relation of production function and the price function. Let the 
periodic per capita agency cost function ݃ሺ݇, ܽሻis defines as same fashion as above, that is, 
݂ሺ݇, ݍ േ ܽሻ ൌ ݂ሺ݇, ݍሻ േ ݃ሺ݇, ܽሻ. Then the value from the unit operational slack ܩሺ݇, ܽሻ is calculated 
as ܩ௜௧ ൌ ܧ௧ ∑ ሺ݃ሺ݇௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻ/ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜௦ሻሽ∞௦ୀ௧  where ݎ represents the cost of capital.  
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portion of the total agency cost attributed to the agent, then the following equation 
summarizes the above argument.79   
 ܽ௜ ൌ ܽ௜ெ ൅ ܽ௜ா  (14)
 ܩሺ݇௜௧,  ܽ௜ெሻ ൌ ߶௜ ܩሺ݇௜௧, ܽ௜ሻ (15)
Note that the employee slack ൫ܽ௜ா൯ is given as constant over time for a single manager while 
different among managers so that this figure represents the competence of the manager. 
Therefore, the management portion of the total slack ሺ߶௜ሻ is determined by the operational 
slack, which is controlled by the manager. Theoretically, the manager can choose both the 
total operational slack ሺܽ௜ሻ and the management portion ሺ߶௜ሻ independently. However, 
each manager in his or her own labor market is different in the ability to control this 
employee slack which determines the difference in technology. Employee retirement plans 
or fringe benefits are not likely to be changed by the manager once they are set, and they 
seem not to be flexible even in the case of declensions in expected performance.  
 
1.4. Investment 
 
A firm’s capital ሺ݇ሻ is the other factor affecting a firm’s profit in addition to the manager’s 
technology ሺݍሻ and the productivity shock ሺߠሻ discussed above. There are two ways to 
increase capital for a firm. Internal investment is one way to increase the same kind of 
capital as the current one, and a corporate takeover is a way to acquire a different kind of 
                                                 
79 It is assumed that there is no dead weight loss for benefits from the operational slack to be 
transferred to private benefits with different destinations. In terms of utility, private benefits from 
the operational slack is not equal to the monetary compensation since some part of the former is 
earmarked to be consumed such as private jet or health center while the cash compensation has no 
such restriction. Furthermore, some extra money or efforts may be required to implement it since it 
would be monitored by the board. This utility discount is a kind of dead weight loss we call in this 
paper. 
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capital since each firm produces distinct products.80 Let ݖ be the investment opportunity 
set for bidder firm, and then this can be expressed as ܼ ൌ ሼݔ; ݆ ് ݅ሽ where ݔ represents the 
internal investment and ݆ the takeover of another firm. No depreciation or perfect 
maintenance of a capital level is assumed. Any takeover may create value.  A takeover could 
be the result of the operating side such as production efficiency, reduction in capital 
expenditure, or increasing market power. Or it could be the result of the financial side such 
as tax deduction or decreasing the cost of capital by reducing the default risk.81 Whatever 
the reasons are, let us call  ݏ൫݇௜௧, ௝݇௧൯  the synergy creating the desire for a takeover, which 
is the increased value of the combined firm compared to the summation of the stand-alone 
firm values without the takeover. That is, ݏ௜௧௝ ൌ ݏ൫݇௜௧, ௝݇௧൯ ൌ ܧ௧ ∑  ݏݕ݊௜௦௝ஶ௦ୀ௧  . For simplicity of 
discussion, I will consider the situation where the internal investment and the takeover are 
mutually exclusive projects because of budget constraints. Let ݒ௜௧௝  be the per capita value of 
the firm  ݅ taking over the firm  ݆  and ݕ௜௧௫  be the corresponding value without a takeover. 
Then these values are written as follows: 
 ௜ܸ௧௫ ൌ ௜ܲ௫் ൌ ܨሺ݇௜௧ ൅ ݔ௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻ ߠ௜௧, (16)
 
௜ܸ௧
௝ ൌ ௜்ܲ௝ ൌ ଵ൫ଵା఑ೕ൯ ܨሺ݇௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻߠ௜௧ ൅
఑ೕ
ሺଵା఑ೕሻ ൛ܨ൫ ௝݇௧, ݍ௜௧൯ߠ௝௧ൟ ൅ ݏ௜௧
௝ . (17)
In this equation ߢ௝ represents the relative size of the target capital defined as a target 
capital divided by the bidder capital. Note that the synergy is not applied to the second 
term of the RHS in equation (12). This is because the change in the technology of the stand 
                                                 
80 Alternatively, the corporate takeover can be viewed as an acquisition of old capital while the 
investment is corresponding to the acquisition of new capital. See Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) 
for this argument. 
 
81 For the summary of discussions on these sources of takeovers including recent empirical tests, see 
Devos et al (2009). They find, however, that most of the synergy is coming from the reduction in 
investment, which is almost up to 80 percent of the total synergy measured.  
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alone target firm ሺݍ௝௧ ՜ ݍ௜௧ሻ could be achieved without the physical combination of two 
firms, i.e., through merely replacing the management team from the outside executive labor 
market.  
 Let ܿሺ݅௜௧, ݇௝௧ሻ be the total cost to be paid for investing the same kind of capital ሺ݅௜௧ሻ 
and for acquiring a different kind of capitalሺ݇௝௧ሻ already employed by the other firm. Most 
importantly, the purchasing price should be counted as a primary cost for both of the firms 
which is basically evaluated by the current cost of each capital ሺ݌௜௧, ݌௝௧כ ሻ. Note that the 
purchasing price of the target capital  ሺ݌௝௧כ ሻ is greater than the current price considering the 
fact that some premium would be added in practice ሺ݌௝௧כ ൐ ݌௝௧ሻ.  In order to focus on the 
takeover, assume that there is no additional cost to install the newly added capital for both 
kinds. However, the takeover requires additional cost which is not paid to the target 
shareholders such as in the case of a golden parachute. This additional cost is denoted as 
݁ሺ ௝݇௧, ௝߳௧ሻ. Then the investment cost is given as follows.82 
 ܥ௜௧௫ ൌ ܿ൫ ௝݇௧ ൌ 0൯ ൌ ߢ௫ ௜ܲ௧, (18)
 ܥ௜௧௝ ൌ ܿ൫ ௝݇௧ ൐ 0൯ ൌ ߢ௝൛ሺ1 െ ߱ሻ ௝ܲ௧כ ൅ ௝߳௧ൟ. (19)
 
  
                                                 
82 The periodic synergy of the combined firm in the integral of Equation (8) can be defined as 
follows;  
ݏݕ݊௖௧ ൌ ሺܱܥܨ௖௧ െ ܥܣܲܧܺ௖௧ሻ െ ଵሺଵା఑ೕሻ ሺܱܥܨ௜௧ െ ܥܣܲܧ ௜ܺ௧ሻ െ
఑ೕ
ሺଵା఑ೕሻ ൫ܱܥܨ௝௧ െ ܥܣܲܧ ௝ܺ௧൯, 
where the operating cash flow of the target ሺ݆ሻ is defined under the production technology of the 
bidder ሺ݅ሻ management. In the extreme case where the synergy is not from the operating efficiency 
but only from the reduction in investment which is argues by Devos et al. (2009), then the periodic 
synergy is written as follows; ݏݕ݊௖௧ ൌ ሺ ଵሺଵା఑ೕሻ ܥܣܲܧ ௜ܺ௧ ൅
఑ೕ
ሺଵା఑ೕሻ ܥܣܲܧ ௝ܺ௧ሻ െ ܥܣܲܧܺ௖௧. Also note that 
we omit the other costs of takeover such as relocation cost, financial or legal advising cost for 
simplicity of discussion. 
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1.5. Finance 
 
One thing I should now consider is the budget constraints of the manager. For the time 
being, let us assume that no debt or equity financing is used by firms and no dividend is 
paid to shareholders. That is, the internal investment and the takeover are both financed 
only by the internal fund83, which is generated from past operations. Now the budget 
constraint of the agent can be written as 
  0 ൏ ܥ௜௧௭ ൑ ∑  ݕ௜௦ሺ݇௜௦, ݍതሻ௧௦ୀ଴ ൌ തܻ௜௧. (20)
While the second inequality relation ሺܥ ൑ തܻሻ constrains the size of the additional 
investment (or the takeover target), the first inequality condition ሺ0 ൏ തܻሻ acts as a 
necessary condition for the additional investment (or takeover).  
 
[Definition 3] Corporate takeover is defined as acquiring the control of the target firm by 
the incumbent management team of the bidder firm with a substantial amount of the 
internal fund generated from past operations. 
 
Note that the full capacity of the production technology ሺݍതሻ is included in the Equation (4) 
instead of the agency cost involved one ሺݍ௜ሻ. This figure does not represent the 
nonexistence of the agency problem, but rather the result from the assumption of 
reinvestment by the agent. This issue will be discussed in Section 3. Finally, Equation (10) 
                                                 
83 Alternatively the external financing amount is a function of the internal fund, i.e., the result from 
the past performance of the firm which is positively associated with the financing capacity. 
However, this may not change the fundamental fact that the internal fund is the most important 
factor of budget constraint. Arguments with financing conditions or the optimal capital structure in 
the case of takeover are beyond the scope of this paper, we defer these analyses to the future 
research.  
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makes the agent’s problem at time ݐ be independent of any past decision making by the 
agent so that he or she only cares about future cash flow from the current investments.  
 Note that the RHS of Equation (9) is not affected by the management slack decision 
but only affected by the series of capital up to time ሺ݃௜ሺ݇௜כሻሻ. That is, the agency problem 
does not distort the previous capital investment decisions that are the result of the 
optimization of the agent. This lack of distortion enables the manager’s decision on future 
investment and the takeover to be immune from past decisions. In contrast, previous 
management slack decision increases the expected payoff of the agent by increasing the 
compensation ratio. If I denote the new compensation ratio as ߤᇱ, then this is greater than 
the original one and positively associated with the operational slack ሺߤᇱሺܽ௜ሻ ൒ ߤሻ.  
 
1.6 Manager’s problem 
 
Let ௜்ܹ be the compensation given at manager retirement and ߤ be a compensation rate 
which is given at the contract date and assumed to be the same across the firm for 
simplicity. Since the compensation is given in terms of equity shares, i.e., ߤ ௜்ܲ where 
 ߤ ൌ ݇௜଴ெ/݇௜଴ , this can be described as 
 ௜்ܹ ൌ ݓഥ௜଴ ൅ ߤ݇௜଴ሺ ௜்ܲ െ ௜ܲ଴ሻ, (21)
where ݓഥ௜଴ ൌ ߤ ௜ܲ଴. Note that the compensation is composed of a fixed salary ሺݓഥ௜଴ሻ and 
performance-based bonus ሺߤ ׬ ݀ ௜ܲ௦ሻ, which represents the value increase of the share 
during the whole contract period. Meanwhile, the agency cost is another source of the 
payoff to the agent. 
 A௜௧௫ ൌ ሺ݇௜௧ ൅ ݔ௜௧ሻܩሺ݇௜௧ ൅ ݔ௜௧, ܽ௜ሻ ߠ௜௧, (22)
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 A௜௧௝ ൌ ݇௜௧ܩሺ݇௜௧, ܽ௜ሻߠ௜௧ ൅ ௝݇௧ ܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ܽ௜൯ߠ௝௧. (23)
 Let Π௜௭்  be the total contingent payoff of the agent of firm ݅ at time ݐ with possible 
events of investment; internal investment ሺݖ ൌ ݔሻ or the takeover of target ሺݖ ൌ ݆ሻ. If I 
denote Π௜௧ as the payoff generated from the previous operations, then the contingent gains 
to the agent from these investment opportunities are the difference between the 
contingent payoff and the continuation payoff. Mathematically,  
 Π௜௭் ൌ Π௜௧ ൅ ߤ݇௜଴Δ ௜ܲ௧௭ ൅ ߶௜Δܣ௜௦௭ , (24)
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ Δ ௜ܲ௧௭ ൌ ሺ ௜ܸ௧௭ െ ܥ݅ݐݖ െ ௜ܲ௧ሻ, and Δܣ௜௦௭ ൌ ܣ௜௦௭ െ ௜ܲ௧, ݖ א ܼ holds. The per capital value gains 
ሺΔ ௜ܲ௧௭ ሻ from the investment can be calculated as a difference between the post investment 
value of the share net of its cost and the current share price before the investment decision. 
For simplicity of discussion, assume that no further investments will be made until the end 
of the contract, i.e., keeping the same level of the capital after the investment at time ݐ. 
Finally, the bidder agent’s problem can be written as follows. At time ݐ, the agent of the 
firm ݅ will choose investment project ݖ א ܼ which maximizes the contingent payoff ሺΠ௜௭் ሻ 
under the firm’s budget constraint and the corporate governance reigning at that time.  
 Therefore, the takeover occurs only when there exists any ݆ ് ݅ satisfying 
ሺΠ௜௧௝ െ  Π௜௧௫ ሻ ൐ 0.  From the previous equations, I can derive the payoff gain from takeover 
to the internal investment as follows (see Appendix for derivation). 
ሾ Π௜௧௝ െ Π௜௧௫  ሿ ൎ ܻܵܰ ൅ ܴܵܶ ൅ ܸܣܮ ൅ ܣܩܥ (25)
 ܻܵܰ ൌ ߤ݇௜଴ݏ௜௧௝  (26)
 ܴܵܶ ൌ ఓ௞೔బ఑ೕሺଵା఑ೕሻ ܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ௝ܽ௧ െ ܽ௜௧൯ߠ௝௧  (27)
 ܸܣܮ ൌ ఓ௞೔బ఑ೕሺଵା఑ೕሻ ൛ܨ൫ ௝݇௧, ݍ௝௧൯ߠ௝௧ െ ܨሺ݇௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻߠ௜௧ൟ  (28)
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 ܣܩܥ ൌ ߟ߶௜൛ݔ௜௧ൣܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ܽ௜௧൯ሺߠ௝௧ െ ߠ௜௧ሻ൧ ൅ ߱ ௝݇௧߶௜ܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ܽ௜௧൯ߠ௝௧ ൟ  (29)
In these equations, ܻܵܰ, ܴܵܶ, ܸܣܮ, ܣܩܥ represent takeover gains to the agent over internal 
investment such as synergy, information gain, valuation gain, and agency gain. As I 
mentioned before, sources of the synergy, SYN, might be various, including tax benefits or 
any reductions in investment. The restructuring gain, RST, represents the gains from the 
information on the target firm which can be inefficiently managed  ሺ ௝ܽ௧ ൐ ܽ௜௧ሻ or the 
undervaluation of the firm, high ߠ௝௧.84 The valuation gain, VAL, is from the difference in the 
per capita value of two firms ሺ ௝ܸ௧ െ ௜ܸ௧ሻ since that value is defined as Equation (2). A few 
scenarios are possible for such a gain. It can occur when the target firm is undervalued 
while the bidder is appropriately valued. Another possible scenario is that the bidder firm 
is overvalued while the target is appropriately valued. Sometimes this gain may be 
achieved as long as the bidder firm is relatively overvalued as compared to the target firm 
when both firms are overvalued in a climate of general market overvaluation. Finally, the 
agency gain, AGC, may be positively associated with management slack ሺܽ௜ெሻ and the size of 
the stock exchange ratio ሺ߱ሻ and relative overvaluation of the target share to the bidder 
share ሺߠ௝௧ െ ߠ௜௧ሻ. 
 
[Definition 4] With takeover gains defined as Equation (16) to (19), a corporate takeover is 
synergistic if ܻܵܰ ൐ 0, restructuring if ܴܵܶ ൐ 0, valuational if ܸܣܮ ൐ 0, agency-cost driven if 
ܣܩܥ ൐ 0.  
                                                 
84  Grossman and Hart (1982) call the former as “allocational” while the latter as “acquisitional”. The 
allocational takeover is often labeled as “disciplinary” takeover. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) call 
the allocational one as “kick-in-the-pant’ hypothesis while the acquisitional one as “sitting on a gold 
mine” hypothesis. 
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Note that even though I label the takeover with valuational gains as a valuational takeover, 
market inefficiency ሺߠ௜௧, ߠ௝௧ ് 1ሻ affects most of the takeover gains and is hard to be 
separated from valuational takeovers alone. In addition, it is important to note that the 
information and valuation gain is positively associated with the relative size of the target 
firm capital over the bidder firm capital ሺߢ ௝ሻ. 
 
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND TAKEOVERS 
 
As Equation (19) shows, positive management slack gives the agent a substantial amount 
of implicit payoff. This section shows how this positive management slack is not only 
compatible with the management control mechanisms which have been developed since 
the modern corporation appeared, but it also can motivate a takeover. There are three 
major schemes to control the agent so as to remove the agency cost or the management 
slack of the firm operation: these are optimal contracting, the corporate board of directors 
as an internal control, and the threat of a hostile takeover by other firms.  
 
 2.1. Optimal contract 
 
An optimal contract is the compensation scheme which aligns the agent’s payoff with that 
of shareholders so that there is no incentive for the agent to deviate from the shareholders’ 
interests. Many performance-based executive compensation packages have been 
developed such as endowment of the equity, restricted shares, or management stock 
options. In this paper, I consider the case of equity based compensation.  
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Equation (14) shows that the agent’s payoff depends on two components, explicit 
compensation ሺߤ௜ ௜ܹ௭் ሻ and the implicit agency cost ሺ߶௜ܣ௜௦௭ ሻ. For simplicity, assume that the 
operational slack is chosen at the beginning of the contract and remains constant over 
time. Then the expected marginal payoff from this slack is calculated as follows (see 
Appendix for details). 
 ∂ஈ∂ ௔೔ ൌ ߤ௜
∂ ௐ೔
∂ ௔೔ ൅ ߶௜
∂ ஺೔
∂ ௔೔ ൌ ሺ߶௜ െ ߤ௜ሻܩሺ݇௜, ܽ௜ሻ . (30)
This equation indicates that the payoff of the agent increases as the operational slack 
increases whenever the management quota of the total agency cost is greater than the 
compensation ratio, i.e., the management quota of the total equity capital ሺ߶௜ ൐ ߤ௜ሻ if all 
other things are equal.  
 One critical assumption here is that the operational slack decision currently made 
does not affect the future path of capital accumulation. The budget constraint of the agent, 
Equation (10), assumes that the private benefits extracted from the operational slack by 
both the agent and employees remains in the firm. This retention is possible only when the 
agent and employees participate in the external financing activity as a shareholder or 
lender. Their consumption of these private benefits is delayed until time ܶ so that the 
money remains in the firm as a form of the capital asset instead.85  
                                                 
85 However, not all of the private benefit can be transferred to cash which is paid for the equity or 
debt purchase considering that the perks such as private jet cannot be translated into cash while the 
farewell bonus can be endowed with cash. Alternatively we can assume that the manager can 
finance the amount of money corresponding to the noncash benefit by private banking and reinvest 
to the firm. Or it may reflect the negligible size of the operating slack relative to the fund required to 
the corporate investment. In practice, this kind of management participation as shareholder or 
lender is observed in the case of leveraged buyout (LBO), specifically the management buyout 
(MBO). Whatever the rationales are, we can make the capital accumulation be free from the 
management slack decision from the above assumption that enables us to focus on the takeover 
decision making and the agency cost itself. 
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Figure 8 shows this relation with the simulated result with the simple linear production 
technology such as ݕ ൌ ݂ሺ݇, ݍሻ ൌ ݍ݇. The difference in the expected payoff is increasing as 
time goes by when management slack exists and is then reinvested into the shares. The 
dotted line represents the expected payoff in terms of management slack when the 
management portion of the slack  ሺ߶௜ሻ equals one while the solid line represents a situation 
without operational slack. The other case with positive  ሺ߶௜ሻ would be that obtaining 
between these two lines. Finally, the rational agent would choose positive agency cost as 
long as the agent is competent enough to transfer the shareholders’ benefits into private 
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Figure 8 . The operational slack and the payoff of manager
This figure shows simulated result of payoffs for the agent with and without operational
slack. Solid line represents the agent's periodic performance based payoff in the case of no
operational slack. Dotted line represents the opposite case. For comparison, some amount of
private payoff from the operational slack is reinvested to the same firm to the extent that it
makes the next period investment does not be affected by the previous slack decision. For
simulation, typical "y=qk" type production function is used where initial capital starts from 1
million and compensation ratio is 0.1 and technology parameter (q) equals 0.01 and slack
parameter (a) equals 0.1. No depreciation is assumed.
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ones, i.e., ߶௜ ൐ ߤ௜. Considering that CEO equity holdings are less than 1% on average in the 
public corporation, such an agency cost is probable. The fundamental reason behind this is 
that the agent would have a limited time horizon for his or her decision making. Although 
the restricted shares and stock options expand the prospect of the agent to a couple of 
years later than the case of equity endowment, these factors may not remove the agency 
cost incentive completely.86    
 
2.2. Board of directors  
 
Shareholders comprise the control mechanism to reduce the manager agency problem 
both internally and externally. The former is represented by the corporate board of 
directors while the latter is represented by a takeover.  
 
[Definition 5] The firm has ‘sound corporate governance’ if the board of directors only 
allows alternative investment proposals, including takeovers, of which NPV is expected to 
be not only positive but also greater than that of the incumbent internal investment 
project. The board of directors is effective if the agent having offered the negative NPV 
project is disciplined during his or her tenure.  
 
 Under sound corporate governance as defined above, a corporate takeover 
proposal is passed by the board of directors only when  ॱሾ Δ ௜ܲ௧௝ ሿ ൒ ॱሾ Δ ௜ܲ௧௫ ሿ, and ॱሾ Δ ௜ܲ௧௝ ሿ ൐
                                                 
86 In a dynamic situation where the operational slack is variant over time, the time to retirement for 
a agent may affect the magnitude of the agency cost over time. Empirical evidence shows that 
decision makings of old CEOs are more likely to be motivated by the agency cost.  
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0. This relation is rewritten as follows if the NPV of any investment project ݖ is defined in 
terms of price such as Δ ௜ܲ௧௭ ൌ ሺ ௜ܸ௧௭ െ ܥ௜௧௭ െ ௜ܲ௧ሻ where ݖ א ܼ (see Appendix for details).  
 ߛ௜ሼܻܵ ௜ܰ௧௘ ൅ ܸܣܮ௜௧௘ ൅ ܫܰܨ௜௧௘ ሽ ൐ ߦ ൐ 0, (31)
                ߛ௜ ൌ ௄೔೟௄೔೟ାఠ௄ೕ೟ ൌ
ଵ
ሺଵାఠುೕ೟ು೔೟
ഇೕ೟
ഇ೔೟
ሻ
 . (32)
Note that the ߛ௜ in Equation (22) represents the bidder shareholders’ ownership portion of 
the combined firm after the takeover, i.e. ௜ܸ௧௝ ൌ ߛ௜ ௜ܸ௧௝ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻ ௜ܸ௧௝ .  It is positively associated 
with the relative overvaluation of the bidder to the target firm, i.e., ఏೕ೟ఏ೔೟. This association is 
because of the different interests obtaining among the agent and the shareholders, who 
care about the relative overvaluation more than the agent since it increases their share 
over the future shareholders from the target firm as well as it increases the valuation gain 
(VAL). Note that this overvaluation gain is available only in the case of a positive stock 
exchange offer, i.e., ߱ ൐ 0. In the inequality described above, the superscript ݁ represents 
the expectation by the board of directors with their information set  ሺΩBሻ , which is 
between that of shareholders and the agent ሺΩS ൑ ΩB ൑ ΩMሻ; the more such shareholders 
are well-informed by the agent, the more accurately they evaluate takeover gains. Under an 
effective board of directors, expected gains are equal to the actual gains since the rational 
agent has no incentive to over-report takeover gains in order for the takeover proposal to 
be passed the board.  
 
[Hypothesis 1] Let the takeover and takeover gains be defined as in Definition 3,4 and 
Equation (16) ~ (19) and the board of directors as Definition 5. Then under a sound and 
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effective board of directors, the corporate takeover cannot be motivated only by the agency 
gain.87  
 
2.3. The market for corporate control 
 
A corporate takeover is known as an external market mechanism to discipline the 
inefficient incumbent management team. However, this control mechanism may fail to 
remove the agency cost completely as long as there is a firm-specific management 
entrenchment that is considered as an additional takeover cost to the potential bidder firm. 
 
[Definition 6] The market for corporate control is efficient when any positive restructuring 
gains from the difference in the agency cost are quickly realized by other superior 
management teams in the economy.  
 
 For various reasons, each corporation in the economy has its own management 
entrenchment, often in the form of corporate charters. One example of this management 
protection is from the stock market inefficiency assumed in this paper. As I mentioned 
before, there is information asymmetry among agents, boards of directors, and 
shareholders, i.e., ሺΩS ൑ ΩB ൑ ΩMሻ. Therefore, shareholders are exposed to the hostile 
tender offer when their share is undervalued. So-called corporate raiders, who seek out 
this undervaluation, attempt to acquire a substantial amount of target shares in the open 
market by tender offer. This tender offer would be hostile because the board of directors 
                                                 
87 In other words, the so called free cash flow hypothesis argued by Jensen (1986) may not be 
applied under the effective and sound board of directors. 
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and the management of the target firm would not be inclined to accept the offer. In other 
words, the premium might not be sufficient to its real hidden value if it is solely motivated 
by a restructuring gain. Shareholders have incentives to bolster the controlling right of the 
firm to some extent against any encroaching outside management teams. Poison pills, 
golden parachutes, or staggering boards are examples of such management entrenchment. 
Moreover, this entrenchment may be driven by the agents themselves. However, I have not 
considered this case because sound corporate governance has been assumed in this 
paper.88 Rational agents who know the risks of losing control of the firm because of outside 
competent managers will constrain their operational slack as much as possible as opposed 
to not being disciplined. However, management entrenchments add to the cost of any 
takeover to any external bidders so that some amount of operational slack is rationalized 
by managers as beyond the reach of this threat.89 Firm specific management entrenchment 
acts as an upper boundary to such slack. Finally, the agent will choose ܽ௜כ satisfying the 
following equation (see Appendix for the proof). 
 ܩሺ݇௜௧, ܽ௜כ ሻ ൌ ߳௜ . (33)
 As long as the management entrenchment is positive, the optimal agency cost is 
also positive. Equation (19) indicates that the agency gain is determined by the size of the 
capital acquired and the unit agency cost. Therefore, agency cost can motivate a takeover. 
 
                                                 
88 Optimal contract is the one which makes these operational slacks during the whole contract 
period be zero or the payoff ሺߨ௜௧ሻ is not a function of the operational slack ሺܽ௜ሻ. However this issue is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Some researchers find the evidences of the failure in the optimal 
contract with various reasons (see Bebchuck et al, 2004). 
 
89 Equation (6) is based on the assumption that the manger specific ߣ௜, management portion of the 
total operational slack, is expected as the same as those of the other managers ሺ݆ ് ݅). 
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[Hypothesis 2] Let the corporate takeover defined as Definition 2, 3 and assume that the 
stock market is inefficient. Then the agency cost driven takeover could occur even though 
the market for corporate control is efficient. 
 
3. MODEL IMPLICATIONS 
 
3.1. Stock market responses 
 
Market response is the evaluation of the market participants on the offered deal price with 
the available information at that time. The offered price ሺ ௝ܲ௧כ ሻ should be greater than the 
current price in order for the deal to be considered by target shareholders, and it should be 
less than തܲ௝௧௦  , which makes the takeover gain net of the additional takeover cost be zero. 
Therefore, the offer price is determined by the bargaining power of the target agent against 
the bidder agent which is denoted as ߚ௝௜ where ߚ௝௜ א ሺ0,1ሻ. If there are many potential 
bidders in the market for corporate control, then this parameter would be close to one. 
Since the offer also has the possibility to fail, bidders will evaluate the contingent payoff by 
incorporating the success probability of the deal. Let the bid premium and the success 
probability be ߨ௝௧ and  ߩ௝௧ where the premium is defined as the difference between the 
offered price and the pre-offer price for the target share. Then the share revaluation o f the 
target firm is written as  ௝ܲ௧ᇱ െ ௝ܲ௧ ൌ ߩ௝௧ߨ௝௧ ൌ ߩ௝௧ሺ ௝ܲ௧כ െ ௝ܲ௧ሻ , and this can be rewritten as 
follows. 
 
௝ܲ௧ᇱ െ ௝ܲ௧ ൌ ఘೕ೟ఉೕ೟ሺଵା఑
ೕሻ
ሺଵିఠሻ఑ೕ ቄ ܻܵܰ ൅ ܴܵܶ ൅ ܸܣܮ ൅ ߪܣܩܥ െ
఑ೕ
ሺଵା఑ೕሻ ௝߳ቅ  (34)
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 Note that under the sound and effective board of directors ሺߪ ൌ 0ሻ, the agency gain 
(AGC) would be zero given the corporate governance constraint. This equation indicates 
that the share revaluation of the target results from the four takeover gains and success 
probability and the relative size of the acquired capital. Given these parameters, the share 
revaluation of the bidder can be written as follows. 
 
௜ܲ௧ᇱ െ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ఘೕ೟ሺଵିఉೕ೟ሻሺଵା఑
ೕሻ
ሺଵିఠሻ఑ೕ ቄ ܻܵܰ ൅ ܴܵܶ ൅ ܸܣܮ െ
఑ೕ
ሺଵା఑ೕሻ ௝߳ െ
఑ೕሺଵିఠሻ
ሺଵା఑ೕሻ ߪܣܩܥቅ   (35)
As Equation (24) and (25) indicate, the direction and the magnitude of the share valuation 
is the same except for the agency gain. Since some part of the agency gain is paid as a 
premium unless the board of directors is both sound and effective, this factor increases the 
target share value while it simultaneously decreases the bidder share value. Under the 
sound and effective corporate governance system, the difference in the share revaluation 
between the bidder and the target depends only on the bargaining power and the relative 
size of the target firm since this share revaluation should again be normalized by its own 
price.  
 
3.2. Cross-sectional difference in the market response90 
 
Agency cost takeover is likely to occur in the case of stock exchange offers under favorable 
financing conditions and weak corporate governance systems. Loosening financing 
constraints will increase the size of the fund available to acquire the target. Loosening the 
efficiency of the corporate control market will also increase slack incentives, as will weak 
                                                 
90 From this section, please note that only the basic ideas are provided and detailed arguments are 
not sufficiently developed yet so that some sections even remain unwritten. The remaining contents 
are work in progress at this time on this preliminary draft.  
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and ineffective boards of directors. Firmly entrenched CEOs are likely to raise the agency 
cost oriented takeovers. Greater management entrenchment will increase the slack 
incentives. Stock offers increase the agency cost by increasing acquired capital. Cash offers 
can be one of any other types of takeover such as synergistic, restructuring, or valuation 
oriented ones. Hostile takeovers are likely to be disciplinary, which require the 
replacement of the incumbent management team. Given such a disciplinary context, 
tenders offer are more likely to be disciplinary in nature.  
 A conglomeration which is a takeover of a target within a different industry is likely 
to be a valuational takeover since the misvaluation of the target or the future prospects for 
profit might be different among different industries. Because of such differences, a focused 
deal is more likely to be a synergistic or a restructuring oriented one. However, the 
existence of a conglomeration effort itself does not indicate anything about the agency cost 
takeover. Under a weak and ineffective board of directors, the agent might have some 
incentives for entering a different industry for which information asymmetry between the 
agent and others is greater so that an agency cost takeover could occur. In the final 
analysis, this is the empirical issue to be resolved.      
 
3.3. Takeover waves 
 
A takeover wave can be explained by the industrial or overall market-wide shocks or 
factors which drive the takeover in the model. The 1980s are labeled as an era of hostile 
cash tender offer wave of takeovers. Given the arguments of this paper, takeovers from this 
period can be characterized as primarily motivated by the restructuring of inefficient 
targets, i.e., disciplinary takeovers. However, the major driving forces behind takeovers 
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during the 1990s are not yet identified. Friendly stock exchange offers have been common 
phenomena. Therefore, all types of takeovers except the disciplinary one can be the 
candidate during this period, whether synergistic, valuation, or agency cost.  
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CHAPTER Ⅴ 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
 
In this dissertation, I attempt to measure information effect explicitly so that I could 
decompose the takeover gains into the stand-alone information effect and combinational 
synergy gains from the takeover. Two competing hypotheses contradictorily posit that 
each one of these two takeover gains is dominant. Synergy hypothesis argues that 
combination gains are an overwhelming source of share revaluation while information 
hypothesis argues that the information effect is the major source of takeover gains.    
 I develop a model which differentiates these gains. The model attributes the 
information effect to a disciplinary or an acquisitional type of takeover, and also attributes 
the combinational gains to a synergistic, overvaluation-leveraged or hubris/agency-cost 
oriented takeover. After all, dominance between these takeover gains is a matter of how 
often these competing types of takeovers actually occur in the corporate control market. I 
quantify this information effect with new measurement based on the residual income 
valuation model. By a discounted summation of series of forecasted accounting earning 
revisions provided by security analysts, I measure an abnormal change in the intrinsic 
value of a target share around the takeover announcement. I call this measure of the 
information effect CAVR, compared to the other measure of share revaluation (CAR) or 
synergy (CSYN). I assume that financial analysts forecast the stand-alone earnings of the 
target firm regardless of the takeover announcement.     
 The evidence suggests that the information effect is approximately 4% while the 
synergy is about 22% in the 1,372 observations. Information effect takes almost over 1/6 
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of total takeover gains. Important implication, however, is that it is not negligible but 
significant. This is more evident in the failed merger sample considered as disciplinary 
oriented takeovers in this paper. In failed takeover sample, information effect (6.2%) takes 
more than 1/4 in total share revaluation.  
 The empirical analysis of CAR and CAVR is also consistent with the model 
prediction on failed mergers. I further separate the sample of unsuccessful targets that are 
subsequently taken over within five years from the initial offer, i.e. finally successful 
takeovers. With the new failed merger samples which only contain subsequently not-taken 
deals, I find that the positive CAR at the announcement dramatically shrinks and 
approaches to the CAVR after the deal is withdrawn. This is because the combinational 
gains become futile and only the information gains on the stand-alone target firm remains 
after the deal is broken.  
 I also find empirical evidences on sources behind the share revaluation and 
information effect. And disciplinary takeover that is expected to be failed or has a 
competent acquirer with a high Tobin’s-Q has a greater information effect. An acquisitional 
takeover exploiting the undervaluation of target share with a high book-to-market ratio 
and small market capitalization also has a significantly greater information effect. On the 
other hand, synergistic merger, which is expected to succeed and more likely to be a cash 
tender-offer, has greater share revaluation while it does not affect the information effect. A 
stock-market-driven takeover, in which, stock is preferred as payment and acquirer has a 
lower book-to-market ratio than the target stock, does not differentiate the synergy that 
means synergy measured in this paper does not contain the sources from this kind of 
stock-market-driven takeover. Furthermore, as long as the agency-cost oriented takeover 
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is concerned, which is characterized as cash rich, low levered, large size, and highly 
entrenched bidders, no evidence is provided.  
 Finally, it is possible to reconcile the two competing hypotheses from these 
empirical findings. In conclusion, both of the information effect and combinational gains 
are an important source of takeover gains although the former is relatively smaller than 
the latter. To measure the combinational gains such as synergy with more explicit way91, 
however, still remains as a challenging question. Future research may focus on discovering 
these specific gains more narrowly. Recently, Devos et al. (2009) measured synergistic 
gains and finds the specific sources behind it using Value Line analyst forecasts. They 
estimate the average synergy gains to be 10.3% of the combined equity value of a merging 
firm. Although it is hard to directly compare these results to the measured synergy 
(22.5%), it may help to imagine the relative importance between the synergy and the 
information effect.92 
  
                                                 
91 This synergy gain (10.3%) is calculated in terms of the cash flow return of a combined firm and 
again this is decomposed into operating (8.38%) and financial (1.64%) synergies. Major differences 
of this study with our study are that they use analysts’ forecasts from Value Line which has no 
optimism bias they argue, and they examine the abnormal revision within the short-term window 
around the deal closing date instead of the announcement date. Our method is difficult to apply to 
measure synergy gain following their methodology since observations in the estimation window to 
calculate the expected revision are significantly reduced if the event window is extended to the 
closing date. This could be discussed in a separate project.  
 
92 Some researchers try to measure synergy gains by a post-merger stock performance (Loughran & 
Vijh 1997; Rau & Vermaelen 1998; Andrade et al. 2001) or a post-merger operating performance 
(Healy et al. 1992). However, we do not introduce these long-term event studies in this paper since a 
number of methodological concerns have been proposed on these methods. 
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APPENDIX A. CALCULATING ANALYST VALUE REVISION 
 
This appendix gives additional details of deriving abnormal analyst value revision 
representing changes in share value of stand-alone firm. The intrinsic value of a share 
calculated from the residual income valuation model is written as follows in the “three 
period model” where residual incomes maintain their levels from the upcoming third fiscal 
year on. 
 
௜ܸ,௧כ ൌ ܤ௜,௧଴ ൅
ሺܨ௜,௧ଵ െ ݎܤ௜,௧଴ ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻ ൅
ሺܨ௜,௧ଶ െ ݎ௜ܤ௜,௧ଵ ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻଶ ൅ ෍
ሺܨ௧ଷ െ ݎ௜ܤ௜,௧ଶ ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻ௝
∞
௝ୀଷ
 
 
In this equation, ܨ௧௝ represents I/B/E/S analysts’ consensus earnings forecast for the ݆௧௛ 
upcoming fiscal year end at time ݐ. At the same token, intrinsic value of a share at time 
ݐ െ 1 is written as follows.  
 
௜ܸ,௧ିଵכ ൌ ܤ௜,௧ିଵ଴ ൅
ሺܨ௜,௧ିଵଵ െ ݎ௜ܤ௜,௧ିଵ଴ ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻ ൅
ሺܨ௜,௧ିଵଶ െ ݎ௜ܤ௜,௧ିଵଵ ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻଶ ൅ ෍
ሺܨ௜,௧ିଵଷ െ ݎ௜ܤ௜,௧ିଵଶ ሻ
ሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻ௝  
∞
௝ୀଷ
 
 
Analyst value revision at time ݐ, defined as a first difference of intrinsic value of share, 
normalized by its share price at time ݐ െ 1, denoted as ܲ, is written as follows.  
 
ܸܴ௜,௧ ൌ ௜ܸ,௧
כ െ ௜ܸ,௧ିଵכ
ܲ ൌ
∆ ௜ܸ,௧כ
ܲ  
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= ሺܤ௜,௧
଴ െ ܤ௜,௧ିଵ଴ ሻ
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ሺܨ௜,௧ଵ െ ܨ௜,௧ିଵଵ ሻ െ ݎ௜ሺܤ௜,௧଴ െ ܤ௜,௧ିଵ଴ ሻ
ܲሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻ  
 ൅ ሺܨ௜,௧
ଶ െ ܨ௜,௧ିଵଶ ሻ െ ݎ௜ሺܤ௜,௧ଵ െ ܤ௜,௧ିଵଵ ሻ
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ܲሺ1 ൅ ݎ௜ሻ௝
∞
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= ∆ܤ௜,௧
଴
ܲ ൅
∆ܨ௜,௧ଵ െ ݎ௜∆ܤ௜,௧଴
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∆ܨ௜,௧ଷ െ ݎ௜∆ܤ௜,௧ଶ
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∞
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In order to get the above analyst value revision, unknown future book values, ൫ܤ௜,௧ଵ , ܤ௜,௧ଶ ൯, 
should be determined. Clean surplus relation suggests that the book value per share equals 
to the book value per share at previous fiscal period plus earnings per share minus net 
dividends per share. From this relation, future book values are written as follows.  
 
ܤ௜,௧ଵ ൌ ܤ௜,௧଴ ൅ ܨ௜,௧ଵ െ ܦ௜,௧ଵ ൌ ܤ௜,௧଴ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݇௜,௧௘ ሻܨ௜,௧ଵ   
ܤ௜,௧ଶ ൌ ܤ௜,௧ଵ ൅ ܨ௜,௧ଶ െ ܦ௜,௧ଶ ൌ ܤ௜,௧ଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ݇௜,௧௘ ሻܨ௜,௧ଶ   
 
Let ݇௜,௧௘  represent the expected future dividend payout ratio with all available information 
set at time ݐ. Then changes in book value per share in equation are written as follows.  
 
∆ܤ௜,௧଴ ൌ ሺܤ௜,௧଴ െ ܤ௜,௧ିଵ଴ ሻ ൌ 0 
∆ܤ௜,௧ଵ ൌ ሺܤ௜,௧ଵ െ ܤ௜,௧ିଵଵ ሻ ൌ ∆ܤ௜,௧଴ ൅ ൫1 െ ݇௜,௧௘ ൯∆ܨ௜,௧ଵ ൌ ሺ1 െ ݇௜,௧௘ ሻ∆ܨ௜,௧ଵ  
∆ܤ௜,௧ଶ ൌ ሺܤ௧ଶ െ ܤ௧ିଵଶ ሻ ൌ ∆ܤ௜,௧ଵ ൅ ൫1 െ ݇௜,௧௘ ൯∆ܨ௜,௧ଶ ൌ ൫1 െ ݇௜,௧௘ ൯∆ܨ௜,௧ଵ ൅ ൫1 െ ݇௜,௧௘ ൯∆ܨ௜,௧ଶ  
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From the above relations, analyst value revision is derived as follows.   
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APPENDIX B. CORRELATIONS AMONG DEAL VARIABLES 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients among deal and accounting variables for 810 U.S. domestic control oriented takeover deals between 
public firms from 1980 to 2006 where the target is identified in SDC, CRSP, and I/B/E/S, and both acquirer and target are covered by COMPUSTAT ("ACCO"). 
'1980S(1990S)' represents deals offered during 1980s(1990s), 'SUCC' does successful, 'CASHO' does cash only payment, 'STOCKO' does stock only payment, 
'%STOCK' does % of stock as method of payment, 'HOSTL' does hostile, 'TENDR' does tender offer, 'COMPT' does 'competing', 'FOCUS' does focused deal, 
'SMD' does stock-market driven takeover defined as stock-only deals where bidder BEME is both less than the target BEME (relatively over-valued) and less 
than 33 percentile of all observations. 'BEME' is defined as book-to-market value of equity. Statistical significances are provided as ***(1%), **(5%) and 
*(10%).  
  1980S 1990S SUCC HOSTL CASHO STOCKO %STOCK TENDR COMPT FOCUS SMD 
        
1980S 1.00 -0.58 -0.04 0.17 0.10 -0.15 -0.18 0.26 0.05 -0.11 -0.14 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
1990S 1.00 0.01 -0.07 -0.22 0.27 0.30 -0.10 -0.06 0.08 0.23 
** *** *** *** *** * *** *** 
SUCC 1.00 -0.40 0.00 0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.36 0.04 0.05 
*** * *** 
HOSTL 1.00 0.17 -0.20 -0.24 0.25 0.28 -0.03 -0.10 
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
CASHO 1.00 -0.48 -0.88 0.46 0.08 -0.10 -0.26 
*** *** *** ** *** *** 
STOCKO 1.00 0.78 -0.35 -0.11 0.07 0.56 
*** *** *** ** *** 
%STOCK 1.00 -0.55 -0.14 0.09 0.43 
*** *** ** *** 
TENDER 1.00 0.12 -0.16 -0.21 
*** *** *** 
COMPT 1.00 0.04 -0.06 
* 
FOCUS 1.00 0.01 
SMD 1.00 
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APPENDIX C. CORRELATIONS AMONG ACCOUNTING VARIABLES 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients among accounting variables for 810 U.S. domestic control oriented takeover deals between public firms 
from 1980 to 2006 where the target is identified in SDC, CRSP, and I/B/E/S, and both acquirer and target are covered by COMPUSTAT ("ACCO"). 'LIQ' does 
liquidity, 'LEV' does leverage, 'OCF' does operating cash flow, 'TOBQ' does Tobin's-Q, 'BEME' does book-to-market value of equity, 'CAP' does logarithm of 
real market capitalization. Prefix 'B(T)' represents bidder (target). Statistical significances are provided as ***(1%), **(5%) and *(10%).  
  B_LIQ B_LEV B_OCF B_TOBQ B_BEME B_CAP T_LIQ T_LEV T_OCF T_TOBQ T_BEME T_CAP 
B_LIQ 1.00 -0.48 -0.37 0.44 -0.21 -0.12 0.50 -0.40 -0.18 0.22 -0.12 -0.16 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
B_LEV 1.00 0.03 -0.60 0.48 -0.12 -0.48 0.76 0.04 -0.35 0.28 0.05 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
B_OCF 1.00 -0.33 0.34 -0.05 -0.22 0.00 0.43 -0.17 0.16 0.06 
*** *** *** *** *** *** ** 
B_TOBQ 1.00 -0.49 0.21 0.45 -0.47 -0.21 0.45 -0.27 -0.01 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
B_BEME 1.00 -0.27 -0.27 0.34 0.21 -0.25 0.43 -0.09 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
B_CAP 1.00 0.12 -0.12 -0.15 0.20 -0.28 0.55 
*** *** *** *** *** *** 
T_LIQ 1.00 -0.58 -0.39 0.44 -0.27 -0.16 
*** *** *** *** *** 
T_LEV 1.00 0.09 -0.46 0.43 0.03 
*** *** *** 
T_OCF 1.00 -0.24 0.25 0.06 
*** *** ** 
T_TOBQ 1.00 -0.42 0.14 
*** *** 
T_BEME 1.00 -0.27 
*** 
T_CAP 1.00 
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APPENDIX D. CORRELATIONS AMONG DEAL AND ACCOUNTING VARIABLES 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients among deal and accounting variables for 810 U.S. domestic control oriented takeover deals between 
public firms from 1980 to 2006 where the target is identified in SDC, CRSP, and I/B/E/S, and both acquirer and target are covered by COMPUSTAT 
("ACCO"). '1980S(1990S)' represents deals offered during 1980s(1990s), 'SUCC' does successful, 'CASHO' does cash only payment, 'STOCKO' does stock only 
payment, '%STOCK' does % of stock as method of payment, 'HOSTL' does hostile, 'TENDR' does tender offer, 'COMPT' does 'competing', 'FOCUS' does 
focused deal, 'SMD' does stock-market driven takeover defined as stock-only deals where bidder BEME is both less than the target BEME (relatively over-
valued) and less than 33 percentile of all observations, 'LIQ' does liquidity, 'LEV' does leverage, 'OCF' does operating cash flow, 'TOBQ' does Tobin's-Q, 
'BEME' does book-to-market value of equity, 'CAP' does logarithm of real market capitalization. Prefix 'B(T)' represents bidder (target). Statistical 
significances are provided as ***(1%), **(5%) and *(10%).  
  1980S 1990S SUCC HOSTL CASHO STOCKO %STOCK TENDR COMPT FOCUS SMD 
B_LIQ -0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.14 0.10 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.29 
** *** *** *** 
B_LEV 0.07 -0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.02 -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.05 -0.39 
** ** ** *** 
B_OCF 0.28 -0.21 -0.01 0.10 0.16 -0.32 -0.30 0.27 0.16 -0.03 -0.29 
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
B_TOBQ -0.16 0.19 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 0.21 0.19 -0.07 -0.09 0.02 0.51 
*** *** ** ** *** *** ** ** *** 
B_BEME 0.26 -0.16 -0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.18 -0.14 0.11 0.09 -0.01 -0.39 
*** *** ** *** *** *** *** *** 
B_CAP -0.16 0.00 0.25 -0.13 0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 0.15 
*** *** *** ** * *** 
T_LIQ -0.10 0.00 0.06 -0.11 0.01 0.17 0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.06 0.29 
*** * *** *** *** * ** *** 
T_LEV 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.03 -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.14 -0.35 
*** *** *** 
T_OCF 0.18 -0.11 -0.14 0.15 0.08 -0.22 -0.18 0.17 0.17 -0.09 -0.18 
*** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
T_TOBQ -0.09 0.06 0.04 -0.07 -0.09 0.20 0.17 -0.09 -0.06 -0.02 0.33 
** * * *** *** *** ** * *** 
T_BEME 0.11 -0.01 -0.10 0.11 0.11 -0.15 -0.16 0.13 0.10 0.02 -0.21 
*** * *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
T_CAP -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 0.10 -0.14 0.01 0.08 -0.08 0.12 0.11 0.03 
  ** **   *** ***   ** ** *** ***   
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APPENDIX E. FAILED DEALS BY CAR MODELS AND SUBGROUP DEFINITIONS 
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(5) Remain-independent deals: Fama-French 4 factor model
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APPENDIX F. DYNAMICS IN THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 
 
0    t    T 
              
 Past (stand-alone) operation Future (post-takeover) operation   
      ( Valuation )   (Negotiation)        
Contract   Offer (+)  Closing  Retire 
           
              
  Operation (OCF)   Synergy gain   Firm information   Success: combined  
  Technology utilized   Operating   Bidder   Restructuring  
  Industry/market structure   Financial (leverage, tax)   Target   Becoming target  
  Government regulation      Competing bidders   Disciplining CEO  
     Restructuring gain        
  Investment (CAPEX)   Management gain   Deal information   Failure: bidder  
  PPE & R&D      Premium   Seeking another target  
  Security investment   Valuation gain   Tender offer vs merger   Becoming target  
     Portfolio gain (+/-)   Cash vs. Stock   Disciplining CEO  
  Finance   Stock payment gain   Diversification vs. focused     
  Taxation      Friendly vs. hostile   Failure: target  
  Internal fund (FCF)   Managerial gain   Defensive tactics   Facing subsequent offer  
  Debt financing (interest)   Agency cost      Self-restructuring  
  Equity financing (dividend)   Hubris   Executive information   Disciplining CEO  
        Personal characteristics     
  Corporate governance   Takeover cost   Side payment arrangement     
  Compensation scheme   Physical cost   Change in equity holdings     
  Board of directors   Breaking entrenchemnt        
  Anti-takeover entrenchment           
          
  
This figure shows the information flow during the corporate takeover process. Factors which is suggested as a driving force of merger wave is displayed in the 
first columns of stand-alone period. Neoclassical theory argues that the industry-wide shock on forein competition, energy price, technology shock such as 
financial innovation derives merger wave. Meanwhile, the behavioral theory argues that the over-valued stock market may derive the 1990s merger wave.  
'Managerial incentive' such as free cash flow, corporate governance system, and executive compensation scheme, may be determined endogenously as a result of 
the optimal control mechanism or another kind of agency cost by the existing CEO. However I assume these variables are exogenously given for the simplicity of 
our discussion in this paper. I also assume that there is an industry-wide spill over effect, denoted as '(+)' when the takeover offer is announced. 
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APPENDIX G. DERIVATION OF TAKEOVER GAINS 
 
Let the size of the agency gain is a function of the remaining tenure as a CEO. Then this can 
be written as  ߟ ൌ ߟሺܶ െ ݐሻ, ݀ఎ݀ሺܶെݐሻ ൐ 0. Finally, relative gains from takeover to the internal 
investment ሺΔΠ௜௧௝ െ ΔΠ௜௧௫ ሻ can be expressed as follows.  
  
Π௜௧௝ െ Π௜௧௫  ൌ ߤ݇݅0ሼ൫V௜௧௝ െ C௜௧௝ െ ܲ݅0൯ െ ሺV௜௧௫ െ C௜௧௫ െ ܲ݅0ሻሽ ൅ ߶݅ߟሺA௜௧௝ െ A௜௧௫ ሻ 
 ൌ ߤ݇௜଴ሺV݅ݐ݆ െ V݅ݐݔሻ ൅ ߶௜ߟሺA݅ݐ݆ െ A݅ݐݔ ሻ 
  
V௜௧௝ െ V௜௧௫  ൌ 1൫1൅ߢ݆൯ ܨ൫݇݅ݐ, ݍ݅ݐ൯ߠ݅ݐ ൅
ߢ݆
ሺ1൅ߢ݆ሻ ൛ܨ൫݆݇ݐ, ݍ݅ݐ൯ߠ݆ݐൟ ൅ ݏ݅ݐ
݆   
 െܨሺ݇௜௧ ൅ ݔ௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻ ߠ௜௧  
 ൌ ݏ௜௧௝ ൅ ఑
ೕ
ሺଵା఑ೕሻ ൛ܨ൫ ௝݇௧, ݍ௝௧൯ߠ௝௧ െ ܨሺ݇௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻߠ௜௧ൟ  
     ൅ ఑ೕሺଵା఑ೕሻ ܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ௝ܽ௧ െ ௝ܽ௧൯ െ ߠ௜௧ሼܨሺ݇௜௧ ൅ ݔ௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻ െ ܨሺ݇௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻሽ 
 ൎ ݏ௜௧௝ ൅ ఑
ೕ
ሺଵା఑ೕሻ ൛ܨ൫ ௝݇௧, ݍ௝௧൯ߠ௝௧ െ ܨሺ݇௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻߠ௜௧ ൅ ܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ௝ܽ௧ െ ܽ௜௧൯ߠ௝௧ൟ  
  
A௜௧௝ െ A௜௧௫  ൌ ሼ݇݅ݐܩሺ݇݅ݐ, ܽ݅ሻߠ݅ݐ ൅ ݆݇ݐ ܩ൫݆݇ݐ, ܽ݅൯ߠ݆ݐ െ ሺ݇݅ݐ ൅ ݔ݅ݐሻܩሺ݇݅ݐ ൅ ݔ݅ݐ, ܽ݅ሻ ߠ݅ݐሽ 
  
 Since ݔ௜௧כ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߱ሻ ௝݇௧, 
 =  ݇݅ݐߠ݅ݐሾܩሺ݇݅ݐ, ܽ݅ሻ െ ܩሺ݇݅ݐ ൅ ݔ݅ݐ, ܽ݅ሻሿ 
 ൅ ሺ1 െ ߱ሻ ௝݇௧ൣܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ܽ௜൯ߠ௝௧ െ ܩሺ݇௜௧ ൅ ݔ௜௧, ܽ௜ሻ ߠ௜௧൧ 
 ൅ ߱ ௝݇௧ܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ܽ௜൯ߠ௝௧ 
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 ൎ ݔ݅ݐ ቂܩ൫݆݇ݐ, ܽ݅൯ሺߠ݆ݐ െ ߠ݅ݐሻቃ ൅ ݆߱݇ݐܩ൫݆݇ݐ, ܽ݅൯ߠ݆ݐ  
  
Π௜௧௝ െ Π௜௧௫  ൎ ܻܵܰ ൅ ܸܣܮ ൅ ܫܰܨ ൅ ܣܩܥ
  
 ܻܵܰ ൌ ߤ݇௜଴ݏ௜௧௝  
 ܸܣܮ ൌ ఓ௞೔బ఑ೕሺଵା఑ೕሻ ൛ܨ൫ ௝݇௧, ݍ௝௧൯ߠ௝௧ െ ܨሺ݇௜௧, ݍ௜௧ሻߠ௜௧ൟ  
 ܫܰܨ ൌ ఓ௞೔బ఑ೕሺଵା఑ೕሻ ܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ௝ܽ௧ െ ܽ௜௧൯ߠ௝௧  
 ܣܩܥ ൌ ߶௜ߟ൛ݔ௜௧כ ൣܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ܽ௜൯ሺߠ௝௧ െ ߠ௜௧ሻ൧ ൅ ߱ ௝݇௧ܩ൫ ௝݇௧, ܽ௜൯ߠ௝௧ ൟ  
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APPENDIX H. DERIVATION OF THE TAKEOVER CONSTRAINT 
 
The rational agent will make the restructuring gain from external hostile takeover, where 
cash offer is assumed, be zero in order to evade the disciplinary tender offer. Since this 
takeover is disciplinary one, other gains are assumed to be zero. That is, ∆V௜௧௝ ൌ 0 , 
ݓ݄݁ݎ݁ ߠ෡݅ݐ ൌ 0, ߠ݆ݐ ൌ 1,   ݏ݅ݐ݆ ൌ 0, ߱ ൌ 0. Since the management labor market is assumed 
sufficiently efficient, or the management entrenchment scheme is various across firm, 
expected minimum operational slack by other management team is zero. 
 
The agent will choose ௝ܽ௧כ  such that ∆V௜௧௝ ൫݆ܽݐכ ൯ ൌ 0 where ߠ෡݅ݐ ൌ 0, ߠ݆ݐ ൌ 1,   ݏ݅ݐ݆ ൌ 0, ߱ ൌ 0. 
∆V௜௧௝ ൌ 1൫1൅ߢ݆൯ ݌൫݇݅ݐ, ݍ݅ݐ൯ߠ෡݅ݐ ൅
ߢ݆
ሺ1൅ߢ݆ሻ ൛݌൫݆݇ݐ, ݍ݅ݐ൯ߠ෡݆ݐ ൅ ݃൫݆݇ݐ, ݆ܽݐ െ ܯ݅݊ሼܽ݅ݐሽ൯ߠ݆ݐ െ ߳݅ݐ ൟ ൅ ݏ݅ݐ
݆   
֞ ݃൫ ௝݇௧, ௝ܽ௧ െ ܯ݅݊ሼܽ௜௧ሽ൯ െ ߳௜௧ ൌ 0  
֞ ݃൫ ௝݇௧, ௝ܽ௧ െ ܯ݅݊ሼܽ௜௧ሽ൯ ൌ ߳௜௧  
ሺ ܯ݅݊ሼܽ௜௧ሽ ൌ 0 ) 
֜ Agent will choose ௝ܽ௧כ  such that ݃൫ ௝݇௧, ௝ܽ௧൯ ൌ ߳௜௧ . 
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